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Abstract 
This dissertation argues that certain eighteenth-century female bildungsromans 
reproduce the logic of the rituals of torture and confession that underwrote the 
seventeenth-century witch-hunts and witchcraft trials in the western world. However, 
these eighteenth-century novels and often the critics who have written about them 
misrecognize the torture and confession that their narratives reproduce. This 
misrecognition takes three forms: (1) female empowerment is misrecognized as female 
transgression (2) the heroine’s “torture” is misrecognized as the obstacles she encounters 
during her maturation process, and (3) the heroine’s “confession” is misrecognized as her 
achievement of enlightened self-awareness. The direction of these novels is that of 
regression. Each novel’s logic, which I refer to as “the logic of torture and confession,” 
tortures its initially empowered heroine through a repetition of violence, which escalates 
in intensity as the novel progresses until she “confesses” her defect. Moreover, the logic 
of torture and confession produces its heroine’s female flaw as “inherent” even as it 
insists that this flaw has always been latently present. Consequently, the heroines in these 
novels do not become fully-realized and empowered women as the bildungsroman genre 
promises; instead they unwittingly follow a regressive course to collude in their own 
subjugation.  
This dissertation draws on Michel Foucault’s theory of disciplinary power to 
demonstrate how the seventeenth-century patriarchal discourse that produced the 
diabolical witch’s inherently flawed hypersexual body transformed itself into an 
immaterial, diffused, less visible form of patriarchal power that I argue made use of the 
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eighteenth-century female bildungsroman to continue its subjugation of women. The 
asymmetry of power that organizes these female bildungsromans is consistently one of 
masculine disembodied power that functions imperceptibly to embody women as 
inherently flawed. This dissertation aims to expose the several forms of misrecognition 
that occur in these novels so it will enable readers to more readily grasp how patriarchy 
must endlessly reaffirm and reinscribe its domination of women through insidious 
strategies that, I argue, are still evident in contemporary narratives. 
 3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Dark Shadow of Female Enlightenment: 
Torture, Confession, and the Production of Truth 
 
“Since the Middle Ages, torture has accompanied [confession] like a shadow, and 
supported it when it could go no further: the dark twins.” 
 – Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 
 
“Torture is conquest through irresistible force. It is to destroy opposition through 
causing it to destroy itself: in despair, in self-hatred for its own vulnerability, impotence. 
It is to defile, degrade, overwhelm with shame, to ravage.” 
 – Kate Millett, The Politics of Cruelty 
 
 
 
 
At a witchcraft trial in 1645 Suffolk County England, Elisabeth Warne “confessed 
that pride and lustfullness had brought her to this [point] and desired she might be walked 
apace for she had the devil within her” (qtd. in Jackson 80). A little over a century later, 
the eponymous heroine of Samuel Richardson’s novel Clarissa (1747-48) declares: “And 
now, being led to account for the cause of my temporary calamities, find I had a secret 
pride to be punished for, which I had not fathomed: and it was necessary perhaps that 
some sore and terrible misfortunes should befall me in order to mortify my pride and my 
vanity” (1375). History and context clearly distinguish Elisabeth Warne’s confession 
from Clarissa’s assertion of self realization. Warne’s confession, like the majority of 
confessions produced during the witch-hunts of the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, 
was most likely coerced through torture1 by Inquisitorial authorities. Consequently, her 
speech act is one of disempowerment. If she had any agency at all before her confession, 
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it is now attributed to the Devil. In contrast, Clarissa’s statement is one of empowerment:  
the speaking subject offers a statement of self-knowledge brought about by self-reflection 
and only after enduring “terrible misfortunes.” Indeed, life’s challenges “led” Clarissa to 
reflect on her ‘self’ and “account” for her errors. Clarissa’s statement is one of self-
enlightenment.  
There happens to be, however, striking similarities between these two women’s 
speech acts. For example, both women view “pride” as the source of their present 
suffering; both feel that they deserve(d) punishment for it; and both have or had their 
bodies possessed by someone (Warne: “devil within”) or something (Clarissa: “secret 
pride”) that is outside their control and beyond their awareness. Also, being “walked 
apace” will exorcise Elisabeth of “the devil within her” while comparably, “sore” and 
“terrible misfortunes” have “mortif[ied]” Clarissa’s “secret pride.” Her use of words such 
as “sore,” “terrible,” and “mortify” connote bodily pain.2 The phrase “terrible 
misfortunes” also suggests a series of pain-causing events that exceed the occasional 
setbacks that routine life presents; even more significantly, Clarissa implies that the 
repetition of pain was “necessary” in bringing her “secret pride” to her consciousness. 
However, while Clarissa sees her suffering as a consequence of her own “pride,” it is 
Lovelace who orchestrates most of Clarissa’s “misfortunes.” Lovelace’s manipulation of 
Clarissa’s experiences begs the following question:  Does masculine authority (via 
Lovelace) function similarly to the witch-hunt’s Inquisitorial authority? To state the 
question more explicitly, has patriarchal power “tortured” Clarissa into “confessing” her 
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“secret pride” just as the Inquisitorial authorities coerced or tortured Warne into her 
confession?  
One of this dissertation’s major premises is that the eighteenth-century female 
bildungsroman misrecognizes the rituals of torture and confession that its narrative 
involves. Indeed, the three female bildungsromans that this dissertation examines, 
namely, Mary Davys’s The Reform’d Coquet; or, The Memoirs of Amoranda (1724), 
Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (published in 1813; written in 1797), and Charles 
Brockden Brown’s Wieland, Or, the Transformation: An American Tale (1798), only 
recognize their respective heroine’s alleged flaw and the subsequent “cure” of her flaw 
by the narrative’s end. This misrecognition takes three forms (1) female empowerment is 
misrecognized as female transgression, i.e. the heroine’s “flaw” (2) the heroine’s repeated 
and gradually intensified “torture” is misrecognized as the normal obstacles of the 
maturation process, and (3) the heroine’s “confession” is misrecognized as her 
achievement of enlightened self-awareness or self-knowledge . Not only do these novels 
participate in misrecognition, but I also argue that their respective authors, often the 
critics who have written about them, and sometimes even their readers misrecognize the 
torture and confession that their narratives communicate. 
The torture and confession that organizes these three novels is a disturbing 
reproduction of the rituals of torture and confession that underwrote the seventeenth-
century witchcraft accusations and trials of England, Europe, and America. Seventeenth 
century Catholic and Protestant religious discourse fostered the belief that women were 
more susceptible to the Devil’s temptations because of their naturally defective and 
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hyper-sexualized bodies. The authors of the infamous Malleus Malificarum (“The 
Hammer of Witches”) set a standard for misogyny in the late fifteenth century, for 
example, in their attempt to account for the greater number of female witches by 
referencing Genesis. As inheritors of Eve’s legacy, women are by their very nature 
“defective,” because they were formed from Adam’s “bent rib” (Institoris 44). Women’s 
“bent” nature makes them “more carnal”—“an imperfect animal” (Institoris 44).  What 
these church sanctioned witch-hunts misrecognized, however, is that the accused woman, 
that is to say, the potentially threatening powerful female who practiced maleficium 
(traditional malevolent witchcraft in which women practiced mischief and magic that 
operated outside of Christianity and the belief in the Devil), was transformed through 
Inquisitorial torture into confessing herself a “diabolical witch.” Evident here is that 
judicial torture is not simply about acquiring evidence as stipulated by the Roman law of 
proof. As Brian P. Levack relates, what started out as accusations of maleficium 
culminated with a confession of diabolic witchcraft only after the use of torture 
techniques described above. Thus Levack asserts that “torture in a certain sense ‘created’ 
witchcraft, or at least created diabolical witchcraft” (13). Richard Godbeer supports 
Levack’s assertion, stating that “[t]he courts took suspects and witnesses who saw 
witchcraft in terms of maleficium rather than diabolical compact and then used torture to 
extract the kind of evidence that would justify conviction on theological terms” (156-7). 
Godbeer also points out that through both “coercive techniques and the public reading of 
forced confessions, the authorities disseminated their own [diabolical] view of 
witchcraft” (157). What should strike us here are the apparent connections between 
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torture, the body, and language (in the form of the confession and the public disclosure of 
it), and the masculine construction of a reality in which women are innately flawed. 
These same relations are evident in the female coming-of-age novels I discuss in this 
dissertation. 
Torture and confession, moreover, produced more than diabolical witchcraft:  
they also created the “diabolical witch.” Louise Jackson points out that “once a woman 
was labeled a ‘witch’, with her original experiences distorted and set within this context, 
this was what she became. Just as she had (with a strong input from others) constructed 
what became a written testimony, that text also constructed her, both in terms of her 
identity within the community and of self-identity” (70). Nicholas P. Spanos expands 
further on Jackson’s idea with the concept of “selective reconstruction.”  He explains that 
the “confessing witch reviewed her past experiences for remembrances that converged 
with her new identity . . . [that she] reconstructed her biography to make it consistent 
with her self- perception of being a witch” (431). This concept of “selective 
reconstruction,” I argue, occurs most apparently in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice 
and Brown’s Wieland.  
The accused woman’s confession also unwittingly acknowledged a particular type 
of flawed body—the witch’s hypersexualized body. While the “truth” of the witch’s body 
was actually produced through torture and confession, Church authorities mitigated their 
own cruelty and culpability by (dis)covering that the “witch’s body” was, in fact, already 
there—as an always already “diseased” female body, that is, as a less reasonable and 
inherently oversexed body—a body that is not only susceptible to entering into a pact 
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with the Devil but also one that cannot restrain its own sexuality and easily succumbs to 
the temptation of pursuing a sexual liaison with the Devil or His minions. Furthermore, 
the accused “witch’s” coerced confession suggests that she was not aware of her own 
flawed body until the moment of confession. If she was, in fact, a witch who practiced 
her craft outside of Christianity proper (traditional pagan maleficium), her forced 
“confession” suggests that she was not aware of the telltale satanic marks her body 
possessed, such as the presence of paps, located on the most inaccessible places of her 
body. Indeed, this same logic, in which the female does not know her own body until the 
point of confession and only after a lengthy ritual of coercion, reappears in the 
eighteenth-century novels that this dissertation examines. 
Besides being burned or hanged, confessed witches also had their property 
confiscated—typical of the punishments for heresy as Henry Charles Lea details it in A 
History of the Inquisition (1922). More recently, however, certain witchcraft historians 
have argued that female economic independence was indeed the motive of many 
witchcraft accusations. And these women were not poor, old village “hags” who 
practiced pagan rites. In The Devil in the Shape of a Woman: Witchcraft in Colonial New 
England” (1987), Carol F. Karlsen argues that “anxieties about [non-male] inheritance 
lay at the heart of most witchcraft accusations” in colonial New England (84). Karlsen 
further states that “women [heiresses] who stood to benefit economically also assumed a 
position of unusual vulnerability. They, and in many instances, their daughters, became 
prime targets for witchcraft accusations” (83-4). These “witches” were often completely 
“dispossessed” of their property by male authorities, as their financial security was a 
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direct threat to patriarchal inheritance customs (Karlsen 109). Indeed, the heroines 
Amoranda in The Reform’d Coquet and Clara in Wieland are both heiresses who, similar 
to these accused witches, are dispossessed of their property after they are coerced to 
“confess” their flaws.  
Why is it that eighteenth-century and modern readers are unable to recognize that 
witch-hunt logic reproduces itself in The Reform’d Coquet, Pride and Prejudice, and 
Wieland? How does the ritual of torture and confession alter so that we are unaware of its 
reproduction in these novels? Power’s diffusion through institutionalization during the 
course of the eighteenth century necessitated the transformation of the church’s 
centralized power. Indeed, power’s decentralization during this century renders the 
church’s production of the witch’s flawed body through torture and confession an 
unviable strategy. Thus, a new one is required. 
 Michel Foucault’s concepts of disciplinary power and confessional discourse 
form the overarching theoretical basis for my dissertation’s argument. Under the regime 
of disciplinary power, in which power is decentralized, Foucault claims that “we no 
longer perceive [confession] as the effect of power that constrains us; on the contrary, it 
seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, ‘demands’ only to surface” (The 
History of Sexuality 60). However, as Foucault makes very clear, “truth” is not liberating; 
“its production is thoroughly imbued with relations of power” (The History of Sexuality 
60). Confession, as Foucault sees it, is “one of the main rituals we rely on for the 
production of truth” (The History of Sexuality 58). During the course of the eighteenth 
century, power’s gradual diffusion amongst emerging disciplinary institutions (schools, 
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prisons, hospitals, the insane asylum), also enables the “inducement to speak” to reinvent 
itself and reappear as the discourses of “the examination,” “the personal history,” “the 
interrogation,” “the exacting questionnaire,” etc. (Foucault The History of Sexuality 65).  
Foucault also claims that literature itself changes under disciplinary power; he claims it is 
now “ordered according to the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself . . . a 
truth which the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering mirage” (The 
History of Sexuality 59). The emerging genre of what would eventually be termed the 
bildungsroman during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century seems ideally 
suited to serve as one of the confessional discourses emerging under the evolving 
disciplinary regime. In other words, the female bildungsroman as a literary form was 
taking shape at the same point in history when disciplinary power itself was emerging.3 
Moreover, as Foucault emphasizes, disciplinary power functions positively; it is not built 
on exclusion as in the case of the witch-hunts, but on inclusion. The basis of the 
eighteenth century female bildungsroman is positive individual development, in which 
literary authors experimented with the then emerging Lockean philosophy of self-
formation; young women have an opportunity to shape their own lives.  The form of 
disciplinary power that I claim insinuates itself into the then emerging eighteenth-century 
female bildungsroman is one that reproduces the same masculine domination and 
misogynistic viewpoint of women that was evident in the seventeenth-century witch-
hunts, except it much less visible to the point where it is misrecognized not only by the 
novels’ authors but also by their readers then and now. Its tactics of domination are 
diffused throughout each of the three novels I examine in this dissertation. The 
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patriarchal power that produced the diabolical, oversexed witch during the seventeenth 
century through the ritual of torture and confession did not somehow purge itself of its 
misogynistic viewpoint in its evolution into a much less visible and dispersed form of 
power. In this dissertation, then, I primarily use the term “patriarchal power” to 
specifically identify the type of disciplinary power I claim makes use of the female 
bildungsromans of The Reform’d Coquet, Pride and Prejudice, and Wieland.  
Indeed, this dissertation’s primary argument is that the eighteenth-century female 
bildungsroman sometimes discursively reproduces the rituals of torture and confession.4 
What becomes evident is that an asymmetrical power relation organizes these novels, in 
which patriarchal power subjugates each heroine through a series of escalating and 
sometimes violent bodily disturbance (i.e. the logic of torture). The heroine’s body is 
repeatedly threatened, endangered, emotionally distressed, shocked, or made vulnerable 
until she confesses her inherent flaw—what I refer to in this dissertation as “the logic of 
torture and confession.” Because patriarchal power functions in each of these novels as a 
nameless and faceless immaterial form of power—“the silence of regulation” as Foucault 
terms it—their respective narratives present themselves only as a fulfillment of the 
expectations that the bildungsroman genre requires. Moreover, this subtle, immaterial 
form of power functions through the various characters (male and female), events, 
dialogue, and/or one or more traditional literary techniques. To clarify, I am not 
suggesting that patriarchal power consciously or deliberately “tortures” these heroines 
into confessing. And, I am not saying that only the male characters, because they are 
male, are necessarily the agents through which patriarchal power functions. Rather, to use 
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Foucault’s terminology, this violence functions as a “strategy without a subject”—just 
one of an infinite number of “support mechanisms” that operates unobtrusively and 
imperceptibly (what Pierre Bourdieu refers to as “symbolic violence”), because it does its 
subjugating work (Foucault would also say its resisting work) at the “micro” level or at 
the level of the day to day habits and exchanges between ordinary people. Indeed, while 
the perpetrators of the violence in The Reform’d Coquet and Wieland are primarily male 
characters, this does not, in any way, suggest that women don’t play a role in the 
heroines’ domination or that men are not the victims of subjugation. As products of the 
same culture and the masculine ideology it espouses, both men and women collude in 
masculine domination. Both are continually subjected to the forces of power that enable 
them to reproduce or resist patriarchal culture. In The Reform’d Coquet, for example, 
Amoranda’s childhood friend Arentia works alongside Biranthus to discipline Amoranda 
through violence. One may argue that Davys herself unwittingly colludes in Amoranda’s 
subjugation, since it is she who draws on discourses of violence in her novel to subjugate 
its heroine. In Pride and Prejudice, I argue that Wickham resists Darcy’s dominant 
worldview and that he, along with Elizabeth Bennet, is also a victim of patriarchal 
power’s discipline. The matter, in other words, cannot be reduced to biological sexual 
categories in terms of how patriarchal power operates in these novels, since this strategy 
without a subject is about power acting through various discourses that may or may not 
have anything to do with the characters’ gender. 
Furthermore, this asymmetrical power relation, in which patriarchal power 
subjugates the heroine, is consistently one of immaterial power and embodied objectivity. 
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To bring this asymmetrical relation of power out of hiding for readers, I draw on Elaine 
Scarry’s extraordinary and provocative book on political torture entitled, The Body in 
Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985); Doug Liman’s insightful article 
on political shaming entitled, “The Shame of Abu Ghraib” (2008); and Foucault’s 
Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973-1974 (2006), in which he 
elaborates on how disciplinary power operates in the asylum. Indeed, both Scarry’s 
concept of political torture and Liman’s theory of political shaming depict a 
dissymmetrical relationship between disembodied power (the torturer) and embodied 
victimization (the individual tortured/shamed) that reproduces what is at the basis of 
Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power, which, he claims, acts invisibly (immaterially) 
on the bodies of an institution’s individuals. Each of these works, therefore, makes an 
interconnection amongst the body, torture, confession, and truth-production by power.5
Moreover, while torture “induces [each heroine] to speak” or “confess” her 
peculiarly female flaw or flaws, it also serves to verify the “truth” her confession 
professes. Thus the “obstacles and resistances” (i.e., the “torture”) that the heroine must 
face and overcome before she speaks her “truth” also function after her confession to 
validate it as “truth” (The History of Sexuality 62). Despite Clarissa’s eventual death, for 
example, she has survived “terrible misfortunes,” which she believes were “necessary” to 
at last speak the discovery of her “secret pride.” Truth, as something produced, requires 
labor, and this labor bears witness to the “truth” that the individual seems to legitimize. 
 
This dissertation makes visible this heretofore soft (because invisible) cruelty. And, as I 
argue in the Epilogue, this interconnection persists in contemporary narratives.  
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The alleged enlightenment that the heroine’s confession seems to finally bring authorizes 
the necessity of the suffering that preceded it, obscuring the often violent coercion that 
produced the heroine’s confessional moment. 
Feminist criticism of both eighteenth and nineteenth century female 
bildungsromans attempts to recuperate this genre from earlier conservative scholarship 
by discovering, emphasizing, and celebrating moments of female empowerment. These 
critical views, moreover, interpret within the boundaries and limitations that the 
bildungsroman genre itself sets. Overall, this criticism positions coming-of-age heroines 
less as passive victims than as active participants in resistance to an oppressive 
patriarchy. One feminist recuperative approach, for example, draws on psychoanalytic 
theory to celebrate a “more conflicted” and “disruptive” female developmental process 
that differs from the orderly and smooth course of the paradigmatic male maturation 
experience. Feminists utilizing this theory tend to embrace texts that foreground an 
“independent feminine other” typically repressed by the novel’s dominant masculine 
voice. They also privilege female intimacy, which originates in the “pre-Oedipal, mother-
infant relationship” (9-11; 7) and which, according to them, often results in what is 
termed a “submerged plot, which encodes rebellion” to the text’s heterosexist ideology 
(12). This psychoanalytic critical perspective even welcomes death in certain female 
coming-of-age novels, seeing it not as a mark of failure but rather as a refusal “to accept 
an adulthood that denies profound convictions and desires” (11).6 Another feminist 
recuperative approach enthusiastically traces the heroine’s progressive and steady course 
to rational adulthood or what some critics call her “trajectory of ascent” from “nothing” 
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to “all”; it tends to highlight the heroine’s “development of feminine self-sufficiency” 
and her gradual education to wise decision-making about marriage and partner choice.7 
Finally, similar to the psychoanalytic model and its rebellious “submerged plot,” other 
female bildungsroman critical models frequently discover a “sub-text,” a “subversive 
narrative middle,” a “double-sided” narrative, or a variety of “counternarratives” whose 
“oppositional impulses” reveal revolutionary and liberating possibilities that sometimes 
pleasurably exceed the conservative logic of the novel’s ending.8
My dissertation’s argument represents a significant departure from other studies 
and critical views of female coming-of-age novels. Its argument is not one whose 
intention is to foreground a resistance to generic expectations or reveals a “repressed” 
alternative reading; neither is it one that exposes a “subtext” that reads against the grain 
of progressive female development; it also does not argue that the novels in question 
amount to “anti-bildungsromans.” Indeed, neither do I claim that these novels enclose 
within their respective narratives the logic of torture and confession. What I do argue is 
that these three novels discursively reproduce the rituals of torture and confession and 
therefore constitute an entirely different discursive field that is misrecognized as a female 
bildungsroman. Moreover, this dissertation challenges feminist recuperative readings that 
claim to liberate or empower women. These critical views reify patriarchy’s power by 
actively and artificially transforming these novels into celebrations of female 
empowerment that ultimately obscure patriarchy’s oppressive strategies. Accordingly, 
this dissertation’s aim is the exposure of this discursive tactic that will enable readers to 
more readily grasp how patriarchy must endlessly reaffirm and reinscribe its power 
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through insidious strategies—strategies of violence against women—a “microphysics” of 
power, to use Foucault’s term— that exert themselves measurably (not excessively as in 
the case of the witch-hunts) and almost entirely on the symbolic level (in contrast to a 
public display of power) so they tend to escape the critical awareness of most readers. 
This dissertation treats the subject of torture seriously in its discussion of its functioning 
in eighteenth-century literature. It “place[s]” torture “in a conversation by the side of 
other subjects,” as Elaine Scarry justifies in The Body in Pain, since the risk of not doing 
so, as she also claims, “increases our vulnerability to power” (60).  
Besides the three forms of misrecognition that I claim occur at the plot level, what 
all three novels further misrecognize is that power produces these heroines diseased 
female bodies through the logic of torture and confession, even as it insists it only 
discovers that these heroines’ flawed bodies are always already there. Each heroine’s 
“confession” inadvertently attests to this “truth.” Each heroine, it seems, like the 
seventeenth-century accused witches, does not know her own body until the instant of her 
confession (for example, Clarissa’s body contained a “secret pride . . . which [she] had 
not fathomed”). The logic of torture and confession states that her body contains the 
“truth,” but she does not have access to it prior to the program of “torture” that the 
novel’s logic initiates almost immediately in the plotline. Indeed, this logic resembles 
how Inquisitorial power produced the “diabolical” witch, even as it exposed the fact that 
the accused woman’s body was already flawed because of its hypersexuality. What this 
means is that the heroine’s sudden “discovery” of, or flash of insight about, her “flaw,” 
attested to by her “confession,” i.e., what the text wants us to read as her moment of self-
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realization, totally obscures the fact that power produced her “flawed” body through a 
program of torture. This explains why readers believe Elizabeth Bennet when she 
declares, “‘Till this moment, I never knew myself.’” We do not recognize that patriarchal 
power “tortured” her into this “confession.” 
The Reform’d Coquet, Pride and Prejudice, and Wieland all function to preserve 
the unequal relation of power, in which patriarchal power in these novels is represented 
as free from embodiment while Amoranda, Elizabeth Bennet, and Clara Wieland are 
gradually “tortured” into helpless corporeality that occurs at the point of their respective 
“confessions.” Similar to Foucault’s “delinquent,” the female heroine has an “affinity” to 
her “crime” because, as these particular novels contend, she is biologically female and so 
susceptible to various traits—the criminal exists before the crime, as Foucault contends 
(Discipline & Punish 252). The genre of the female bildungsroman constitutes, similar to 
the life examination of Foucault’s delinquent or mad individual, the heroine’s “life 
history.” This genre provides each heroine’s “psychological causality” as it were, which 
has additional benefits for power, since it ensures the delinquent/heroine bears the sole 
responsibility for her punishment.  
Disciplinary power also organizes time, which “assures its control and guarantees 
its use” (Foucault Discipline & Punish 160). This “segmentation” and “seriation” of an 
individual’s activities for the purposes of observation and quick intervention and 
correction by power makes the female bildungsroman genre ideal for the functioning of 
disciplinary power. It focuses on a particular unit of time in a young women’s life—what 
society deems the most precarious and unstable time in her life:  the courtship phase—
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and offers it up for intense scrutiny. The novel itself and the form of the bildungsroman 
(both also emerging at this time) provide a perfect “analytical space” for such scrutiny. 
The female bildungsroman generates the individual female (as inherently flawed as I 
argue) even as it has its readers (mis)recognize that the heroine has the agency to self-
create, to improve, and to reform. Indeed, each female bildungsroman that this 
dissertation examines functions as a Panoptic “laboratory,” which, as Foucault claims, is 
a way for power to “test” what strategies work best for keeping women in, or getting 
women to take, their proper subjugated place (Discipline & Punish 203-4). Indeed, the 
three novels that this dissertation examines serve as “case studies.” 
The female bildungsroman as a “case study” explains the “outbreak” of “dis-
eased” heroines during the eighteenth century, including “the coquet,” the “jilt,” the 
“female quixote,” the “vain” woman, and the “prideful” woman, etc. These novels are, as 
Foucault explains, “part of [disciplinary power’s] very functioning” (Discipline & Punish 
234). Indeed, these three novels are not about “curing” or eliminating these heroines’ 
offenses, but are instead about “distinguishing” their offenses; patriarchy profits by 
rendering these women’s “crimes” visible, and it uses them as a rationale to continue to 
subjugate and manage women. It epitomizes Foucault’s assertion that surveillance is the 
subjection of bodies through individualization and that “visibility is a trap” (Discipline & 
Punish 200). While some critics may view as empowering to women the fact that novels 
about women and even by women reached immense popularity in the eighteenth century, 
it is imperative we question whether or not this is authentic empowerment or if it simply 
reveals that patriarchy, under the newly evolving regime of disciplinary power, is 
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exerting itself to subjugate women through intensified scrutiny and has appropriated the 
bildungsroman genre in which to do its work. 
Chapter 1 fully develops and discloses the logic of torture and confession in Mary 
Davys’s The Reform’d Coquet; or, The Memoirs of Amoranda (1724). The analysis of 
this early eighteenth-century female bildungsroman functions as a standard against which 
to compare the novels examined in the next two chapters, respectively, Jane Austen’s 
Pride and Prejudice (published in 1813; written in 1797) and Charles Brockden Brown’s 
Wieland; or the Transformation (1798). Indeed, these two late eighteenth-century novels 
contain the very same logic of torture and confession that Davys’s earlier novel contains, 
even though they appear to offer readers more empowered heroines. Elizabeth Bennet 
and Clara Wieland are surprisingly more like Amoranda than readers might first perceive. 
In The Reform’d Coquet, the logic of torture insinuates itself into the improbable 
adventures and libertine cruelty that readers expect from the early eighteenth-century 
novel. Elaine Scarry’s theory of political torture illuminates how the logic of torture 
gradually, violently, and permanently embodies Amoranda, stripping her of her original 
empowerment until she “confesses” her “Coquetry.” This novel’s logic does not ask its 
readers to remember Amoranda’s “cure” or her reformation into rational womanhood as 
the novel’s title promises; instead it functions to distinguish Amoranda’s “Foible” or 
“Coquetry” by making it permanently visible.  
Chapter 2 examines Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (published in 1813; 
written in 1797) and argues that Elizabeth Bennet’s alleged bildung is not very different 
from the early eighteenth-century’s Amoranda. The only difference, I argue, is that Pride 
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and Prejudice incorporates a more insidious logic of torture and confession than The 
Reform’d Coquet. Austen’s novel presents itself as a humorous and lighthearted novel of 
manners—as a more realistic novel in terms of human interaction, and one that ostensibly 
offers up a revised, more empowered heroine—but I argue that Elizabeth is repeatedly 
shamed into embodiment and into adopting Darcy’s worldview.  
Chapter 3 crosses the Atlantic to examine a male-authored American gothic 
bildungsroman:  Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland; or the Transformation (1798). 
Wieland, also offers its readers a more finely attuned female subjectivity in that it 
employs a female first-person narrator;  indeed, the entire narrative is authored by the 
speaking “I” of Clara Wieland, who seems at first to represent a more empowered female 
subjectivity than either Davys’s Amoranda or Austen’s Elizabeth Bennet. However, I 
argue that the logic of Brown’s full length female-authored narrative functions to make 
its speaker “confess” her “self” as mad in order to oust her from her numerous 
empowered positions at the novel’s start and to repeatedly showcase her failing 
rationalism—a flawed rationalism that patriarchal power produces by subjecting Clara to 
a repetition of horrific and mystifying events. Michel Foucault’s logic of the insane 
asylum helps to explain how power in Wieland produces Clara’s “madness” even as it 
points to her narrative as a “biographical history” that implicates Clara as an already 
latently “mad” body. In other words, the novel’s logic ensures that Clara’s entire 
narrative functions as the mandatory “confession” of the insane asylum. This novel’s use 
of a female narrator epitomizes the disturbing discursive transformative abilities of 
disciplinary power.  
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The Epilogue briefly examines Robert Zemeckis’s 1997 film Contact and 
Jonathan Demme’s 1991 film The Silence of the Lambs to illustrate the disconcerting 
persistence of torture and confession to subjugate women. The logic of torture and 
confession in both of these films appropriates the discourse of feminism in which to 
reproduce its subjugation of women. I argue that the rational, brilliant, and atheistic Ellie 
Arroway is “tortured” into confessing her submission to the “Father,” which is 
misrecognized as a profession of her new found faith in a higher power. What the film’s 
logic sets out to accomplish is the feminization of Ellie, whose dedication to her career 
precluded the need for a heterosexual relationship. The Silence of the Lambs reveals 
striking similarities to Brown’s novel Wieland in terms of the rationally irrational 
Hannibal Lecter who resembles Theodore Wieland and in terms of its sensationalism 
which functions to eclipse Clarice’s “torture” by Lecter. This film also co-opts feminist 
discourse so that readers misrecognize how Clarice’s ongoing “confession” reveals her 
inherent female vulnerability and the victimization that it always already represents. 
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Introduction Notes 
                                                 
1 While physical torture was illegal in England, “first degree” methods were still used as well as such other 
“harsh procedures” endorsed and encouraged by the English Witchfinder General Mathew Hopkins. These 
procedures included “enforced sleeplessness and starvation combined with highly leading questions” (428). 
According to Louise Jackson, Hopkins also employed “watchers,” upstanding female members of the 
community whom he paid to keep constant watch of the suspected female in case her “familiars” appeared 
to suckle her supernumerary paps. Frequently these same female “watchers” would “walk” the suspect all 
night, so her activity would attract her familiars (69). Nicholas P. Spanos also describes “witch pricking,” 
in which the female “watchers” applied a needle to certain parts of the female’s body in order to test if the 
suspect was insensitive to pain or bleeding, a guaranteed sign that the suspect was a witch. Typically the 
best sites for witch-pricking were those that revealed the “Devil’s Mark,” which the watchers expected to 
find on either the female’s breasts or private parts; thus women’s bodies were first “completely shaved” 
and then “systematically pricked with needles” (431). The employment of female watchers by male 
officials reveals how easily male authority was able to pit female community members against each other. 
“Swimming” or “trial by water” was also frequently used to test a suspected witch, and was endorsed by 
James I in his treatise Daemonologie, in which he claims that the water rejected witches who have rejected 
their baptism (qtd. in Hopkins). The alleged witch was first stripped naked and then each thumb was tied to 
an opposing large toe. She was then cast into the water; if she floated she was deemed guilty. Ironically, 
sinking declared the suspect innocent but it cost the woman her life since she usually drowned. Frequently 
just the threat of torture or the sight of the weapons would garner a confession. If a suspect confessed after 
this first degree method, her/his confession would be documented as “elicited without torture” (Spanos 
426). Another popular and effective method to extract a confession was the psychological pressure applied 
to suspects to confess by their families, friends, and the authorities (428). Numerous modern obedience 
experiments, as Spanos, points out, reveal that “relatively mild interpersonal pressure, in the absence of all 
of the other variables, have led to substantial degrees of conformity and obedience” (428). Actual physical 
torture supposedly only took place on the Continent. Spanos’ research reveals that this torture included 
such disturbingly violent acts as cutting off the female suspect’s breasts, whipping her with twisted wire, 
and breaking both of her arms (426).  
2The Oxford English Dictionary Online defines “mortification” as “the action of mortifying the body, its 
appetites, etc. . . . by the self-infliction or voluntary toleration of bodily pain and discomfort.” 
3 Thomas L. Jeffers Apprenticeships: The Bildungsroman from Goethe to Santayana (2005) claims that, 
while Thomas Carlyle’s translation of Goethe’s Wilhelm Meister in the 1824 is frequently regarded as the 
official introduction of the bildungsroman genre into England, he points out that England’s political climate 
after its 1688 Glorious Revolution was conducive to the formation of the realist novel, including the 
“biographical novel” (he uses Bakhtin’s term), which represents the bildungsroman novel in its nascent and 
more limiting form in terms of self-cultivation. He cites Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders and 
Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa as examples. 
4 I am not arguing that every eighteenth-century female bildungsroman functions as the discourses of 
torture and confession. Indeed, this would be a weak strategy on the part of patriarchal power. I do, 
however, see the discourses of torture and confession organizing several other eighteenth and nineteenth-
century British and American female bildungsromans that I have not covered in this dissertation, including 
Samuel Richardson’ Clarissa, which this Introduction only briefly discusses, Francis Burney’s Evelina 
(1778), Jane Austen’s Emma (1814), Susan Warner’s The Wide, Wide World (1850), and Maria Susanna 
Cummins The Lamplighter (1854).  
5 The relationship amongst the unknowing female body, truth, and torture originated in Greek mythology. 
Page duBois outlines the west’s philosophical assumptions about these concepts in her appropriately named 
Torture and Truth. duBois claims that the west has inherited its ideas about truth from the ancient Greeks 
and that the search for truth in the western philosophical tradition “is inextricably linked with torture” (7). 
The spatial model of truth-searching in pre-classical Greece is one of descent—a descent into darkness, 
hiddenness, interiority, oblivion and then back out into the light. Indeed, for the ancient Greeks, truth had a 
 23 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
locus. It was always conceived of as a metaphysical foreknowledge or a fixed idea that was already in 
existence; it was hidden and needed to be “un-covered.” The Greeks, in other words, conceived of truth as 
residing elsewhere, as always slipping from the seeker, as always just out of reach. Violence, labor, and 
pain might be necessary to wrench it from its dark and hidden place. Consequently, the worthy male seeker 
of Greek mythology discovers truth in “the mysterious cavities of the female body,” frequently represented 
as metaphors such as the earth into which, for instance, Odysseus travels, or the temple, in which truth 
passes through the body of the Pythia in its conveyance to the male seeker (duBois 82-91). Indeed, female 
bodies may house “truth,” but women themselves “cannot know truth” (duBois 82). Truth’s inaccessibility, 
especially for the average man, makes the Greek hero’s journey all the more “extraordinary” (87). The 
journey to “truth,” it seems, is always fraught with pain and even death. The later secularization of the 
Greece state, as duBois argues, incorporates into its legal system the idea that truth is located in the Other. 
Thus, for example, when the Athenian legal system requires “true” testimony about its citizen on trial, it 
searches for it inside the body of that citizen’s slave. Not only does truth “resid[e] in the body of the slave,” 
but the Greeks believed that the slave can only produce this truth under coercion” (duBois 68).   
6 See Elizabeth Abel, et al.’s The Voyage In: Fictions of Female Development and Leslie W. Rabine’s 
Reading the Romantic Heroine: Text, History, Ideology. See the “Works Cited” for the complete citations. 
7 See Ros Ballaster’s “Women and the rise of the novel: sexual prescripts” in Women and Literature in 
Britain, 1700-1800, Paula R. Backscheider’s and John J. Richetti’s “Introduction” in Popular Fiction by 
Women, 1660-1730: An Anthology, Anne Williams’s Art of Darkness: A Poetics of the Gothic, Marilyn L. 
Williamson’s Raising Their Voices, 1650-1750, Nancy K. Miller’s The Heroine’s Text: Readings in the 
French and English Novel, 1722-1782, and Nina Baym’s Woman’s Fiction: A Guide to Novels by and 
about Women in America, 1820-1870. See the “Works Cited” for the complete citations. 
8 See Elizabeth Abel et al.’s The Voyage In: Fictions of Female Development, Leslie W. Rabine’s Reading 
the Romantic Heroine: Text, History, Ideology, Susan Fraiman’s Unbecoming Women: British Women 
Writers and the Novel of Development, and Lorna Ellis’s Appearing to Diminish: Female Development and 
the British Bildungsroman, 1750—1850. See the “Works Cited” for the complete citations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Diseasing Amoranda’s Body: 
The Logic of Torture and Confession in Mary Davys’s The Reform’d Coquet 
 
 
 
“The discovery of truth is a physical operation.” 
 – from Lisa Silverman’s Tortured Subjects 
 
 
“[W]hat is essential in all power is that ultimately its point of application is always the 
body.” 
 – from Michel Foucault’s Psychiatric Power 
 
 
 
 
 
Near the close of Mary Davys’s female coming-of-age novel The Reform’d 
Coquet; or, Memoirs of Amoranda (1724), the heroine announces with conviction: “I 
have now brought myself to an utter Contempt for all that part of our Species and shall 
for the future, not only despise Flattery but abhor the mouth it comes from.”1 Amoranda 
is poised on the very threshold of self-transformation, when past, present, and future 
merge, and for a moment, the seemingly omniscient heroine knows who she is, who she 
has been, and who she shall become. The power inherent in such an epiphany irresistibly 
compels us to view it as an exemplary moment of female agency. Indeed, the agency 
inherent in the “I” that begins this declaration attests to the Enlightenment belief in the 
development of a fully realized self. It is a “self,’ moreover, that has acted on its self (“I 
have brought myself”) and reaffirms the Age of Reason’s ideal of willed self-
transformation. Through a “self”-sustaining circular logic of individuation, Amoranda’s 
words authenticate her being even as her being authenticates the words she speaks; 
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“truth” and the individual validate each other. Such a notion is still captivating today, 
because it validates our own democratic belief in humanity’s ability to reason, to learn 
from experience and error, and to fashion itself accordingly. The Reform’d Coquet is one 
of the earliest novels out of which this modern subject as we know it emerges. 
Many critics’ interpretations of The Reform’d Coquet remain within the terms 
established by the female bildungsroman genre; thus their readings reproduce its 
expectations.2
This chapter will challenge, however, a reading of The Reform’d Coquet that 
simply satisfies readerly expectations of the bildungsroman genre and the Enlightenment 
ideals of self-definition it upholds. It will argue that patriarchal power has insinuated 
itself into the empowering discourse of the bildungsroman as a strategy of female 
subjugation. It will also argue that Amoranda’s moment of self-realization is, in fact, her 
“confession” and that she has been strongly, if not violently, coerced into making this 
confession. Indeed, this novel is not about Amoranda’s reformation as the title promises; 
rather, it is about producing the “truth” of her bodily susceptibility to what Davys herself 
terms the “Disease” of coquetry. Amoranda’s diseased embodiment substantiates the 
 These critical evaluations adopt the novel’s own attitude that Amoranda is 
in need of reform—what Jane Spencer terms “the Reform’d coquette tradition”—and 
they routinely refer to this reform process as Amoranda’s “development,” “education,” 
“journey of self-identity,” “moral development,” or “moral education.” Further espousing 
the novel’s own stance, these readings regard Amoranda’s course of reform as one of 
gradual positive transformation, in which this heroine, with the aid and support of her 
guardian Formator, comes to realize a self that is “mature,” “wise,” and “rational.”  
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disembodied ideology of patriarchy. Simply stated, this novel’s logic reproduces 
masculine domination through female embodiment. 
 The logic of The Reform’d Coquet both produces and discovers a diseased female 
body. In other words, the text violently and continually acts upon Amoranda’s body until 
she exists only as a diseased body. However, the text insists that Amoranda’s body is a 
priori susceptible to coquetry because it is biologically female. Furthermore, Amoranda’s 
supposed moment of self-realization, or what I view as her coerced “confession,” has 
readers believe that Amoranda herself did not ‘realize’ the “truth” of her own body until 
this point. Indeed, The Reform’d Coquet does not want its readers to remember its 
“Reform’d” or made-marriageable heroine; it wants us to remember her bodily 
susceptibility to coquetry. Indeed, this novel’s logic reveals a asymmetrical power 
relation in which Amoranda must be ‘made body’ so that patriarchal power can dominate 
this body and appropriate it as a material referent for its own continued ideological 
existence; Amoranda’s body becomes a tangible sign of the fiction of male superiority. 
Furthermore, Davys’s novel can be cited as an early novel that represents what 
Foucault refers to as the gradual emergence of “disciplinary power,” since the power to 
punish already shows its diffusion from a single identifiable source (the monarch) into 
many alternative, unidentifiable, and seemingly benign discourses. Consequently, while 
Amoranda’s “truth” or moment of self-realization may appear to be produced through the 
democratic way of coming to truth—i.e., a temporal process of self-discovery via 
experiential encounters with the world, dialogue with others (especially her mentor), due 
self-contemplation, calm reason, and individual will—I will show that this Enlightenment 
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philosophy, this new epistemology of truth-finding as Lisa Silverman describes it in 
Tortured Subjects,3
As I stated above, while the novel ostensibly sets out to resolve the crisis of 
Amoranda’s coquetry, the The Reform’d Coquet’s legitimate crisis is the financial 
independence that Amoranda acquires at the age of fifteen. The novel actually begins its 
embodiment of Amoranda during her childhood by reducing her to a body through its 
physical description of her: “her Eyes were like Diamonds, her Cheeks roses, her Skin 
Alabaster, her Lips Coral, and her Hair Cupid’s Nets” (12). This soft violence applied to 
Amoranda’s body while she is still a child will be greatly and gradually intensified after 
Amoranda matures and receives her inheritance. During Amoranda’s childhood, 
patriarchal power does not react with the same intensity of violence as it does later, most 
likely because it views the child as an already powerless body—a body under the control 
of its parents, and so it does not appear to be any immediate threat to power.
 misrecognizes the logic of torture and the confession that it extracts. I 
will further demonstrate that this logic of torture and confession is consistent with the 
logic of political torture/confession as elaborated upon by Elaine Scarry in The Body in 
Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (1985). 
4
Amoranda’s wealth challenges male inheritance practices, yes, but the issue goes 
much deeper. Amoranda’s wealth provides her with the power of worldly self-extension 
 Indeed, it is 
only after Amoranda is orphaned, inherits her fortune, and reaches marriageable age and 
delays marrying (enabling her disembodiment as will be seen) that patriarchal power is 
compelled to act with concentrated violence against her body in an attempt to embody, 
or, we might even say, re-embody her.  
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that is normally reserved for men. Financial independence enables Amoranda to move 
beyond the boundaries of her own body and exist as an empowering disembodied voice. 
As Elaine Scarry asserts in The Body in Pain: “It is only when the body is comfortable, 
when it has ceased to be an obsessive object of perception and concern, that 
consciousness develops other objects, that for any individual the external world comes 
into being and begins to grow” (39).5 Amoranda comes to exist as a disembodied voice 
once her financial independence brings her great potential for worldly self-extension.6 
The Reform’d Coquet at this junction begins to draw our attention, not to Amoranda’s 
body, but to her voice; that is, we ‘hear’ her rather than ‘see’ her. Amoranda’s world is 
filled with objects that enable her body to be comfortable, pain free, and protected, so her 
body does not call attention to itself (or even to the reader). Indeed, Amoranda’s house is 
the primary object of her physical comfort, because it is her house—not her father’s, not 
her uncle’s, and most significantly, not her husband’s house. Of course, Amoranda’s 
inherited wealth offers many advantages—the worldly extension of which Elaine Scarry 
speaks. This heiress can employ a private maid (Jenny) who dresses and undresses her 
body and attends to every personal need. Jenny’s attendance to the demands of 
Amoranda’s body frees her mind to move beyond the body. She also employs a 
housekeeper and servants so she doesn’t have to experience the bodily labor and 
discomfort of cleaning, cooking, or procuring food but can instead experience the 
forgetfulness of a satiated and energized body—a body whose needs are fulfilled before 
the body even feels the discomfort of them. Amoranda also owns a carriage which 
enables her body to be present at distant locations (greater worldly extension) and even 
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more importantly, the carriage operates like a mobile shelter, protecting her body as her 
own home does while it also takes over the physical labor of walking to a destination. 
Amoranda’s wealth, moreover, has the added benefit of providing her with 
objects that not only preclude bodily discomfort by taking over the work of her body but 
with objects whose sole function is to bring pleasure, enabling an even greater 
forgetfulness of the body. Amoranda has a beautiful “Garden,” which includes a roofed 
bench that blocks out the sun’s heat, a “Summer-house,” “Fish-Ponds,” and a “Barge,” all 
of which relax the body, relieving Amoranda from a sense of bodily weight and presence. 
Indeed, Amoranda’s fortune enables a virtually complete forgetfulness of her body, 
ensuring what Scarry refers to as “larger mindfulness.” No wonder that Lord Lofty 
describes Amoranda as “open and free as ever” (16). In the context of eighteenth-century 
society, moreover, we can now see that Amoranda’s fortune challenges more than just 
male inheritance tradition; it challenges the very foundation of what it means to have 
power and a voice in the world. 
Amoranda’s “larger mindfulness” comes through to the reader primarily as an 
empowering bodiless voice in the novel’s first half. Her language demonstrates her 
indomitable spirit, her quick wit, and her reasoning abilities. We first see evidence of her 
quick wit in her response to Lord Lofty’s remark that her “Ponds” will be in a little time 
quite ruined” if she catches men like she does “Fish” (16). Lordy Lofty’s amusing 
analogy and attempt to label Amoranda a “coquet” boomerangs when she objectifies men 
by referring to them as “Fish” and by claiming she has a “very good way of disposing of 
them”—“one I throw into the Water again, and the other may consume in his own 
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Flames” (16). Her final retort in this exchange of wit in which she clearly has the upper 
hand is that men (Fish) “should e’en keep out of harm’s way” (16). Amoranda clearly 
redirects the blame back onto men, implying that it is their own lust that ensnares men 
(“consume in his own Flames”) and draws them to her, since they can always choose to 
avoid her (“keep out of harm’s way”). Amoranda’s verbal power precludes her from 
incorporeality, since Lord Lofty’s attempt to embody her rebounds to him; consequently 
he becomes the “Fish” or vulnerable/disposable body. Helen Thompson’s assertion that 
Amoranda is unable “to arrest [her] body in the name of a less sensationally urgent good” 
(“urgent good” meaning marriage) is certainly much more applicable to Lord Lofty and 
other men, since it is they, and not she, who act on bodily impulses.  
Amoranda again reveals the power of her voice when she cuts short Formator’s 
sermon on youth and the pitfalls of “Pleasure.” She exclaims, “O Lud! . . . I believe you 
are to be the Chaplain too, if you talk thus much longer, you’ll argue me out of my 
Senses; I told you I could not come into your grave Measures of a sudden” (25). 
Amoranda’s voice reveals a masculine assertiveness, since it is she who interrupts 
Formator and quickly establishes limits on his behavior. By interrupting him, 
Amoranda’s voice overrides and silences Formator’s. Amoranda’s language also 
demonstrates both reasoning power and worldly wisdom in another conversation with 
Lord Lofty and later, with Formator. After Lord Lofty implies that to marry a woman is 
“to have so little love” for her, Amoranda responds with the following: 
[O]ne thing I have often observed, when once a Woman’s married, 
nobody cares for her but her Husband; and if your Lordship’s Remark’s be 
true, not he neither: so that, my Lord, I think we must live single in our 
own defence. (22) 
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Amoranda undoubtedly shows her ability to reason by deduction, and it further reveals 
her awareness of Lord Lofty’s libertine “designs;” thus, she is able to match him at his 
own game. The heiress shows that she is far from being ensnared by Lord Lofty’s wicked 
plans. Indeed, Amoranda’s sharp reason exposes Formator’s own flawed reasoning in 
response to his accusation that she is “engross[ing] the whole Male world to herself”: 
Nay, . . . there never was any such thing in nature, as one Woman 
engrossing the whole contrary Sex; believe me, sir, you all love Variety 
too well for that, and your Affections, like your Money, circulates all the 
Nation over; so that it is only who can keep their Lovers longest we strive 
for, not who can keep them always, for that we none of us expect. (26) 
 
Amoranda’s clever response again reveals not only her ability to discern between fact and 
exaggeration, but also her ability to reason that the very behavior of men precludes any 
woman from “engrossing the whole Male world to herself.” Again, her words implicitly 
reject the label of herself as a “coquet,” and the power of her words redirects the blame to 
where it belongs—on men’s own coquettish behavior. In fact, her words also implicitly 
liken men to prostitutes whose “Affections” circulate like “Money.” Amoranda’s clever 
retort demonstrates her rational mind, while it simultaneously divulges Formator’s 
unsound reasoning. Her language again imposes a body, if you will, on men (as coquets 
and prostitutes), while she remains exempt from one. 
It is not only this “young Lady’s” verbal perspicuity that displays her initial 
power and disembodied agency, but it is also manifested in her ability to design plans that 
ensure she does not become a vulnerable female body. Amoranda does not hesitate to 
orchestrate a “Counter-Plot” against Froth and Callid, after being informed by the 
housekeeper of their plot to kidnap her (an act that will take and so make her a body). 
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Even Formator defers to Amoranda’s plan, asking her permission to pose as the disguised 
Amoranda:  “Madam, said he, give me leave to personate you in the Summer-house 
tomorrow night” (27). She even goes so far as to suggest that they “invert” conventional 
gender customs by offering to “come and rescue” Formator if he “happen[s] to be 
worsted” by participating in her revenge plot (27). Amoranda does not, in this scene, 
exist as the vulnerable female body; instead she is the creator—the unalterable, bodiless 
voice behind the scene—and Formator finds himself in the role of the vulnerable female 
body. Moreover, Amoranda transforms both Callid and Froth from powerful plotters into 
disempowered ‘bodies’ by offering them up as “Slaves” in service of her Uncle’s 
merchandizing company in the Indies (33). If death itself is the ultimate embodiment—
the absolute loss of worldly self-extension—as Scarry claims, then Callid’s and Froth’s 
eventual slaying of each other in their subsequent duel (33) posits their absolute 
embodiment against Amoranda’s empowering and “designing” (creating) voice. 
Amoranda’s assertive and resolute spirit presents itself again after Lord Lofty’s 
duplicity (his intentions to marry another woman) is partially revealed. Upon discovering 
Lord Lofty’s incriminating silver box, Amoranda’s first instinct is to take the matter into 
her own hands. Again she reveals her independent spirit when she declares to her maid 
Jenny:  “Give me my Clothes . . . I’ll be revenged of him or lose my Life in the Attempt” 
(27). Amoranda refuses to be outmaneuvered by any man and always opts instead to take 
a course of action rather than find herself in the position as the passive, silenced and 
manipulated body. Later in the story, Amoranda positions herself in the role as the father 
of the bride, who arranges Altemira’s marriage to Lord Lofty. Once again, Amoranda 
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operates behind the scene as a disembodied voice that plans but is not and does not have 
to be present amongst the bodies (both Altemira’s and Lord Lofty’s) that act on each 
other and surrender themselves in the scene. Evidence of Amoranda’s initial agency as I 
have just offered exposes the erroneousness of reading this novel as a female 
bildungsroman. Indeed, Amoranda is neither “heedless” nor “thoughtless” as Marilyn L. 
Williamson and Paula R. Backscheider respectively describe her. And, whereas Mary 
Anne Schofield views Amoranda as an “asexual maid” (85), the evidence reveals that she 
is simply exercising the privileges of male power, which were inadvertently enabled by 
her financial independence. Moreover, the logic of these other readings must necessarily 
equate heterosexual marriage with cautious rationalism and ‘authentic’ female sexuality, 
since marriage is posited as the alleged cure for Amoranda’s “heedless,” “thoughtless,” 
and “asexual” behavior.  
Another way of viewing Amoranda’s disembodied voice is in terms of what 
Scarry refers to as a “withholding of the body” (203). Amoranda resembles Scarry’s 
religious non-believer or doubter, whose move toward disembodiment (pure voice) is 
regarded by God as disobedience, because it is a move that approaches God’s own 
disembodied power; the non-believer, therefore, is viewed as withholding his or her body 
from God (202-3). The Old Testament represents the non-believer’s body as having a 
hardened or rigid bodily surface that will inevitably be “violently entered” by God 
(unless voluntarily surrendered to God) in order to re-establish the categories of voice 
and body that distinguish God from humans; the subject’s own pained body will verify 
(for him or herself and others) God’s intangible existence (Scarry 203). Similarly, 
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Amoranda’s empowered voice can be viewed as a withholding of her body from 
patriarchal belief by her refusal to marry, forfeit her fortune to her husband, and 
perpetuate male inheritance through sexual reproduction. Indeed, as a disembodied voice, 
Amoranda has no body to sexually reproduce; the “surface” of her body, we might say, is 
closed to sexual penetration. Belief, Scarry asserts, requires full surrender of the body and 
its interior, which not only represents the most intimate and private aspect of one’s body, 
but is also the locus of one’s sentience or bodily sensations, including pain. Surrender of 
one’s “bodily interior . . . does not simply accompany belief” or is “required” by it, “[it] 
is itself belief”; the private body in pain stands as the public, tangible, material referent 
for an idea (belief) that has no material substantiation (Scarry 204). Thus Amoranda, like 
the non-believer who requires violent conversion through power’s (God’s) infliction of 
bodily pain, blurs the categories of voice and body that distinguish those who have power 
and voice from those who are powerless bodies.  
To re-establish these categories the novel acts to generate Amoranda as body—to 
not only dis-ease and make her body a latent coquet body that only a husband can 
restrain, but to also force open her heretofore closed body and make her an open, 
penetrable, body that will serve the ends of patriarchal ideology. The wounded body, the 
suffering body, the body made open and aware of its own vulnerability will either 
surrender itself or be “violently penetrated” to “analogical[ly] substantiate” the reality 
(which is really a fiction) of patriarchal ideology (Scarry 14). As Scarry explains, “the 
sheer material factualness of the human body will be borrowed to lend that cultural 
construct the aura of ‘realness’ and ‘certainty’” (14). Because power, Scarry argues, is 
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always in a “crisis of substantiation,” it will co-opt another’s body, violently if necessary, 
to substantiate itself, even as power simultaneously, legitimate or not, is “always based 
on distance from the body” (46). Pain’s inexpressibility makes this co-optation possible, 
because pain has no referent—“it is not of or for anything” as with other states of 
consciousness (Scarry 5). Thus the deeply private and purely subjective and inexpressible 
experience of pain enables the torturer to easily objectify this pain and transform it into a 
fiction of his power. Power takes the intensely pained body for its own referent.  It is the 
overall goal of this novel, therefore, to take Amoranda down, to produce the “truth” of 
her coquet body by dis-easing her body and thus silencing her voice, which is so voluble 
and strong at the novel’s beginning. This logic—the logic of producing a body and 
silencing a voice, while simultaneously reasserting the fictive and disembodied voice of 
power—comprises the very logic of torture and confession as theorized by Elaine 
Scarry.7
But, exactly how does this gradual embodiment occur in the novel? As I have 
stated, while the novel recognizes her evolution as leading to her moment of self-
realization, I argue that the novel’s logic coerces Amoranda into confessing her flawed 
body. Indeed, the novel would have us believe that Amoranda’s alleged self-reformation 
is facilitated by Formator’s guidance and advice. But where is the evidence for this? 
What exactly does Formator do to “reform” Amoranda of her coquetry? Natasha Saje 
 Thus the “Project” of this novel is not Amoranda’s “reform” from her coquettish 
behavior; the “Project” is to dis-ease or to “torture” Amoranda into becoming a diseased 
female (and sexually reproducible) body and to distinguish this flawed female body by 
making it permanently visible.  
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insightfully observes that Amoranda’s reform occurs as soon as he arrives—“not much of 
a process” (168). Given Amoranda’s alleged empowering epiphany (what I view as her 
confession) near the end of the novel, we are compelled to ask what or whom is the 
catalyst for her change? It is my belief that we are looking in the wrong places to account 
for Amoranda’s transformation. This is not to say that Formator plays no role in her 
change, because he does, but not in the way that the novel’s plot claims—as her advisor 
or guardian. 
I propose, therefore, that we take a closer look at the violent acts attempted on 
Amoranda’s body. The novel’s own rationalization for these violent acts is that this 
heiress’s fondness for “Adoration” makes her “a prey to every designing Rascal” (264). 
The bildungsroman tradition would have us believe that she is to learn wisdom and 
reason from these encounters with, or experiences in, the ‘real’ world. To explain them, 
as Saje does, as Davys’s implicit “critique” of the political corruption “under the 
administration of Robert Walpole” (174), or to not even take notice of these acts at all 
like Helen Thompson, only contributes to our further misrecognition of Amoranda’s 
transformation from a voice of power into a subjugated and latently diseased body. 
Early eighteenth-century readers most likely took these violent acts for granted, 
attributing them to the conventions of what is now referred to as “amatory fiction,” which 
incorporated the romantic or adventure plots from its Italian and French literary 
predecessors. The Reform’d Coquet’s inclusion of violent episodes, in other words, 
fulfills reader’s expectations in several ways. Toni O’Shaughnessy Bowers claims that 
amatory fiction not only provided women with information about “dangerous male 
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ways,” but it also fulfilled women’s need for sensuality, “a sense of involvement in the 
outside world,” and an empowering sense of rebelliousness in reading such literature (52; 
62). Patricia Meyer Spacks explains that the emphasis in early eighteenth-century 
adventure novels is “on happening rather than character, on diverse rather than detailed 
evidence” (32). She states that the “early fiction of the eighteenth-century resolutely 
declares the excitement, for readers and potentially for those who undergo comparable 
fates in actuality, of many kinds of life happening” (34). The adventure novel thus 
explores life’s possibilities, even dangerous ones. On the surface, it all sounds so 
empowering. According to Spacks, the reader need not suspend disbelief, since readerly 
pleasure has everything to do with the implausibility of the heroine’s adventures, which 
are further “heightened by the speed of narration” (34). Because readers expect and even 
desire dangerous and adventurous episodes in The Reform’d Coquet, these episodes 
consequently go unscrutinized and unquestioned by readers (then and now) and so enable 
patriarchal power to exploit this violence for its own purposes.  
What may also authorize and so cause readers to overlook these violent episodes 
is eighteenth-century libertine philosophy. Marilyn L. Williamson claims that Davys 
draws on the “libertine paradigm,” but she does not allow its “immorality to prosper.” 
Indeed Davys’s very management of her rakish characters by either reforming them as 
she does Lord Lofty or making them fail at their designs, as in the case of Callid and 
Froth, and Biranthus, who actually comes very close to succeeding, enables modern 
readers to see only Davys’s moral agenda and thus overlook the possibility that libertine 
violence in this novel might actually be ‘prospering,’ although not in the ways normally 
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expected by readers. Tiffany Potter, for example, argues that the early eighteenth 
century’s “prominent cultural discourse of libertinism” contributed to the early formation 
of the English novel by bringing to it the “disruptive and creative impulses” that 
characterize libertinism (171; 175). Potter views the libertine discourse in The Reform’d 
Coquet as a paradoxical component, since Davys’s critique of it is also what enables the 
individualism of her characters, especially Amoranda. Prominent as this discourse was, 
early eighteenth century readers probably didn’t question its presence in novels, 
especially since it lent the story excitement while it simultaneously instructed the naïve 
female reader on how to recognize a male libertine. In my view, however, both 
Williamson’s conservative and Potter’s more progressive reading of this novel overlook 
how libertine discourse, like the discourse of adventure and romance, might be used as a 
strategy for producing the truth of the flawed female body.  
 Unlike the failed kidnapping plot of Callid and Froth, the next several acts of 
violence directed against Amoranda begin the world contracting work of transforming 
her into a silenced, powerless, and open body. First, masked-men attempt to kidnap 
Amoranda on her ride home from Lord Lofty’s. Gunfire is exchanged, one man is killed, 
the Coachman is shot, and Formator is wounded. Amoranda, the narrator relates, “fell 
into a swoon, and continued in it” after seeing her Coachman shot (51). The narrator then 
tells us that it “was some days before she recovered her Fright” (51). Indeed the violence 
in this scene rapidly shrinks Amoranda’s worldly self-extension:  she doesn’t speak, she 
doesn’t act; for all intents and purposes, Amoranda is body. Having fainted, there is 
clearly no self-extension beyond her body. Also, the carriage that usually protects her 
 39 
 
traveling body is threatened by violent penetration from the outside. At this point, the 
novel starts to assert a strategy that men alone (not her fortune) can protect Amoranda’s 
body and enable her to forget bodily discomfort and vulnerability. Her post-traumatic 
bodily discomfort in the form of a “Fright” lasts for weeks. 
As Amoranda becomes more body after this event, patriarchy correspondingly 
becomes more voice. Torture’s logic rests on the voice/body asymmetrical power relation 
and accounts for why torture is comprised of both the interrogation and the infliction of 
bodily pain. Patriarchy’s expanding voice is represented in the novel by the character of 
Formator. Indeed, Formator’s role in Amoranda’s violent embodiment challenges 
Thompson’s and Barney’s construction of him as the “gentle” post-patriarch and the 
“gentle” pedagogue, respectively. During the “Three Weeks” of her recovery, Formator’s 
(lit. one who forms) “daily application to form Amoranda’s mind to his own liking” 
strongly implies that Amoranda was the passive listener (body) to Formator’s empowered 
and proselytizing voice (51). Later in the novel Amoranda will refer to these “daily 
applications” as his “Lectures” (64, 79). Furthermore, just as interrogation (voice) is the 
necessary and concomitant partner to the physical (body) aspect of torture, Formator also 
‘interrogates,’ if you will, Amoranda during this recovery period by ‘putting her to the 
question’ as the Inquisition once termed it: “Why, lovely Amoranda, must all these fine 
accomplishments be eclipsed, by that Foible of your Sex, Vanity? Why have you such a 
greedy thirst after Praise, which every Man that has his eyes and ears, must give you of 
course?” (52). Similar to the logic of interrogation as outlined by Scarry, Formator’s 
questions sound more like declaratives that function to impose her “Foible” even as they 
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convey sincerity in desiring a real answer.  His interrogation also functions to absolve 
him (as patriarchy’s mouthpiece) of responsibility by providing him with a morally 
superior “motive” that justifies torture or the forced embodiment of Amoranda. His 
questioning is also logically similar to interrogation techniques in that they imply 
Amoranda is the real agent of the violence being enacted against her—yes, this logic 
says, she is the cause of her own suffering because she chooses to act as a coquet, even as 
she is being denied any agency by these very same acts of violence against her body. 
Indeed one can see here why the confession when it finally comes is so powerful a 
statement, as it functions to fully justify the use of torture in the first place, absolving the 
torturer as it simultaneously confers total responsibility on the victim, especially since the 
victim’s voice at the point of confession is in reality silenced, because, as Scarry 
explains, it mimes, doubles, and so enlarges the torturer’s, essentially authenticating the 
torturer’s world view (36). 
Because Amoranda does not make a legitimate confession after this particular 
round of body-making (she only resolves to stop finding Flattery pleasing), the novel tries 
again to make her a disempowered body, and, in keeping with the logic of torture, the 
novel quickly and several times intensifies its violence against her. First the disguised 
Biranthus and Amoranda’s childhood friend Arentia successfully kidnap her. Because 
Biranthus disguises himself as a woman and is carrying a weapon, it precludes his need to 
exert his own male body (i.e. become embodied) to carry out the violence he does to 
Amoranda’s body. But, she withholds her body through her strong voice by refusing to 
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marry Biranthus. Consequently, power must retaliate with an intensified attempt at 
embodiment; hence Biranthus threatens to rape (take and make) her body by force: 
[T]he Devils that carried her off had conveyed her into the most 
unfrequented part of the Wood and laid her on the Grass to recover 
herself; but who can express the Rage, Despair, and Grief, which appeared 
in her lovely Eyes, when they opened to such a Scene of Sorrow, when she 
saw herself in the full power of a threatening Ravisher, her own Servants 
aiding and assisting him, in the midst of a wild Desert, where nothing but 
Air and Beasts could receive her Cries? (58) 
 
Yet, even as the threatening Biranthus stands over her body with a “Pistol” in his pocket, 
Amoranda again draws on her vocal power to refuse to surrender her body to Biranthus 
for marriage and sexual reproduction. As a result, Biranthus retaliates even more with the 
threat of an intensified violence against her body; he threatens double rape or what today 
we would call “gang rape”: “Then hear . . . and tremble at thy approaching Fate. This 
minute, by the help of thy own Servant, I will enjoy thee; and then, by the assistance of 
my Arm, he shall do so too” (59). His imperative “hear and tremble” reveals that 
Biranthus seeks a bodily response. What’s most significant in this scene, however, is that 
Amoranda’s threatened rape is really about forcing her to surrender the interior of her 
body, which, as I have stated above, is what Scarry argues is the essence of belief; 
Amoranda must submit her body as the validating sign of the coquet body. Either she 
willingly surrenders or she will be “violently entered” (Scarry 204). Indeed Amoranda’s 
victimized position makes her feel the full gravity of bodily presence, the physical feeling 
of being a vulnerable and weak body, exemplified in her eventual cry, “Why has Nature 
denied us Strength to revenge our own Wrongs?” (59). Similar to the tortured victim’s 
body, her own body acts against her, which, again, exempts the torturer—in Amoranda’s 
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case, Biranthus—from any responsibility and thus contributes to his disembodied power. 
Amoranda’s world has collapsed down to a space the size of her own body—her body is 
all that she experiences; her body is all that matters now. The narrator describes her in 
terms of vulnerable embodiment:  she is “half-drown’d in her own Tears, pulling off her 
Hair, and wringing her lovely Hands” (60). In a very real sense, the Amoranda we knew 
at the novel’s beginning is now overcome by her own body. Amoranda’s tears resemble 
the tears of accused witches, which were read by the Inquisitors as “a mark of sincerity” 
and demonstrated a “posture of openheartedness toward God,” since “weeping was 
destroyed by the Devil, who was known literally to harden the hearts and to dry up the 
tears of his minions” (Silverman 102-3). Likewise, as Elaine Scarry tells us, the hardened 
heart describes the problem of the non-believer or the individual who refuses to surrender 
the interior of his body to the bodiless Hebrew God, revealing a similar logic to the 
hardened heart of the diabolic witch, who withholds her body from the bodiless Christian 
God. Indeed, Amoranda’s own tears strongly imply she is beginning to surrender her 
body to masculine power.8
Moreover, all those artifacts that previously enabled Amoranda’s self-extension 
into the world, all those objects that enabled her to act in the world as a disembodied 
voice, have been transformed into weapons to be used against her body. Through torture, 
as Scarry claims, the domestic—all those things that take over the work of the body, that 
deconstruct pain—is unmade through its inverted use—“the artifact is deconstructed to 
produce pain” (145). Amoranda’s barge, which previously offered bodily forgetfulness, 
relaxation, and pleasure, facilitates her kidnapping by Birtanthus:  rather than protecting 
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her body on the water, it exposes her body to his designs. Her servant, who previously 
served her, is now about to violate her body. Amoranda’s house, the main source of 
bodily protection, has been ‘violently entered’ by kidnappers and rapists, including her 
childhood friend. That which enabled forgetfulness of the body now operates to make her 
think only of her body, to the point where she exists only as one.  
Indeed Amoranda’s situation follows the logic that Scarry so astutely describes in 
the unmaking of the word “host” in torture’s deconstruction of civilization. Torture 
unmakes the word “host” (Amoranda is a “host” to Biranthus and Arentia) by bringing it 
back to its main root of “hos” and then forward again to a reformation of new meanings 
in the words “hostage” (which Amoranda is to both Biranthus and Arentia) and to “host” 
again—but, as Scarry explains, “not the host that willfully abandons the ground of his 
power in acts of reciprocity and equality [as Amoranda does while Biranthus and Arentia 
are guests in her house] but the “host” deprived of all ground, the host of the eucharist, 
the sacrificial victim” (45), which Amoranda becomes by the end of this violent scene. If 
Amoranda is “Reform’d” at all it is in this sense—she is Reform’d from the host of her 
guests into the bodily host of the sacrifice—the bodily sacrifice (whether animal or 
human) that reaffirms God’s (patriarchy’s) power. Scarry’s concept of torture or 
unmaking and remaking evokes Pierre Bourdieu’s concept in which a “new man” is 
produced through a process of “deculturation” and “reculturation” of the body—“the 
made body” or “transubstantiation”9 via a “hidden persuasion” (Outline of a Theory of 
Practice 94).  
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 After bringing its readers to the brink of a pleasurable tension, the novel suddenly 
interrupts this scene of violence against Amoranda with the arrival of Alanthus (the 
disguised Formator), but rather than immediately rescuing Amoranda, he ‘interrogates’ 
her:  
I presume, Madam, you are some self-willed, head-strong Lady, who, 
resolved to follow your own Inventions, have left the Care of a tender 
Father to ramble with you know not who. Oh Sir! said she, some part of 
your guess is true; but Father I have none. Nor Mother? said the Stranger; 
nor Guardian? Nor Mother, said she, but a Guardian, a good one too, I 
have; and were I but once again in his possession, I would never leave him 
while I live. (60) 
 
The novel once again manifests the logic of torture with its two-part physical and verbal, 
body and voice, power relation. The interrogation functions to impart responsibility to 
Amoranda while it simultaneously excuses and redirects our attention away from the 
violence being enacted against her. Our attention is called to the choices Amoranda made 
that brought her to this dangerous situation. Formator’s language again reveals the 
conflation of speech modes that Scarry argues are evident in the interrogation. His 
sentences demonstrate the uncertainty of the interrogatory, but they also reveal the 
dominance of the imperative (his questions already contain the answers he wants her to 
admit to). In the Althusserian sense, Formator’s words interpellate Amoranda; they “hail” 
a subject that won’t make the reader doubt for a second Amoranda’s approaching 
empowering moment of willed self-transformation, since she is, as Formator tells her, 
“self-will’d,” “head-strong,” and someone who’s determined to abide by her “own 
Inventions.” 
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Indeed, this near-rape scene is pivotal in the novel’s project because we see a 
definite shifting in the voice/body relation in comparison to the earlier scenes of violence 
in the story. Amoranda loses voice and becomes a “colossal body” (to use Scarry’s term) 
while Alanthus / Formator loses body and functions as the powerful disembodied voice 
that hovers God-like over the scene of action. In fact, Amoranda even refers to him on 
her return home from the woods as “too God-like to be an inhabitant of this world” (301). 
Power keeps (must keep) its distance from the body, since “to have no body is to have no 
limits on one’s extension out into the world”; bodilessness exempts one from being 
wounded or altered (Scarry 206-7). Formator, in essence, is several times removed from 
the scene of embodiment, since he is obviously not the recipient of the violence, nor is he 
the literal agent of the violence against Amoranda in any given scene. Furthermore, he is 
always in disguise—he is either Alanthus disguised as Formator and, in the rape scene, he 
is Formator disguised as Alanthus (since Formator at this point has not yet revealed his 
true identity to Amoranda). In contrast to Saje, I do not view the disguised Formator as 
Davy’s employment of an implausible plot device to undermine the novel’s surface plot 
of patriarchal domination.10 Instead, I argue that the disguised Formator functions as one 
of patriarchal power’s most formidable strategies in its domination of Amoranda. 
Whereas in the novel’s beginning, Amoranda is the designer, the bodiless God behind the 
scenes, in the latter half of the novel it is the disguised Formator who operates behind the 
scenes, manipulating the novel’s action. By the end of the narrative, we wonder what the 
“true” identity of Formator is or will be—and this because he exists as the unanchored or 
disembodied voice of patriarchy; indeed, he keeps his distance from powerless 
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embodiment. The character of Formator/Alanthus epitomizes Scarry’s assertion that 
power, even when represented, is “represented in its unrepresentability” (211). Whereas 
only one curtain divides Dorothy from the true identity of the powerful Wizard of Oz, it 
seems a myriad of curtains divide Amoranda and the reader from the true identity of 
Formator/Alanthus. We draw aside one curtain only to discover another.   
 Through the character of Formator, patriarchal power also draws on another 
strategy to exempt itself from any culpability in its subjugation of Amoranda. In a 
disturbingly classic move that torturers draw on time and time again,11 Formator redirects 
vulnerability and sympathy away from Amoranda and toward himself. After Amoranda’s 
kidnapping attempt by the masked-men (one of whom was Biranthus, which we only find 
out later), the text directs our attention to Formator’s possible concussion (he was struck 
on the head by one of the masked-men): Amoranda asks after she recovers from fainting, 
“Do you live, Formator” and Formator responds with “I have no Wounds, but what the 
fear of losing you gave me; the dreadful apprehension of such a misfortune, stab’d me in 
a thousand places” (51). Of course, being “stab’d” in “a thousand places” certainly 
trumps what Amoranda herself has just experienced (after all she fainted and didn’t risk 
her life fighting the masked men like Formator). But—this is exactly what the novel 
wants us to perceive; it wants us to forget or overlook Amoranda’s vulnerable or made 
vulnerable body in this scene. Furthermore, just a few pages later, Formator once more 
directs attention to his own suffering, when he begins to suspect Biranthus at dinner. The 
narrator relates that Formator’s “Soul was rack’d and tortur’d” (53)—an interesting 
choice of words—words that invoke literal torture. His use of this particular language is 
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even more effective at distracting our attention from the violence against Amoranda’s 
body, since it operates as a kind of ‘decoy’ laid before the reader prior to the upcoming 
violent rape scene. It ensures that the reader (either consciously or unconsciously) 
recognizes torture as literary hyperbole. Lastly, Formator refers to Amoranda as “the 
Enchantress, who, by a natural Magick, has kept me all this while in Chains of Love” 
(83), which is disturbing on several levels:  it camouflages his domination of her with the 
discourse of “Love,” it yet again places all responsibility on Amoranda for all that has 
happened (it assigns agency even as it takes it away), it constructs Formator as a prisoner 
(as if he’s the one experiencing the bodily discomfort), and it comes uncannily close to 
constructing—or, better yet, let’s say “reforming”—Amoranda as a witch who practices 
maleficium. In all these instances, patriarchal power through the character of Formator 
sets out to incarnate Amoranda through violence, but that very violence always finds a 
way to circle back to Formator, ensuring we overlook the suffering Amoranda. Let me 
immediately clarify, however, that this does not in any way make Formator a 
disempowered body as the text sets out to make Amoranda, since, as Pierre Bourdieu has 
pointed out, masculine power is always strategizing, controlling and determining others’ 
perception of it as either a subject or object, depending on which position strategically 
better serves its ends at the time (Masculine Domination 68 Footnote 19). 
As I have maintained, the entire novel is driven by its goal of dis-easing 
Amoranda’s body so that she finally confesses to her diseased female body. Indeed, 
immediately following Amoranda’s near-rape scene, everything that patriarchy has 
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worked for throughout the novel culminates in what I view as the novel’s pivotal point: 
Amoranda’s moment of self-realization: 
I have now brought myself to an utter Contempt for all that part of our 
Species and shall for the future, not only despise Flattery but abhor the 
mouth it comes from. I own, Formator, the groundwork of this 
Reformation in me, came from those wholesome Lectures you have so 
often read to me; but the finishing stroke is given by my own inclination. 
(63-4) 
 
The impact of Amoranda’s words comes from its use of first person, which clearly works 
to emphasize the discrete reality of a thinking and reflecting modern subject—a subject 
who has the ability to reinvent herself as her words “I have now brought myself” and 
“shall for the future” indicate. As Foucault claims, the modern individual is 
“authenticated by the discourse of truth he [is] able or obliged to pronounce concerning 
himself” (The History of Sexuality 58). How can any individual, past or present, resist 
such a validation of his or her own empowerment?  
 The Reform’d Coquet’s use of the first person “I” departs from earlier texts, since 
alleged epiphanies in past literary texts about “Reform’d” young women are neither 
expressed in the first person nor do they convey the profound sense of self-discovery 
evident in Amoranda’s words. Aphra Behn’s The Fair Jilt (1668) and Alexander Pope’s 
The Rape of the Lock (1717), to name just two examples, do not provide their respective 
heroines with this empowering self-affirmation. Similar to how The Reform’d Coquet 
constructs Amoranda, both Miranda and Belinda are constructed as vain coquettes who 
postpone marrying because their inherited wealth precludes this social obligation. Also 
following the logic of The Reform’d Coquet, both are punished (tortured) for their vanity 
and independence, although like The Reform’d Coquet, these texts lead their readers to 
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believe they are being punished for some other crime. Returning to my original point, 
however, their confessional speech act is not proffered as self-discovery as it is in The 
Reform’d Coquet. The Fair Jilt, for example, does not try to pretend that Miranda’s 
confession is anything but a confession: 
[Miranda] at last confessed all her life, all the lewdness of her practices 
with several princes and great men, besides her lusts with people that 
served her, and others in mean capacity; and lastly, the whole truth of the 
young friar; and how she had drawn the page, and the prince, her husband, 
to this designed murder of her sister. (Behn 66) 
 
Indeed, unlike Amoranda’s first person statement, Miranda’s third-person confession 
lacks the therapeutic and truth-affirming power that comes from the speaking subject’s 
use of the first person to make its confession. Moreover, the punishing techniques in this 
novella are not passed off as life experiences that enable self-growth and transformation. 
Miranda confesses to both clerical and secular authorities—identifiable and tangible 
sources of patriarchal power within the text—thus power in this text looks backward to 
the centralized power of the monarchy. Patriarchal power in The Reform’d Coquet 
operates in and through the very fabric of the scenes and so anticipates Foucault’s 
description of the evolution of disciplinary power from a centralized and identifiable 
source of power. 
 As in The Fair Jilt, patriarchal power in The Rape of the Lock is also identifiable. 
Belinda’s “torture” is quite public, clearly corporal, and even quite theatrical. What can 
be more spectacular than the Baron cutting off her lock in public (at “Court”) and the 
lock itself being eternally displayed in the night sky? Belinda’s “public torture” and 
“public death”12 (torture and death in a single blow by the executioner Foucault terms 
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“zero-degree torture”) also seems to look to the past for the traditional penal ceremony or 
what Foucault refers to as the “spectacle of the scaffold.” In the case of Belinda, the 
combination of spectacle and her marked body produces “the truth” of Belinda’s “crime” 
and is “legible for all” (including the reader). As Foucault claims, spectacle and the 
“excess of violence” guarantee the triumph of “truth” and consequently reinscribe the 
unquestioned power of the monarch (Discipline & Punish 34). This unassailable power is 
represented by the Baron, whose position makes him an extension of the King’s power. 
The rape of Belinda’s lock is also a form of what Foucault terms “symbolic torture,” in 
that the form of the “execution” directly implies the nature of the crime. In other words, 
Belinda’s vanity can only be punished by castrating the physical part of the body that is 
responsible for that vanity. Moreover, just as the King’s power follows the criminal even 
after his death in the form of “corpses burnt, ashes thrown to the wind, bodies dragged on 
hurdles and exhibited on the roadside” (Foucault Discipline & Punish 34), it would seem 
the Baron’s power also pursues Belinda to the “Cave of Spleen,” where “She sighs for 
ever on her pensive Bed, / Pain at her Side, and Megrim at her Head” (Pope Canto IV, 
23-4). 
The closest we get to a confession from Belinda is what can be more accurately 
termed “regret”: 
For ever curs’d be this detested Day, 
Which snatch’d my best, my fav’rite Curl away! 
Happy! ah ten times happy, had I been, 
If Hampton-Court these Eyes had never seen! 
Yet am not I the first mistaken Maid, 
By Love of Courts to num’rous Ills betray’d. 
Oh had I rather un-admir’d remain’d 
In some lone Isle, or distant Northern Land; 
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Where the gilt Chariot never marks the Way, 
Where none learn Ombre, none e’er taste Bohea! 
There kept my Charms conceal’d from mortal Eye, 
Like Roses that in Desarts bloom and die. 
What mov’d my Mind with youthful Lords to rome? 
O had I stay’d, and said my Pray’rs at home! (Pope Canto IV, lines 147-
160) 
 
Unlike Amoranda’s statement which looks to the future and promises an altered and 
transformed self, Belinda only looks to the past with regret (“had I been” and “had never 
seen”). Also, Belinda even mitigates her crime, or one might say she even excuses herself 
from her crime, by acknowledging her own inexperience:  “Yet am not I the first 
mistaken Maid.” While Belinda does speak in the first person, this equivocal 
“confession” lacks the self-inventing, self-affirming, and self-realizing potent power of 
Amoranda’s speech act. The Reform’d Coquet stands indeed as an early example of the 
powerful authority of the first person “I” to ‘sell’ the authenticity of what it speaks. 
 However, it is vital that we put aside all our assumptions concerning Amoranda’s 
self-willed new identity and the agency inherent in its first person usage; otherwise we 
will overlook, as I mentioned earlier, how power can insinuate itself even into moments 
of alleged agency. First, her declaration “I have brought myself” may sound like the 
power of self-willed transformation, but it also indicates she accepts total responsibility 
for all that has occurred to her prior to this moment. That is, the novel recognizes that it 
wasn’t male violence or the logic of torture that brought her to this point; it was her own 
coquettish behavior. Second, her assertion—“the finishing stroke is given by my own 
inclination”—strongly implies that she not only accepts the violence that has been done 
to her, but it suggests that she is acting or about to act violently against herself—is her 
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own “torturer” as it were. As Scarry claims, the logic of confession serves to turn the 
tables and “the one annihilated shifts to being the agent of his own annihilation” (47). Her 
use of the phrase “finishing stroke,” moreover, disturbingly invokes the French term 
“coup de grace,” which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as:  “[lit. stroke of grace]: 
a blow by which one condemned or mortally wounded is ‘put out of his misery’ or 
dispatched quickly; hence fig. a finishing stroke, one that settles or puts an end to 
something” (emphasis mine). Just as the suffering torture victim confesses (willingly 
annihilates himself) to put himself out of his own misery—to finally end his intense 
bodily pain, Amoranda also confesses to end the repeated violence against her body. 
Amoranda does indeed “put an end” or applies the “finishing stroke”13
Amoranda’s confession raises one more crucial issue. The novel appears to 
commit an error in logic referred to as non causa pro causa (no cause for a cause), also 
known as the fallacy of the false cause. Amoranda’s moment of self-realization, in which 
 to the novel’s 
project of making her a silenced body not only by confessing but also by marrying 
Formator / Alanthus, since, as the novel wants her and us to think, he will allegedly 
‘protect’ her vulnerable female body. But by now we know that her actual “self” 
annihilation is that she will forfeit to him all her property and the verbal power and 
worldly self-extension it enabled. If in the novel’s beginning Amoranda stood at one end 
of the spectrum of the voice/body power relation as the powerful disembodied voice in 
contrast to Callid’s and Froth’s total embodiment through their deaths, then it is now 
Amoranda who stands at the extreme of absolute disempowered embodiment via her 
confession and subsequent marriage, i.e. the “finishing stroke,” to Alanthus / Formator. 
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she recognizes herself as a coquet, immediately follows the violent scene in the woods. If 
we read this novel as it wants us to—as a narrative about Amoranda’s bildung—this 
cause/effect relationship begs the question:  what is the connection between violence and 
this moment of seeming self-awareness? How can the one prompt the other? Indeed the 
plot would be logically sound if Amoranda’s insight followed one of Formator’s 
“Lectures.” But, as Natasha Saje astutely points out, the reader doesn’t get to see or hear 
about Formator’s process of reforming Amoranda—it’s only generally and briefly 
alluded to (his “daily application” and “Lectures”). The novel’s skewed logic epitomizes 
its total misrecognition of the real anxiety driving this text. Does Amoranda’s coquettish 
behavior bring on Biranthus’s brutality? The novel would have us believe so. Recall, 
however, that Biranthus never even met Amoranda. He saw her a year ago at “the Bath” 
and developed a “Passion” for her (57). A closer look reveals that the real cause is to be 
found with Biranthus—not Amoranda. In the end, Amoranda’s fortune and the 
independence and the worldly self-extension it brings her are the source of patriarchy’s 
retaliatory and aggressive strategy of domination. Indeed, cause-effect in this novel 
works this way:  Amoranda’s coquetry does not cause the violence against her; the 
violence against her—because of her economic independence—causes or produces the 
truth of her coquetry. 
This said, I want once again to reiterate what I have been arguing throughout this 
chapter: the goal of this novel is not to reform Amoranda of her coquetry or to have her 
gradually learn and shed her naiveté from her encounters with harsh reality; the goal is to 
make Amoranda a body and a latently diseased one at that—the coquet body, in other 
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words. As I have shown, following Scarry’s logic of torture, the repeated violence 
enacted against her body leaves Amoranda no choice but to give full attention to her 
suffering, vulnerable body until she exists only as a body and confesses herself as such. 
Amoranda’s confession ironically acts to silence her, since her confession doubles or 
ventriloquizes and so enlarges and empowers the disembodied voice of patriarchy. At the 
site of confession, Amoranda’s absolute incorporeality attests to the “truth” of 
patriarchy’s belief in the always already flawed female. Her body, in other words, 
functions as a material referent for patriarchy’s belief in female inferiority. If we look 
closely at what the narrative wants us to see as Amoranda’s alleged moment of self-
realization, it becomes evident that she cannot be “Reform’d” of her coquetry in the 
literal sense of the word “to form again” (this time without the coquettish behavior). 
Simply stated, there is no “post-coquette” version of Amoranda as Tiffany Potter 
contends (65), because her own words convey that coquetry is always already 
intrinsically and inherently “that Part of our [female] Species.” Amoranda’s change, 
therefore, is not that she is no longer a coquet—because as a biological female this is not 
possible—but that she will “Despise” those who “Flatter” her. Indeed, her only option is 
to scorn those who flatter her. She is still the “Coquet,” only now this “Disease” is 
latent—a disease in remission one might say, ready to surface if not restrained by 
Formator, who, as her guardian, educator, doctor, and now husband, will help to keep this 
female latent disease in check.  
 And herein lies the novel’s curious contradiction—patriarchal power produces 
Amoranda’s coquet body through the logic of torture that forces a confession even as it 
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insists that it discovers Amoranda’s coquet body in the past—it was there all along. The 
narrator points out her susceptibility to it as a child: 
If we trace Human Nature through all the Stages of Life, we shall find 
those Dawnings of the Passions in Children, which riper Years bring to the 
highest perfection; and a Child, rightly considered, may give us a very 
great guess at his Temper, when he comes to be a Man. An Instance of this 
we have in the young Creature already named [Amoranda], who had, ’tis 
true, all the Beauties of her Sex, but then she had the Seeds of their Pride 
and Vanity too. (12) 
 
Our attention should be drawn to the word “Seeds” in this passage, which strongly 
suggests that “Pride and Vanity” are already an interior, organic, bodily presence in 
Amoranda. The narrator also relates at this time that “the whole Woman gather’d in 
[Amoranda’s] Soul,” again strongly suggesting that femaleness is already an inherent 
problem inside Amoranda’s body (13). This search into the heroine’s past and the 
“Seeds” of “Pride and Vanity” it discovers is strikingly similar to Foucault’s definition of 
the “delinquent” whose past, discovered through “biographical investigation,” reveals his 
“affinity with his crime”—certain “instincts, drives, tendencies, character” (Discipline & 
Punish 253). Foucault explains how the “delinquent” differs from “offender”:  “[b]ehind 
the offender,” Foucault claims, “to whom the investigation of the facts may attribute 
responsibility for an offence, stands the delinquent whose slow formation is shown in a 
biographical investigation” (Discipline & Punish 252). In contrast to the old punitive 
system, the modern penal system doesn’t assess its punishment based solely on the “act” 
or offense; it further pursues a “biographical investigation”—it requires a life story to 
account for the offense. This logic, says Foucault, “establishes the criminal before the 
crime” (Discipline & Punish 252). According to Foucault, the prison’s function is not “to 
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eliminate offences”; rather it is to “distinguish them” and use them in a tactics of 
subjection” (Discipline & Punish 272). Thus, with the delinquent, “truth” appears to be 
produced through the democratic process of the criminal investigation and the court 
trial—a truth that is produced in the present through sound reasoning, but the “truth” is 
actually found in the past—in the delinquent’s propensity for crime. The delinquent’s 
“crime” is, in other words, found in his body—his “instincts” and “drives.”  
The Reform’d Coquet produces its truth of Amoranda’s coquetry in the present by 
coercing Amoranda’s confession through physical violence, even as it masquerades as a 
“truth” produced in the present by the means of Enlightenment self-discovery. But, her 
very confession reveals that the “truth” of her coquetry is to be discovered in the past—in 
her already diseased female body. The plotline of The Reform’d Coquet is not about 
curing or eliminating Amoranda’s coquetry, any more than the discourse of delinquency 
is about rehabilitating the offender. “Reform,” as the title promises, is not what this novel 
sets out to do. It’s about distinguishing Amoranda’s coquetry as an inherently female 
disease that requires surveillance and management by male power. In The Reform’d 
Coquet, the truth produced in the present, or what the novel constructs as Enlightenment 
self-discovery, functions to obscure the fact that truth is discovered in the past—in the 
always already diseased body of Amoranda. 
Davys’s The Reform’d Coquet manifests power’s dispersion into other discourses, 
including her female bildungsroman with its individual affirming rhetoric. Strategy-wise 
this makes total sense, since power, according to Foucault, readily appropriates resisting 
strategies for itself, and the self-defining female promised by Enlightenment philosophy 
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is one such resisting strategy. Davys’s own dedication includes a very troubling yet 
telling statement that captures the essence of Foucault’s concept of institutional power. 
Davys writes, “But who can forsake a Fault, till they are convinc’d they are guilty? 
Vanity is a lurking subtle Thief that works itself insensibly into our Bosoms, and while 
we declare our dislike to it, know not ’tis so near us” (3). In these two seemingly innocent 
sentences, which on the surface appear to be an attempt on the part of Davys to create 
female community, she captures disciplinary power’s mechanisms for producing truth:  
first, the production of truth / power / knowledge through institutional torture-punishment 
or the incitement to confess (“till they are convinc’d they are guilty), and second, 
knowledge must be extracted (via torture and confession) from the unknowing subject 
(“know not ’tis so near us”) from the hidden depths of the subject’s body (“works itself 
insensibly into our Bosoms”). Amoranda is surely “convinced” of her “Vanity,” but alas 
the novel implies that it is not simply a “Fault” she can “forsake”; rather it is and has 
always been a part of her female “Bosom”—what Davys also refers to in her novels as a 
“stamp[ed] Deformity” and a “Disease”; the only things Amoranda will “forsake” are her 
fortune, her “Fire and Spirit,” and the disembodied power that both guaranteed her. 
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CHAPTER 2 
“‘Till this moment, I never knew myself’”: 
The Production of Elizabeth Bennet’s Vanity in Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice 
 
Girls blush sometimes because they are alive, 
Half wishing they were dead to save the shame. 
The sudden blush devours them, neck and brow; 
They have drawn too near the fire of life, like gnats, 
And flare up bodily, wings and all. What then? 
Who’s sorry for a gnat . . . or girl? 
    – from Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s Aurora Leigh 
 
 
Perhaps no two female bildungsromans can seem less similar than Mary Davys’s 
The Reform’d Coquet (1724) and Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice (1813). So much 
history divides them, including the history of the novel itself. Anyone who has read 
eighteenth-century novels immediately notices the difference upon reading an Austen 
novel. Indeed, scholarly consensus views Austen as one of the first authors to set a new 
standard of representation and realism in fiction. One of the earliest scholars to 
acknowledge Austen’s contribution is Ian Watt, who notes that Austen’s novels embody 
the culmination of the novelistic form in her skilled integration of Richardsonian 
domestic concerns and her more comprehensive use of Fielding’s less intrusive narrator 
(now termed “free indirect discourse”).1
Upholding the scholarship of Watt, Margaret Doody credits Austen (and other 
women writers of the later eighteenth century) as developing the “ur-model” of a new 
kind of novel, primarily because of their use of free indirect discourse, since this enables 
the reader to sympathize with the individual voices of history while simultaneously 
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viewing characters’ actions through the single, authoritative lens of the narrator/author2. 
John Bender also mentions Austen’s novels as one of the first to fully exploit the use of 
free indirect discourse. Bender views this then-emerging narrative convention, perfected 
by Austen, as a sign of an emerging consciousness that he then relates to the rise of the 
modern prison and of penitentiary authority.3 Mary Poovey views Austen’s use of free 
and indirect discourse as a “doubling” strategy that obligates the reader to actively 
participate in the role of the characters, compelling them to negotiate the oftentimes 
ironic gap between the narrator’s comments and the action of the plot.4 Moreover, 
Poovey and other scholars such as Mary Waldron, view Austen’s lack of authorial 
intrusion as well as her genius with comedy and irony as contributing to her texts’ moral 
ambiguity, in which readers are unable to locate a fixed moral center in any one character 
and consequently are able to freely choose their own interpretation.5
Also acknowledging Austen’s originality in the area of language are George 
Butte, who sees Austen as one of the first authors to offer readers a “newly framed 
intersubjectivity,” made possible by her use of free and indirect discourse.
 In this sense, 
Ausen’s novels are fundamentally different from eighteenth-century novels whose 
didactic purpose was made all too apparent by the frequent use of an intrusive narrator, 
jealously guiding readers’ interpretations.  
6 Christine 
Ross claims Austen recognized language’s ability to construct identity,7 Patricia Howell 
Michaelson views “Austen’s preference for female voices” as her greatest innovation and 
examines the relationship of women’s conversational voices to that of authorized 
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rhetoric.8 Barbara Laughlin Adler examines Austen’s use of interpersonal rhetorical 
styles based on gender.9
Readings from a wider philosophical or political perspective, contributed by such 
scholars as Mary Poovey, Jane Spencer, Anne K. Mellor, Janet Todd, and Kathryn 
Sutherland
 
10
Yet, notwithstanding all of Austen’s genius and her remarkable effect on the 
development of the novel, I will argue that Pride and Prejudice’s logic is, in the end, 
very similar to that of Davys’s popular and sensationalist novel The Reform’d Coquet. 
Indeed, just as The Reformed Coquet functions to embody Amoranda while it pretends to 
reform her of her coquetry and vanity, Pride and Prejudice also operates to embody its 
 recognize her works as products (whether viewed as deliberately political or 
not) of a post-French Revolution paradigm shift in their promotion of liberal, egalitarian, 
individualist and feminist ideals. Her novels are more or less seen by these scholars as a 
dramatic departure from the emotional extremes of Richardsonian-style realism and the 
sensational, popular novels of the early eighteenth century. Austen’s more modernist 
heroines, they more or less claim, have active, rational minds in contrast to the passive, 
irrational, and embodied heroines of the previous century. Indeed, gone from Austen’s art 
are the formulaic seduction, rape, and courtship plots of earlier fiction, whose heroines 
are one dimensional, caricature-like and whose bodies are frequently put through violent 
and implausible events, and in their place appear refreshingly witty, intelligent, and self 
reflective heroines for whom ordinary if not mundane events are the source of their 
maturation and whose marriages are entered into with a heretofore unheard of cool 
rationalism, free will, and equality with their partners.  
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heroine Elizabeth Bennet. The text’s logic, as I will show, tortures Elizabeth into a 
confession of her vanity, and it misrecognizes her confession as a moment of self-willed 
transformation.  
Similar to scholars’ readings of The Reform’d Coquet, earlier and more recent 
scholars of Pride and Prejudice tend to read it as a bildungsroman.  Note how they draw 
on language that situates the novel within the genre by employing words and phrases that 
suggest Elizabeth’s (and sometimes Darcy’s) maturation process:  “development,” 
“progress,” “civility” “a new level,” “makes her way toward,” “romantic bildung,” 
“learns,” “education,” “dispels . . . illusions,” and “realizes.” 11
But more is at stake here than just constrained or limited interpretations. Because 
scholars allow the expectations of the bildungsroman genre to influence if not to fully 
control their interpretations, they inadvertently participate with Elizabeth in what I will 
demonstrate is her selective reconstruction
 As I found in the case of 
The Reform’d Coquet, these scholars’ interpretations are limited by what constitutes the 
genre of a female bildungsroman; their readings reproduce its paradigms. Because of the 
constraints set by what defines this genre, we must inevitably view Elizabeth Bennet as 
having poor judgment and a bruised ego and as having learned (either through her own 
agency or Darcy’s) that her pride (some argue her prejudice) made her blind to 
Wickham’s charms and Darcy’s true gentlemanly nature. Some of us may also see 
evidence to claim that the novel is about Darcy’s bildung as well.  
12 of the past as she forfeits her own 
worldview to Darcy’s masculine dominant worldview. In other words, because scholars 
and readers recognize Elizabeth as undergoing a legitimate self-willed reformation during 
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the pivotal letter scene (in accordance with the expectations of the bildungsroman), they 
are now logically compelled by the genre to view her past perceptions as false and to 
view Wickham as the villain, even though upon a first reading they may have viewed 
Elizabeth as having sound judgment and accurate perceptions and believed Wickham’s 
story along with Elizabeth.13 To place the novel in the bildungsroman genre, in other 
words, the reader must necessarily embrace Darcy’s letter to Elizabeth as a revelation of 
the “truth” about Wickham’s villainous character, since Darcy relates in the letter that 
Wickham nearly seduced his sister. The letter also compels the reader, along with 
Elizabeth, to revise his/her view of Darcy’s character, because the letter reveals him as a 
protector of his sister, not only because he rescues her from Wickham’s alleged plans, but 
because his prior silence on the matter shows that he cares about protecting his sister’s 
reputation. Furthermore, the letter itself indirectly suggests that Darcy truly cares about 
what Elizabeth thinks of him, enough to spend time composing it and then in revealing 
private family matters to her.  Clearly the letter scene is essential to interpreting the novel 
as a bildungsroman, because it requires that Elizabeth and the reader revise Elizabeth’s 
now-known-to-be false version of reality.  But if as readers we resist our overwhelming 
desire for a romance between Darcy and Elizabeth, we can ask some crucial questions:  
Why does Darcy’s letter have so much weight with Elizabeth and readers? Does he really 
describe the “truth” or is he producing it? Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s Outline of a 
Theory of Practice (1977), Masculine Domination (2001), and Language and Symbolic 
Power (1991), I will argue that Darcy’s letter constitutes a performative utterance that 
because of his gender and social position magically brings about the reality it describes. 
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Moreover, his words act as a prophecy of the future, reaffirming the continued legitimacy 
of his power. I will further show, following John Bender’s Imagining the Penitentiary 
(1987), that Darcy’s letter represents the new demands of juridical evidence at the time, 
which began to take a narrative form that included details of time and space that produce 
a more “truthful” version of reality. I will also show that the letter represents what Bender 
views as the new penitentiary narrative, imposing a reformed identity on the prisoner 
through daily routine. 
Indeed, it will become clear that, after reading Darcy’s letter, Elizabeth is not 
suddenly viewing reality as it is and always was, and she is also not willingly choosing 
which version of reality (Darcy’s or Wickham’s) to believe—all of which would imply 
agency. Rather, I will argue that through the logic of torture, the novel forces Elizabeth 
(and by extension the reader) to adopt Darcy’s or masculine power’s version of reality. 
As I will show, the novel is much less about two competing narratives (Darcy’s and 
Wickham’s) than it is about two alternative perceptions of reality (Elizabeth’s and 
Darcy’s), and Elizabeth’s “foible” is that she is a woman who presumes to create reality 
through her perceptions. While the novel would like us to view Elizabeth as undergoing a 
powerfully subjective moment of self-willed transformation, I will demonstrate that 
Elizabeth’s moment is really a forced confession and that Darcy is just one (perhaps the 
most important) of the novel’s patriarchal spokespersons whose version of reality is, as I 
said, ultimately endorsed by the novel’s logic. Similar to Amoranda’s subjecting 
experience in The Reform’d Coquet, Elizabeth is both produced as, and discovered to 
have always been, a diseased female body. The novel’s logic tortures Elizabeth not only 
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through repeatedly shaming her but also by repeatedly ousting her from her subjective 
all-knowing position and repositioning her in the powerless object position. The novel 
also tortures her through the rhetorical devices of Darcy’s letter. Darcy, I will show, is 
exempt from the vulnerable body and operates primarily as the bodiless, all-knowing and 
all-seeing authority from the novel’s very beginning, coming to occupy this position 
completely by the novel’s end. Finally, I will show that Wickham is not so much the 
story’s villain as he is another victim of masculine power. 
Just as The Reform’d Coquet represented Amoranda, Pride and Prejudice 
represents Elizabeth Bennet as primarily bodiless in the first part of the novel (prior to 
reading Darcy’s letter). Indeed, Kay Young captures the reader’s experience of 
Elizabeth’s character when she says, “We don’t experience her body’s countours pressing 
upon us as her readers” (80). She further describes Elizabeth as “formless” and 
“unbounded,” but Young also adds that “we do feel her thinking presence” (80). At the 
novel’s beginning, Elizabeth’s noncorporeality implies her power and agency since, as 
explained in the previous chapter, objects in the world act as extensions of one’s body 
and enable one to exist primarily as a voice or disembodied power. Unlike Amoranda, 
however, the reader experiences Elizabeth not so much as a voice but as the 
perceiver/creator of the novel’s reality. In other words, we don’t hear her like we did 
Amoranda so much as we get to see or perceive through her other characters and the 
world in which she lives. Austen’s skilled management of free indirect discourse 
somewhat accounts for our experience as Margaret Doody explains: “[o]nce we accept a 
narrating author as a surrogate ‘I,’ the interfused character hidden in the narrative 
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becomes also a form of ‘I’ before the reader is aware” (290). As the “interfused 
character,” Elizabeth Bennet is the authoritative voice in the novel’s beginning whether 
we are aware of it or not. 
Also unlike Amoranda is that Elizabeth’s alleged “crime” of reading and knowing 
the world appears more offensive. After all, Elizabeth is not an heiress; she, if anything is 
in a much more financially vulnerable position than Amoranda, because of the entail on 
her father’s estate. But Elizabeth is of the leisured, gentry class, and while she can exist 
secure and bodiless, because of her father’s present ownership of property (enabling his 
own and his family’s worldly extension via the ownership of objects), her liminal 
position between belonging to her father and her future husband tends to make her 
presumption to knowledge of reality a greater social transgression. 
It is through Elizabeth that we perceive and believe in the world that she creates; 
it is through her viewpoint that we come to know and either like (trust) or dislike 
(distrust) other characters. Elizabeth’s ‘reading’ of her world becomes our reading. Why 
does the reader have such faith in her perceptions up to the point at which she reads 
Darcy’s letter? Can Austen’s skilled use of free indirect discourse fully account for it? I 
would like to offer other reasons:  first, she asserts herself with confidence, which 
encourages our acceptance of the version of reality she offers. When Jane, for example, 
refuses to choose between Wickham’s story and Bingley’s good judgment, Jane 
frustratingly says, “One does not know what to think,’” Elizabeth immediately counters 
with, “‘I beg your pardon;—one knows exactly what to think’” (65). Elizabeth’s assertive 
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style and total confidence do not allow for doubt in her version of reality. In this respect, 
she is very much like Amoranda of The Reform’d Coquet. 
Also, Elizabeth’s judgment of others seems impartial, even about those closest to 
her. When Jane tries to defend Charlotte’s marriage to Mr. Collins, Elizabeth responds 
with, “‘You shall not, for the sake of one individual, change the meaning of principle and 
integrity, nor endeavour to persuade yourself or me, that selfishness is prudence, and 
insensibility of danger, security of happiness’” (105). Here we cannot help but be 
persuaded by Elizabeth, since she assesses her own close friend’s behavior so impartially; 
she demonstrates that emotional attachments do not cloud her judgment. 
Elizabeth yet again demonstrates rational and unbiased thinking (even when her 
own interests are concerned) when her aunt suggests Wickham’s motivations are 
“mercenary” in nature because of his pursuit of the monied Miss King. She points out her 
aunt’s gender and class biases by reminding her that she herself had just recently advised 
Elizabeth not to be imprudent by considering a possible match with the penniless 
Wickham, whereas now she finds fault with him because he is pursuing someone with 
money. Here Elizabeth suggests that “prudence” seems to be a euphemism for “avarice” 
but only for the person (male or female) in a position of power:  “Where does discretion 
end and avarice begin?” she asks her aunt (118). 
Later, Elizabeth shows she is far from naïve or gullible when she tells Jane that 
“the more I see of the world, the more am I dissatisfied with it; and every day confirms 
my belief of the inconsistency of all human characters, and of the little dependence that 
can be placed on the appearance of either merit or sense” (104). Elizabeth’s comment 
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sounds like the accumulated wisdom garnered from worldly experience; we also learn 
from this dialogue that Elizabeth is quite aware that appearances cannot be trusted. This 
reaffirms our trust in Elizabeth’s perceptions and our confidence in her previous 
forthright assessments of other characters, especially with regard to her reading of 
Wickham.  
Elizabeth does not readily embrace Wickham’s story as the “truth” as many 
scholars argue. Contrary to their readings,14
Indeed, to claim in hindsight—after the reader and Elizabeth read Darcy’s letter, 
in which he constructs Wickham as the equivalent of the villainous eighteenth-century 
“rake”—that Elizabeth is blinded by Wickham’s charms or is motivated by hurt pride is 
an interpretation that can only be applied after the reader herself accepts Darcy’s letter as 
the “true” version, and it is a reading that seems inconsistent with Elizabeth’s character as 
we have known it so far. Her general reasonableness at this time weakens the stance that 
 I do not see her as blinded by Wickham’s 
charms or as motivated to believe Wickham because of Darcy’s personal insult. Indeed, 
Elizabeth shows good judgment by not accepting either Bingley’s or his sister’s partial, 
second-hand knowledge of the issue (from Darcy himself no less), especially since she is 
quite aware (from her long stay at Netherfield) of Caroline’s attraction to Darcy and 
Bingley’s deference to his opinions. At Netherfield, Elizabeth also observes Caroline’s 
blatant hypocrisy. Consequently, neither Bingley nor Caroline is a reliable source for 
information on either Wickham (whom neither has met) or Darcy as far as Elizabeth is 
concerned. Elizabeth is left only with what little information she has at the present time 
(their manners) in order to make any judgment about their character.  
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claims Elizabeth’s only recourse to Darcy’s insult is for her to believe in his despicable 
nature and to grasp onto anything, including Wickham’s story, which either supports this 
view or flatters her. This latter interpretation inadvertently reproduces the weak and 
powerless position of women whose only recourse to injustice is to what Pierre Bourdieu 
terms “gray power” (“eminence grise”), which describes the means of the weak, since 
they are denied access to legitimate power and only have access to underhanded, sneaky, 
unofficial methods (Outline of a Theory of Practice 41). Prior to the letter scene and in 
the context of the majority of Elizabeth’s accurate perceptions, we cannot help but see 
her as acting rationally with regard to the Wickham versus Darcy issue. 
Another reason we believe in Elizabeth’s perceptions is because she knows things 
or comes to know things, making her the center point from which information either 
flows or is received. She has access to “inside” information in other words, and it is why 
readers align themselves with her view. We are placed in the omniscient position with 
her. For example, Elizabeth is in the right place at the right time to overhear the 
conversation between Bingley and Darcy at the dance and learns of Darcy’s feelings 
about the dance itself and toward the people attending it (including herself). Here we 
come to know Darcy’s classism and sexism and Bingley’s inability to influence his 
friend. Elizabeth also seems to know others better than they know themselves. Elizabeth 
tells Charlotte, for example, that, with regard to Jane’s attraction to Bingley, Jane “is not 
acting by design. As yet, she cannot even be certain of the degree of her own regard, nor 
its reasonableness,” even though Jane had earlier confessed to Elizabeth (again, she is 
recipient of privileged information) “how very much she admired” Bingley without any 
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equivocation (9). The reader does not doubt her assessment of Jane. She also becomes 
privy to how Bingley, Darcy, Bingley’s sister, and Mrs. Hurst interact, since she 
socializes with them frequently while at Netherfield. Because of this, we learn of 
Caroline Bingley’s attraction to Darcy and Bingley’s deference to Darcy’s judgment. It’s 
as if Austen knew she needed to find a reason to bring Elizabeth to Netherfield because 
we wouldn’t learn anything about the characters there if we were to see them through 
Jane’s eyes.  
Indeed, without Elizabeth’s perceptions, the reader would have no reference point 
for reality; we wouldn’t know which characters to like or dislike or which characters to 
trust or distrust. Is the novel setting up Elizabeth for her later fall, so it can deliver on its 
title’s hubris of “pride and prejudice” just as the reader expects Amoranda to be reformed 
of her coquetry in The Reform’d Coquet? Is the novel only fully exploiting the 
possibilities of free indirect discourse, in which, as Margaret Doody contends, we must 
experience the faults of certain characters, because it is necessary in order “to reach the 
other side, the comprehensive shore of the author’s moral view” (290)? Perhaps. But 
there is one very important condition necessary for either of these readings:  the reader 
must interpret the character of Elizabeth in accordance with the logic of the 
bildungsroman and is consequently constrained to see Elizabeth as having successfully 
“reach[ed] the other side” (from pride to humility, from prejudice to tolerance, from 
naïveté to wisdom, from childhood to womanhood, etc.) and to see Darcy’s letter as the 
final corrective of Elizabeth’s false perceptions, which, needless to say, the reader is now 
required to believe have been heretofore skewed by her “pride and prejudice.” 
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Instead of a bildungsroman genre-controlled interpretation, I propose that 
Elizabeth’s actual ‘female flaw’ or hubris is her occupation of a masculine 
epistemological position. Moreover, the text misrecognizes this as Elizabeth’s vanity—
yes, her vanity—not either her “pride” or “prejudice,” which is the way in which most 
readers misrecognize her flaw. Indeed, the novel’s title itself (just like The Reform’d 
Coquet) ensures we misrecognize the heroine’s actual foible. Elizabeth holds the position 
of the powerful patriarch, in other words, of what Bourdieu in Masculine Domination 
terms “paternal prophecy,” in which the father’s words function as “verdicts” (either as 
“orders, blessings, or curses”) as well as a “prediction of wisdom,” which “magically 
bring about what he states”; he is a “quasi-divine visionary” whose wisdom and 
experience can read signs that are unintelligible to others and can send the future into the 
past and give sanction to the yet unknown future (70). It is accurate to say that 
Elizabeth’s assertiveness frequently comes across as her giving “orders” (“One knows 
exactly what to think”) that compel us and Jane to accept her version of reality. Also, 
Elizabeth’s expressed dissatisfaction with the world can be read as the “kill-joy realism” 
that Bourdieu attributes to the patriarch, whose words align with the “order of things,” 
while Jane’s views reflect the “maternal comprehension” that responds to “the paternal 
verdict with a questioning of necessity and an affirmation of contingency based on a pure 
act of faith” (71). Jane’s repeated refusals to believe (to take any unequivocal position) 
that either Wickham or Darcy is guilty or that Caroline Bingley has ulterior motives 
reveal this “faith” that resists the masculine and reality-creating viewpoint (via 
Elizabeth). 
73 
 
In terms of Bourdieu’s concept of “paternal prophecy,” we can see that, at least in 
the beginning, the novel not only constructs Elizabeth as an accurate observer of reality 
but that her words are sometimes performances that create reality. This helps to explain 
why we have such confidence in her viewpoint. For instance, Elizabeth says to Jane “He 
[Bingley] could not help seeing that you were about five times as pretty as every other 
woman in the room. No thanks to his gallantry for that” (9). She then gives Jane her 
patriarchal “blessing” to like Bingley:  “I give you leave to like him,” suggesting that 
Elizabeth foresees a successful relationship and that Bingley will not eventually 
disappoint her sister like the “stupider” men of the past that Jane liked (9). Also, 
Elizabeth gives her “verdict” (and her father agrees) that Mr. Collins is not a “sensible” 
man, and later she and her father exchange knowing glances when Mr. Collins fulfills her 
paternal prediction of his personality (48-51). Also, it is Elizabeth who must validate the 
truth (reality) of Sir William Lucas’s announcement of Charlotte’s engagement, when no 
one in the Bennet family believes him (96-7). Stated another way, Charlotte’s 
engagement does not exist until Elizabeth says it does. Most significantly, the novel 
immediately follows Elizabeth’s first assessment of Darcy—“I think him very 
disagreeable” (58)—with Wickham’s story about Darcy’s shameful behavior (58-64), 
and, of course, Darcy’s subsequent rude and mean behavior at the Netherfield ball and his 
removal of Bingley from Netherfield. Her words seem to call into being the very thing 
she utters. The entire town of Longbourn comes to dislike Darcy (107), and it is as if 
Elizabeth’s perception of him becomes the town’s, the novel’s, and the reader’s reality. 
Let me repeat, however, that Elizabeth occupies this powerful god-like masculine 
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position only in the first part of the novel, for the novel’s logic gradually tortures and 
coerces her into a blind, unknowing, passive, embodied object position. 
The novel begins its coercion of Elizabeth almost immediately, producing her 
specifically female “vanity” even as it will purport to have just discovered this “vanity” 
in Elizabeth’s past. The novel plays out this logic in three ways:  1) it repeatedly places 
her in the female “body-for-others” or object position, eventually overthrowing her from 
her original powerful male position of bodiless subjective perceiver, 2) it repeatedly 
shames Elizabeth until she confesses herself a diseased female body, and 3) it 
interrogates and tortures her through the rhetorical devices of Darcy’s letter. This 
repetition of violence both on and within three fronts, moreover, enacts torture’s 
depraved logic, in which the torturer repeatedly and with increasing intensity continues to 
interrogate and/or torment his victim until he confesses. 
Unlike The Reform’d Coquet, which is overtly physical and even literal in its 
escalating application of violence to Amoranda’s body, Pride and Prejudice deploys its 
increasing violence very subtly. We could say that the novel more resourcefully uses 
what Bourdieu refers to as “symbolic violence,” that is, the “gentle, hidden violence” that 
has been “euphemized,” or is “socially recognized violence” (191-2). In other words, the 
logic of torture has become extremely proficient at insinuating itself into a variety of 
benign and current discourses. While comparable to The Reform’d Coquet, in that 
violence against Elizabeth is still misrecognized as either bildung or romance, Pride and 
Prejudice departs from the The Reform’d Coquet in that we further misrecognize the 
violence because it has been euphemized into what constitutes the discourse of proper 
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social behavior (i.e. manners) and into what scholars have recognized as Austen’s ironic 
comedy. Whereas in The Reform’d Coquet, in which a popular discourse of violence (i.e. 
rakish cruelty) barely concealed the violence of masculine power, Pride and Prejudice’s 
attention to what constitutes proper and improper manners and its “light and bright and 
sparkling” comedy makes the violence in Austen’s novel much more soft, silent, and 
barely able to register even on the close reader’s radar. Violence and comedy are not 
mutually exclusive, however. Recall that in Discipline and Punish, Foucault discusses the 
theatricality of execution in the Middle Ages and the sense of Saturnalian festival15 that 
accompanied these violent displays of the king’s power. The logic of torture that I find 
present in Pride and Prejudice clearly contains traces of these Saturnalian celebrations 
that attended public torture as we find ourselves laughing and even taking pleasure in 
Elizabeth’s many humiliations.16
As just stated above, one way that the novel tortures Elizabeth into a body is by 
repetitively repositioning her from the perceiver to the one perceived. Indeed, the first 
time we get any sense at all of Elizabeth’s physical body is when Darcy makes his 
comments to Bingley at the dance about Elizabeth’s looks: “‘She is tolerable; but not 
handsome enough to tempt me’” (7). Elizabeth occupies the perceived or object position 
rather than her usual privileged disembodied masculine position as perceiver or subject 
position. Significantly, this sudden view of Elizabeth is based on Darcy’s perception, and 
here we see that Darcy’s view of reality begins slowly to insinuate itself into the novel. 
Darcy is the primary spokesperson of patriarchal power, and his subjective position in 
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this scene places him in the very powerful position of the male gazer. As such, his gaze 
begins to create Elizabeth’s embodiment. 
The novel again deploys this subject/object positional switch against Elizabeth 
when Darcy begins to notice his attraction to her: “But no sooner had he made it clear to 
himself and his friends that she had hardly a good feature in her face, than he began to 
find it was rendered uncommonly intelligent by the beautiful expression of her dark eyes” 
(16). There are two things we must notice here—first, Elizabeth is again the object of 
Darcy’s or patriarchal power’s gaze; however, this time he finds her attractive. Darcy is, 
in a very real and disturbing sense, creating Elizabeth’s body; the scene comes across as 
if, on a godlike whim, he decided to give her beautiful eyes and has the power to indulge 
such a whim. Furthermore, Darcy’s view manages our (the reader’s) view of Elizabeth. 
His earlier assessment of her (“tolerable”; “not handsome enough”) forced us to alter any 
previous images we might have had of her, and now his reassessment of her forces us to 
reconceive her eyes as beautiful. Moreover, it is interesting that Elizabeth’s eyes are what 
the novel focuses on in terms of her beauty, since I cannot help but think that Darcy here, 
as representative of masculine power, has objectified the very bodily feature that enables 
Elizabeth to perceive and interpret the world around her. In essence, he turns Elizabeth’s 
powerful Medusian reality-creating eyes into passive objects. Symbolically speaking, 
Elizabeth’s eyes can no longer embody others (turn others to stone); rather, Darcy’s male 
gaze turns her eyes into stone, embodying them and stripping them of their power. 
Peculiar as it may sound, the male gaze both objectifies and blinds Elizabeth, which leads 
me to my second point:  that Elizabeth is totally unaware of (blind to) Darcy’s sudden 
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attraction to her.  It is the beginning of the novel’s attempt to strip Elizabeth of her virtual 
omniscience (unlimited vision) that dominates the beginning of the novel. 
Yet another instance of this kind of symbolic violence enacted against Elizabeth is 
when she decides to walk to Netherfield to attend Jane during her illness. At first it seems 
we can view Elizabeth’s walk with its consequent “weary ankles,” “dirty stockings,” and 
flushed face (24-5) in terms of Bourdieu’s idea of “a body for oneself,” in which the 
“active and acting” female takes back her body or removes it from the male gaze; “it is 
no longer merely a thing that is made to be looked at or which one has to look at in order 
to prepare it to be looked at” (Masculine Domination 67). However, Elizabeth is 
immediately denied this “body for oneself” position and is relegated to being a “body for 
others” when Darcy notices “the brilliancy which exercise had given to her complexion” 
(24). His gaze immediately places her body in the object position. Later, the novel again 
places Elizabeth in the object position when she joins Caroline Bingley in walking about 
the room (41). Most readers infer, as Rachel M. Brownstein points out, that Caroline does 
this purposely to provide Darcy with the opportunity of comparing their beauty (52). 
However, the novel still places Elizabeth in the object position and grants Darcy leave for 
gazing at both of them (since he actually says this is what he is going to do and even 
changes chairs). And, despite the fact that Elizabeth just a few pages earlier had finally 
become aware of Darcy’s gaze and refuses to be the object of it (“she liked him too little 
to care for his approbation” [38]), we still start to suspect that the novel’s logic has 
Elizabeth willingly give up her body to Darcy’s gaze. It is a subtle but significant sign 
that the novel’s coercions are having an effect on Elizabeth. 
78 
 
There is only once instance when we see Elizabeth resist the novel’s pressure to 
embody her, and it is when Mr. Collins proposes marriage. In this scene we see what 
George Butte refers to as a “struggle for control of interpretations of perception” (111), in 
which Elizabeth ultimately “defuses Collins’ narrative and gaze” (112).17 Indeed, 
Elizabeth refuses to occupy the object position, in which Collins (masculine power’s 
spokesperson) attempts to place her. We can read this scene as masculine power’s failed 
attempt to embody Elizabeth by pressuring her, or, more accurately, interrogating her into 
a confession of coquetry. Similar to what we saw in The Reform’d Coquet, Collins’s 
language reveals the conflation of speech modes that Elaine Scarry argues are evident in 
the torturer’s interrogation:  the torturer’s sentences demonstrate the uncertainty of the 
interrogatory even as they also reveal the dominance of the imperative. If a marriage 
proposal is, in essence, a question, and the proposer is uncertain of the answer, then 
Collins’s alleged “proposal” (question) assumes Elizabeth has already accepted his 
proposal: “On that head [referring to her lack of fortune], therefore, I shall be uniformly 
silent; and you may assure yourself that no ungenerous reproach shall ever pass my lips 
when we are married” (82). Although very subtle, his technique resembles the 
interrogator’s whose alleged questions are really demonstrative. We can also look at this 
scene another way:  after each of her refusals (akin to her not confessing), he attempts to 
interrogate her by repeatedly imposing the label of “coquet” until he gets the answer he 
wants (her confession of coquetry):  “You would have been less amiable in my eyes had 
there not been this little unwillingness” (80); “your natural delicacy may lead you to 
dissemble” (80); “it is usual with young ladies to reject the addresses of the man whom 
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they secretly mean to accept” (82); “I know it to be the established custom of your sex to 
reject a man on the first application, and perhaps you have even now said as much to 
encourage my suit as would be consistent with the true delicacy of the female character” 
(83). Similar to the accused but non-confessing witches, Elizabeth’s refusals to confess 
are viewed as further evidence of why she needs to confess. The Inquisitorial torturers 
frequently claimed that non-confessing witches used witchcraft to sustain themselves 
through torture (Institoris 227-30). In other words, an accused woman’s refusal to confess 
was rationalized as further proof of her guilt of witchcraft and justified more torture. The 
logic of the scene also parallels the logic of torture in which the torturer/interrogator 
offers his own reasons for the victim’s refusal to confess as he continues to apply his 
violence to the victim’s body after each refusal to confess. And while the scene may be 
quite comical (Elizabeth herself can barely keep from laughing), it is important that we 
recognize its violence, especially since, with each of his attempts after her refusals, he 
becomes increasingly “more hostile” as Butte also interprets this scene (111). Collins’s 
comments seem preposterous at first glance as he attempts to impose the coquet body of 
the eighteenth-century heroine on Elizabeth. This scene exemplifies Austen’s sense of 
ironic comedy, because the reader knows that Elizabeth is simply incomparable to early 
eighteenth-century heroines like Amoranda. But, the novel’s logic, as I am arguing, is 
indeed disturbingly similar (which will become more evident below), because it will 
eventually succeed when wielded by Darcy. This scene also works to deflect from the 
novel’s project of embodying Elizabeth:  in showing her as refusing Collins’s version of 
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reality, it ensures the reader believes that Elizabeth’s later acceptance of Darcy and his 
perception of what constitutes reality is both rational and an act of free will.  
One of the novel’s other effective means of torturing Elizabeth is through 
repeated humiliation, culminating in the humiliation and shame that Darcy’s letter brings. 
In the multiple scenes where this torture occurs, the novel would have us understand 
these scenes as follows: first, that Elizabeth’s family’s vulgar and uncouth manners are 
the sources of her repeated shame;18 and two, that Elizabeth is very concerned about 
Darcy’s reactions to her family’s behavior, suggesting she may be more attracted to him 
than she knows herself to be. I ask the reader, however, to consider this alternative 
reading:  that masculine power actively shames Elizabeth in each of these scenes. As I 
explained in the previous chapter, masculine power may or may not operate through 
biologically male characters; its diffusion throughout the novel enables it to deploy any 
and many strategies to embody Elizabeth. Rather than reading Elizabeth’s humiliations in 
the very comical if not much less serious context of literal and straightforward social 
embarrassments,19
In all of these scenes then, masculine power attempts to incarnate Elizabeth, 
working through the amusing and seemingly escalating social transgressions of her 
family members. She feels naked, exposed, and vulnerable (the passive object position of 
 whose misrepresentations and miscommunications may pleasurably 
thwart the inevitable heterosexual attraction between the hero and heroine, I view these 
moments as epitomizing Foucault’s concept of a “strategy without a subject,” and I ask 
readers to see the violence, despite power’s diffusion and deflection of it through these 
other readily available and even expected discourses.  
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being female), and her body registers her “ontological shame” as John Liman terms the 
shame of being female. Indeed, power produces through a strategically insinuated logic 
of torture Elizabeth’s disturbed, agitated, and blushing body, which now comes to the 
foreground more frequently than we have yet seen; note how the language used either 
explicitly or implicitly conveys bodily disturbance:  “Elizabeth, blushing for her mother” 
(32); “the general pause which ensued made Elizabeth tremble” (33); “they were dances 
of mortification . . . [that] gave her all the shame and misery which a disagreeable partner 
for a couple of dances can give” (68); “It vexed her to see him expose himself to such a 
man” (75); “deeply was she vexed to find that her mother was talking to that one person” 
(75); “Elizabeth blushed and blushed again with shame and vexation” (76); and 
“Elizabeth’s eyes were fixed on [Mary] with most painful sensations” (77); “Elizabeth 
was in agonies” (77). Power shames, vexes, pains, agonizes, mortifies, and 
physiologically alters the blood flow of Elizabeth’s body. Interestingly, Elizabeth’s use of 
the words “vexed” and “mortification” contain traces of torture in their meanings. The 
Oxford English Dictionary Online gives us the obsolete meaning of “vexation” as “the 
action of subjecting to violence or force,” and it defines “mortification” as “the action of 
mortifying the body, its appetites, etc. . . . by the self-infliction or voluntary toleration of 
bodily pain and discomfort.” Mortification’s “self-infliction” of pain constructs Elizabeth 
as the agent of her own suffering, which deflects responsibility for her suffering from 
masculine power. Also, rather than viewing mortification of the body as a ritual that has 
denial of the body as its goal, so that it brings the individual closer to God or spirit, we 
can instead view it as Elaine Scarry does suffering in the Old Testament—as a means for 
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total embodiment. The religious believer’s tangible and pained body validates the 
intangible, noncorporeality of God just as Elizabeth’s diseased female body will validate 
the abstract and arbitrary concept of masculine domination. 
In addition to paternal power operating to embody Elizabeth through the 
discourses of what constitutes proper and improper social conduct and the comedy that 
such conduct may produce, it also manifests itself through Darcy, who plays an important 
role in each of these scenes. He is, as I said, power’s primary agent in the novel, and it is 
his presence that is the deciding factor as to whether or not Elizabeth feels shame (even 
though her family is the cause). Notice that Elizabeth repeatedly looks at him for his 
responses,20 and it may seem at first glance that Elizabeth is responsible for her own 
shameful feelings, that she is, in fact, the one bringing Darcy’s reactions to bear on her 
physically. What’s more, her bodily suffering appears to stem from a paranoid and 
compulsive masochism, in which she constantly glances at Darcy to gauge his reactions. 
Her bodily responses in this context seem to have less to do with her family’s behavior 
than they do with his presence and judgment of her. It is within this framework that I see 
Darcy as the origin of Elizabeth’s repeated shame, and consequently my reading departs 
from the sociological or critical perspectives that other scholars have applied to these 
scenes.21
To more easily see the relation of power operating in these scenes between 
Elizabeth and Darcy, in other words, we must reexamine the concept of shame in its more 
political context, especially when it is used as a tool or method of torture. Darcy in this 
new context represents what Liman’s politics of shame refer to as the lie of power and its 
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concomitant evasion of shame, in which power projects what should be its own shame 
onto the Other’s body (566). Darcy, in other words, represents the “active” and “veiled” 
behavior that attends power’s lies and misrepresentations and its subsequent evasion of 
its own shameful behavior (563). If we re-examine Elizabeth’s mortifications, we see that 
the normally perceptive Elizabeth has a difficult time reading Darcy; he either walks 
away, or he simply cannot be read by her.22 First let me point out that there is a direct 
correlation here between Elizabeth’s embodiment in these scenes and her inability to 
perceive or read Darcy. In effect, the novel is now actively removing her from her 
godlike virtually omniscient position and enabling Darcy to assume that position to some 
extent. Embodiment and blindness go hand in hand, since in this novel power is 
represented by their opposite:  disembodiment and omniscience—about reading others 
and constructing the novel’s reality. In terms of shame in its political context, we can also 
say that Darcy appears shameless; as power’s representative, he evades the shame that 
should be his. As I said, he either walks away (i.e. evasion) or his face is totally 
illegible—impenetrable. It does not bear the usual marks of shame and exposure 
(blushing). He appears, if anything, totally disinterested. The novel’s construction of 
Darcy in these scenes protects him from any accountability for Elizabeth’s suffering. 
While Elizabeth bears his (power’s) shame as female disempowered embodiment, Darcy 
remains shameless and bodiless because he projected his shame onto Elizabeth. Indeed 
male shame or what Liman terms “ethical shame” is about the cover-up, but, unlike 
female shame, its body plays no part. Masculine shame is not about passivity, exposure, 
and embodiment; this is why Elizabeth cannot perceive or read him; for, symbolically 
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speaking, there is no body to be read. Masculine shame is “active” in the sense that it 
controls perception of itself and others through misrepresentation or through whatever 
capacity it wants to be represented. Power itself enables this shameful act (viewed by 
others as shamelessness) even as the shameful act further enables power. While it may 
appear that the feeling of shame in these scenes originates with Elizabeth, the political 
reality is that shame begins with the shameful lie of power and its cover-up of its shame 
(also a lie and shameful) as Liman contends. Thus the shameful lie in this novel begins 
with masculine power’s project of embodying Elizabeth and its cover up of that shameful 
act through its misrepresentation of itself and Elizabeth, since power’s lie of evasion 
(misrepresentation of itself) also includes the misrepresentation of femaleness as 
powerlessness and vulnerability, which is a purely political move guised as an inherent 
quality of femaleness.  
Despite masculine power’s many attempts to embody Elizabeth in Volume I, at 
the beginning of Volume II, Elizabeth still occupies the powerful all-knowing, reality-
creating position. Elizabeth confidently asserts that Caroline Bingley is primarily 
responsible for her brother’s sudden removal from Netherfield (and we believe her), and 
it is through Elizabeth’s perceptions that we come to know (and dislike) Lady Catherine 
and her daughter. We also see that Elizabeth’s negative verdict pertaining to Charlotte’s 
marriage to Mr. Collins is carried out, since Elizabeth observes that Charlotte purposely 
sits in the drawing room to avoid conversations with her own husband (129). 
Consequently, the novel must deploy yet another and more vigorous method of torture to 
produce Elizabeth’s confession. Masculine coercion, unexpectedly, reaches its most 
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intense application of torture in the form of a seemingly innocuous letter that finally 
extorts Elizabeth’s confession. Why do Elizabeth and readers come to accept Darcy’s 
letter as “truth”? Moreover, doesn’t the letter constitute what might actually be Darcy’s 
confession? Isn’t this his vulnerable, self-exposing moment? What exactly is it about this 
letter that transforms Elizabeth’s reading of it into a tortuous experience?  
The novel certainly wants us to accept Darcy’s letter as “truth” and as an example 
of his feminine vulnerability. Indeed Fiona Stafford views it as a “window into the very 
heart of the man” (xxv). Lloyd W. Brown sees the letter as revealing the real Darcy, as if 
we finally get to see the human side to the heretofore aloof and illegible Darcy (132). It is 
my position, however, that this letter only pretends to a disclosure of the alleged “truth.” 
Power, in other words, retreats behind a performance of honesty and full disclosure. 
Darcy is not finally disclosing a “truth” that has existed all along; he, as patriarchal 
power’s spokesperson, manufactures a “truth” to impose on Elizabeth through the logic 
of torture. Darcy’s version of reality conveyed through the letter ultimately renders the 
reality created by Elizabeth up until this point as distortion and misrepresentation. How 
does this happen? First, Darcy (power) uses the generative force (to use Bourdieu’s term) 
of two discourses in this letter:  classical argument and law. Indeed, the letter is framed 
by the concept of “justice” and, in fact, it reads more like a lawyer’s persuasive argument 
or a legal deposition. It is loaded with such legal jargon as “justice,” “two offences,” 
“investigations,” “decisions,” “testimony,” “appeal,” “acquit,” and the summoning of 
“witnesses.” The opening even “demands” that Elizabeth read the letter—not because it 
is important to Darcy that Elizabeth really know him and the so-called truth, but because 
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he says it is a matter of “justice.” Also, Barbara Laughlin Adler points out that Darcy’s 
letter employs “classical rhetoric,” the principles of which were included as part of men’s 
education in Austen’s time (166). Following classical form, the letter’s opening properly 
restates Elizabeth’s position and then moves into providing evidence for his opposing 
position (Adler 171). In contrast to the emotion that Stafford seems to see in the letter, I 
read the letter as relying heavily on ethos, ostensibly providing “objective information” 
and “expert testimony” that Adler claims Darcy skillfully employs in the letter (171).  By 
drawing on the discourses of law and classical argument, Darcy comes to represent what 
Bourdieu calls the “legitimate speaker” whose “formally correct” utterance not only 
utters “what is right” but “what ought to be” (Language & Symbolic Power 41-42). 
Consequently, both Elizabeth and readers tend to unquestioningly embrace Darcy’s letter 
as the “truth,” because both already recognize Darcy as a “legitimate speaker” authorized 
by his gender, aristocratic class position, and education.  
Moreover, legal rhetoric had acquired even greater meaning and legitimization at 
this time. The legal discourse of Darcy’s letter represent what John Bender in Imagining 
the Penitentiary sees as constituting the new laws of proof that emerged in the eighteenth 
century. The courtroom became a site of competing narratives, and the narrative that a 
lawyer most effectively and efficiently argues in terms of the particulars, facts, and 
proper sequence of events in terms of time and space is the narrative that the jury 
embraced as “truth.” As Bender makes clear, this narration of evidence obeyed the same 
rules of that constituted formal realism in fiction-writing at the time, so the jury, like 
novel readers, adopted the story as an authentic representation of reality. The concept of 
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justice, as Bender explains, is a “representational system of assent” that “constitutes and 
validates” the lawyer’s authority and his assumed “judicial objectivity” (177). Situating 
Darcy’s letter in this context, my argument is that the letter does not speak on behalf of a 
man who is privately and vulnerably revealing himself to Elizabeth; rather, the letter is 
the disembodied representation of justice that offers binding juridical proof or a narrative 
that expertly follows the rules of what came to constitute valid evidence in eighteenth-
century law. Consequently, Darcy’s authoritatively uttered truth-producing masculine 
Enlightenment rhetoric now renders Elizabeth’s heretofore construction of reality, 
especially in regard to Wickham, as distortion and misrepresentation.  
Furthermore, the letter’s narrative discredits Wickham’s earlier narrative (that 
both Elizabeth and readers embrace as truth until Darcy’s letter), making it, for all intents 
and purposes, perjury in the context of legal discourse. It also does something more:  by 
default, the letter’s official rhetoric renders Wickham’s narrative as the impotent and 
unofficial language of female backstabbing gossip. Masculine power in this scene 
removes itself twofold from our recognition of it: it evades its responsibility for the 
embodiment of Elizabeth through what may appear to be Darcy’s only vulnerable 
moment in the novel, and if one happens to look at little too closely at his rhetoric, power 
further retreats into the guise of the genderless, classless, abstract and allegedly 
politically neutral concept of justice. It is not without reason that the novel has Darcy’s 
letter utilize the power of legal discourse, since, as Bourdieu points out, legal discourse is 
the par excellence of all patriarchal performative utterances, because it has the power of 
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“the divine word” and can produce the very reality that will legitimize its own power 
(42).  
Moreover, Darcy (power) also performs an apology to Elizabeth:  “I am under the 
necessity of relating feelings which may be offensive to your’s [sic], I can only say that I 
am sorry.—the necessity must be obeyed” (151); “Pardon me.—It pains me to offend 
you” (152); and “Here again I shall give you pain—to what degree you only can tell” 
(153). Darcy’s words are semantically empty, because they are similar in logic to the 
torturer who ‘apologizes’ to his victim before he sadistically turns the thumbscrews and 
who justifies his own behavior by recourse to the official languages of law or religion. 
Darcy must give Elizabeth pain (torture her) because “justice” demands it. Formal 
correctness can perform its social magic, as Bourdieu points out, while still being 
semantically empty (41). Darcy also constructs himself as the victim in the first two 
apologies: “I am under the necessity” and “It pains me,” which enables him to further 
evade responsibility and maintain power by constructing himself as the suffering victim. 
Recall that Formator does the same thing in The Reform’d Coquet.  
What we also need to notice about this letter is that Elizabeth reads and rereads 
the letter in isolation. Rather than viewing this as an element of romanticism as Janet 
Todd does (28), in which the heroine, “like any Romantic poet,” has an opportunity for 
deep reflection and transformation, or even as affording time for Elizabeth’s multiple 
rereadings that enable “rational deliberation” as Lloyd W. Brown argues (132-33), I see it 
as another part of power’s strategy to torture Elizabeth and impose on her the narrative 
(the letter) that it wants her to adopt. This logic Bender also describes in Imagining the 
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Penitentiary, in which he claims that identity formation in the eighteenth-century came to 
be thought of as fictionally constructed and that penitentiary reform at the time 
capitalized on this idea. In short, “character and conscience were believed to be fictions 
capable of alteration” (203). The penitentiary imposed a new narrative, if you will, on the 
prisoner that he lived out on a day-to-day routine basis. Moreover, his isolation from the 
rest of society ensured that no competing narratives interfered or were able to compete 
with the penitentiary’s own narrative. The penitentiary experience was a “direct, sensory 
rehearsal of reality” capable of “improv[ing] [the prisoner’s] capacity for rational 
thought” (201). Similar to the penitentiary’s invisible authority and its imposition of a 
new narrative onto the prisoner, Darcy or invisible masculine power acts on Elizabeth 
through the letter as a new narrative that can alter her identity, and it also works through 
the isolation she experiences at this time. Her isolation consists not only of her solitary 
walks in the park and her room in Charlotte’s house, to which she retreats to think about 
and re-read the letter, but the novel also strategically removes her from her family and 
psychologically (if not physically) from her best friend (Charlotte), in whom she can no 
longer confide. Like the prisoner, Elizabeth is removed from what constitutes her normal 
and regular society and consequently, she is removed from any competing narratives. The 
letter, therefore, has the force of impressing a new reality onto Elizabeth, especially since 
she repeatedly reads the letter, which parallels the prisoner’s repetition of a daily routine 
that actually constitutes the new narrative that will reform him. 
Besides the reality and identity producing forces of the letter, the letter also 
contains the logic of torture in both the repetition of pain that it gives Elizabeth (“Here 
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again I shall give you pain”) and in the repetition of Elizabeth’s compulsive re-reading of 
the letter. Why does Elizabeth re-read his letter so many times? Why doesn’t she trust her 
first assessment of it, in which she dismisses it as “the grossest falsehood” and recognizes 
it as “all pride and insolence” (156)? In attempting to answer these questions, I first want 
to point out that this repetition (in the form of Elizabeth’s many re-readings of the letter) 
would be impossible without the medium of the letter. If Darcy explained himself to 
Elizabeth in person, which he chooses not to do, obviously he would not offer a verbal 
explanation over and over again, and consequently Elizabeth’s first impression of it 
would hold (“the grossest falsehood”). Thus it is very conceivable that the novel 
strategically uses the letter to impose a logic of torture that utilizes repetition of language 
(interrogation technique) combined with the repetition of pain to elicit confessions. The 
letter’s logic, to be more specific, disturbingly follows the Inquisitorial logic of repeated 
questioning accompanied by the infliction of pain, which wears down its victim 
physically and psychologically and compels her through repetition to confess as truth the 
narrative that the leading questions contain. The letter in this scene therefore acts as the 
torturer and interrogator; it repeatedly acts on Elizabeth and inflicts its pain until she 
ventriloquizes its world view through a confession. The seventeenth-century Inquisitors 
used this same technique on the accused witches—they were not so much asking these 
arrested women if they practiced maleficium or had sexual relations with the Devil or if 
they allowed his familiars to suckle at their paps; they were instead telling these women 
the narrative (the evidence) that they wanted them to confess as “truth.” It is how 
interrogation technique still works today. Repetition of the narrative (really a series of 
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linguistic imperatives disguised as an interrogatories) accompanied by pain results in a 
confession to the torturer’s worldview. 
What also becomes evident if we again examine Elizabeth’s tortuous re-reading 
of Darcy’s letter is that Elizabeth (and by extension, the reader) participates in “selective 
reconstruction.” Nicholas Spanos argues that the accused witches of the seventeenth 
century “consolidated their identities as witches by selectively interpreting and 
reconstructing their past experience to make it consistent with their current identities” 
(431). The arrested, accused, and imprisoned witch, in other words, reconstructs “her 
biography to make it consistent with her [new] self-perception as a witch” (431). In the 
same way, Elizabeth begins to reconstruct her past in order to make it consistent with 
Darcy’s (power’s) worldview and what her confession will finally expose—her female 
vanity (I discuss her confessional moment more completely below). Her own perception 
of Wickham’s honesty and forthrightness she now attributes to his “social powers” and 
“the general approbation of the neighborhood.” With regard to Wickham’s alleged 
seduction of Darcy’s sister, Elizabeth recalls her brief conversation with Colonel 
Fitzwilliam for “some confirmation” of this part of Darcy’s story. At first she doesn’t 
accept Colonel Fitzwilliam as an authoritative witness to Darcy’s version of events, 
because, as a friend and relative, he would be expected to be biased, but now she revises 
her view of Colonel Fitzwilliam to accommodate Darcy’s “truth”—Fitzwilliam, a man 
she hardly knows, is now suddenly of unquestionable character. Another way to look at 
this is to say that Elizabeth decides not to call Darcy on his potential “lawyer’s bluff” (he 
tells her in the letter that Fitzwilliam will confirm his story, knowing she most likely 
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won’t confront him). She also revises her previous assessment of Wickham as a 
courteous and eloquent gentleman to a new view in which his behavior is labeled 
“improper” and even suspect. Previously she believed Wickham’s friend when he told 
her that Wickham did not attend the Netherfield ball because he had other obligations. 
Now, to accommodate Darcy’s version of reality, she overlooks his friend’s comment and 
believes Wickham didn’t attend because he was trying to avoid Darcy, who may expose 
his alleged lie. To further accommodate Darcy’s version of events, Elizabeth now refuses 
to believe Wickham’s assertion that he would never badmouth Darcy, because he 
respected Darcy’s father. Elizabeth is suddenly certain that it was Wickham who spread 
the story of Darcy’s injustice to him throughout Longbourn. Yet again, Darcy’s letter 
feminizes Wickham and makes him a gossip-monger. After thinking along these lines for 
quite some time, Elizabeth suddenly reflects on Darcy’s character, whom she now 
reconstructs as proud but not “unprincipled or unjust” and that if his behavior was as bad 
as Wickham claimed it to be, it could not possibly “be concealed from the world.” And 
this she now believes despite the fact that Elizabeth herself finds Darcy “impenetrable” 
and unknowable and actually tells Darcy that she cannot make out his character. While 
scholars such as Janet Todd and Fiona Stafford may see Elizabeth’s memories of the past 
as unstable or as an education in the “limitations of first impressions,” respectively (27; 
x), I see her review of the past as a process of selective reconstruction, in which 
Elizabeth, like the accused and tortured witches, gradually relinquishes the reality she 
created in order to adopt as her own the one that Darcy is now imposing on her.  
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While Elizabeth is power’s primary target in this novel, we can also view 
Wickham as the other victim of masculine power. When he and Darcy unexpectedly 
encounter each other earlier in the novel, I interpret Darcy’s white face and Wickham’s 
blush as representing Darcy’s/power’s transference of what should be his/its own shame 
onto the Other—in this case, a man of lower birth and class. In other words, Darcy’s face 
drains its shame (why it goes white), and symbolically speaking, shame’s descent to a 
lower class causes it to pool or puddle in Wickham’s body (why he blushes). Darcy’s 
letter as I already mentioned above feminizes Wickham as a gossip but also as a man—
Wickham did not make the most of the opportunity, or, what more accurately should be 
called the benevolent paternalism that Darcy’s power and money offered him. 
Consequently, the novel positions Wickham as a vulnerable woman who must prostitute 
himself (use his charms) in order to marry up the social ladder for survival reasons. 
Rather than viewing Wickham as the villain as many scholars do, I instead read him and 
his situation as the only potentially subversive feature of this novel, since he refuses to 
accommodate Darcy’s (power’s) lie by not becoming the “man” that Darcy (power) 
wants to make him. Wickham’s situation should also enable us to see that the issue is not 
about what the novel wants us to see:  a steward’s son being ungrateful for the charity 
given him, but is instead about the very fact that the naturalization of such wide class 
divisions and unevenly distributed resources puts someone like Wickham in such a 
position in the first place. I would even go so far as identifying Wickham and Lydia as 
the novel’s true heroes, since we could say that they take back from Darcy’s unearned 
and socially constructed aristocracy a portion, albeit a small one, of his wealth. It is no 
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wonder they do not feel any shame, i.e. embodiment, when they revisit Longbourn after 
their marriage. 
What follows the letter scene with its reality and identity producing effects is 
Elizabeth’s confession and not what the novel wants us to see as her climactic moment of 
self realization or her “sudden flash of insight” as Patricia Meyers Spacks claims about 
Austen’s heroines’ unique bildungs (279). I quote her confession in its entirety: 
She grew absolutely ashamed of herself.—Of neither Darcy nor Wickham 
could she think, without feeling that she had been blind, partial, 
prejudiced, absurd. 
 
‘How despicably have I acted!’ she cried.—‘I, who have prided myself on 
my discernment!—I, who have valued myself on my abilities! who have 
often disdained the generous candour of my sister, and gratified my 
vanity, in useless or blameable distrust.—How humiliating is this 
discovery!—Yet, how just a humiliation!—Had I been in love, I could not 
have been more wretchedly blind. But vanity, not love, has been my 
folly.—Pleased with the preference of one, and offended by the neglect of 
the other, on the very beginning of our acquaintance, I have courted 
prepossession and ignorance, and driven reason away, where either were 
concerned.  ’Till this moment, I never knew myself.’ (159). 
 
What first strikes me about her confession is that Elizabeth applies to herself the two 
terms of the novel’s title “pride and prejudice.” This is the moment when readers have the 
pleasure and satisfaction of being able to make the connection between the novel’s plot 
and its title, even though we are taken by surprise, because prior to this moment, we 
believed that Darcy would be the one to have to claim the title’s terms. However, just as 
we are trying to assimilate the reality that Elizabeth is guilty of pride and prejudice, her 
confession immediately converts into a confession of her female vanity. How and why 
does this happen? If we look closely at what she says here, we see she does, in fact, first 
confess her pride in her powers of discernment (“I, who have prided myself on my 
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discernment!”). This suggests that maybe her powers aren’t as good as she and readers 
believed. This doesn’t necessarily mean she no longer has those powers. She then goes on 
to redefine Jane’s refusal to risk reading others and the world as her “generous candour,” 
demonstrating that Elizabeth is now ventriloquizing the male viewpoint. But then 
Elizabeth suddenly qualifies her “pride” into a specifically sexed or female offense that 
has everything to do with how men respond to her: “pleased with the preference of one, 
and offended by the neglect of the other.” Elizabeth is suddenly denied the “pride” to 
which the novel’s title alludes. The novel makes clear that that pride is the kind that only 
powerful men can own, namely, men such as Darcy. This shift from “pride” to “vanity” 
happens so abruptly, so subtly, that the reader barely has time to perceive it and its 
significance. Recall also that much earlier in the novel, Charlotte tells the gathered 
company that “‘[Darcy’s] pride . . . does not offend me so much as pride often does, 
because there is an excuse for it. One cannot wonder that so very fine a young man, with 
family, fortune, every thing in his favour, should think highly of himself. If I may so 
express it, he has a right to be proud’ ” (13). Charlotte’s view of Darcy’s righteous 
masculine pride captures Adam Smith’s definition of healthy pride in his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, in which the impartial spectator’s view of the individual’s merits 
should correspond with the individual’s own view of his merits. The pedantic Mary also 
contributes to this discussion and indirectly supports Charlotte’s assessment of Darcy by 
distinguishing between pride and vanity:  “‘Vanity and pride are different things, though 
the words are often used synonymously. A person may be proud without being vain. 
Pride relates more to our opinion of ourselves, vanity to what we would have others think 
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of us’” (14). Because Darcy does “think highly of himself” as Charlotte contends, he also 
has “pride” in the sense that Mary defines here.  From the beginning, the novel wants to 
make the distinction between pride and vanity so we can better understand Elizabeth’s 
flaw as specifically female when she finally makes her confession. The text, in other 
words, ensures we will understand the distinction between Darcy’s healthy masculine 
pride23
The letter’s logic of torture, moreover, shames Elizabeth absolutely, and in the 
political context of shame, she fully becomes the embodied, exposed, passive female. 
Elizabeth bears the shame of Eve, in other words, which Liman views as ontological 
shame or the shame of being female that really originates in the shame of power. 
Interestingly, Elaine Scarry claims that Eve and Adam’s attempt to “cover” their bodies 
after eating from the tree of knowledge signifies their knowledge of their own 
 and Elizabeth’s female vanity. Elizabeth doesn’t just care about, and consequently 
responds to, what Wickham and Darcy think of her character; she is responding to how 
they reacted to her physical appearance. Darcy’s insult was about her physical 
appearance but Wickham’s attentions restore her confidence. Elizabeth’s confession, 
therefore, is about recognizing and accepting her “self” as a diseased female body, which 
patriarchy terms “vanity” in order to hide its own participation in the domination of 
women, in which women can only perceive themselves through the male dominant 
viewpoint. Elizabeth (and readers) do not recognize (i.e. misrecognize) that her 
occupation of a man’s position as a self-authorized, reality-producing perceiver is her 
actual foible; she (and readers) instead see that her own female vanity is the source of her 
heretofore distorted view of reality.  
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embodiment and God’s disembodiment (209-10). Their covering is a step closer to God’s 
power, in other words. The logic of their transgression and God’s punishment of them for 
this transgression—he ousts them from Paradise and fully embodies them (Eve through 
childbearing and Adam through labor)—aligns with the logic of Pride and Prejudice:  
patriarchal power casts out Elizabeth for her transgression—from her powerful position 
of bodiless omniscience to the exposure of her as a female body who will, in fact, occupy 
her proper position as the future mother of Darcy’s children. She tried to cover up her 
femaleness, metaphorically speaking, by, co-opting masculine power or noncorporeality 
for herself. Power, however, has exposed her for what she really is. 
Lastly, Darcy’s presence through the medium of the letter, i.e. his absence, is 
indicative of a noncorporeality that cannot experience shame or punishment. Power 
maintains its invisible and blameless role by projecting its shame onto Elizabeth, even as 
it subjects Elizabeth’s body to intense scrutiny by it (power), by Elizabeth herself, and by 
the reader. Darcy’s shame, according to Liman, is the shame of Adam, whose shame is 
not that of his body, or exposure, but is the shame of rage stemming from 
misrepresentation and lies– either his own to God or Eve’s to him (567). It is the type of 
shame that can be foisted: “lying is both its source and relief. If you are a liar, lie your 
way out of it” (Liman 567). 
In the post-letter-world-according-to-Darcy, Darcy alone constructs the reality of 
the remainder of the book; he now fully manages Elizabeth’s perceptions even as he 
remains the shameless disembodied omnipresent and omniscient godlike being who 
operates primarily behind the curtain—the novel’s unexposed Wizard of Oz.  There is 
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one significant scene however that intervenes before Elizabeth receives the news of 
Lydia’s elopement and before Darcy is able to begin his production of reality. It is the 
scene in which Elizabeth tours Darcy’s Pemberley mansion. What is so disturbingly 
remarkable about this scene is that Elizabeth believes she comes to know Darcy through 
the objects in his home. But I would say that this scenario, if anything, further establishes 
Darcy’s unknowability. Just like Formator/Alanthus in The Reform’d Coquet, who at one 
point wore a disguise to mask his first disguise, Darcy is also represented in this scene by 
his unrepresentability. Furthermore, we might say that Elizabeth is not so much in his 
mansion as she is in the temple of her new “God.” Indeed, Elizabeth can be likened to the 
embodied religious believer who can only come to know her “God” through the 
representation of him in objects. In this context, Darcy’s servant Mrs. Reynolds, who 
speaks only of his benevolence, enacts the more experienced religious “convert” who is 
partial to her own “God.” One of the most telling and disturbing thoughts that Elizabeth 
has while touring his home is when she ponders the extent of Darcy’s power: 
What praise is more valuable than the praise of an intelligent servant? As a 
brother, a landlord, a master, she considered how many people’s happiness 
were in his guardianship!—How much of pleasure or pain it was in his 
power to bestow! How much of good or evil must be done by him! (189) 
 
Rather than viewing Darcy’s “authority and influence” as “sexy” as Dara Rossman 
Regaignon does (453), I see Elizabeth’s words as affirming Darcy’s arbitrary godlike 
power to embody others, and her rhetoric sounds like the overzealous recent religious 
convert. This scene also reinforces Elizabeth’s recent total embodiment even as it 
reaffirms Darcy’s disembodied status; it reveals the unequal relationship that Elaine 
Scarry describes between the suffering bodies of the Old Testament Hebrews and their 
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bodiless all powerful and sometimes severely punishing God. As I mentioned before, 
their own tortured and pained bodies are material proof of, or tangible referents for, their 
intangible, bodiless, powerful God. Is it any wonder, then, that Elizabeth’s primary 
feeling for Darcy is “gratitude” when she realizes he still loves her despite her family’s 
and her own failings (201)? Rather than viewing Elizabeth’s gratitude for Darcy as 
evidence of Austen’s innovative portrayal of a romance based on “rational love,” we can 
alternatively view Elizabeth’s gratitude in terms of the fully embodied religious believer 
or devotee who is grateful his/her God still loves her despite his severe punishments or 
despite her own weaknesses. Their asymmetrical relationship also corresponds to 
Bourdieu’s view of social exchanges between the dominant and the dominated, which, 
for the dominated, become “moral,” “affective,” or “economic” obligations; in other 
words, exchanges are a strategy by which power maintains “a lasting hold over someone” 
(191). In this light we can now see that Elizabeth’s and Darcy’s relationship is similar to 
the relationship between Darcy and Wickham in that both are relationships based on the 
asymmetry of power and exchange. However, Wickham resists (at least for a time) 
becoming the “man” or object of Darcy’s (power’s) creation, and he shows ingratitude 
for Darcy’s (power’s) generosity as I mentioned earlier.   
I argued above that Elizabeth had, before her confession, the masculine power of 
paternal prophecy—that her words created the now-known-to-be-false reality of the first 
part of the novel. In the last part of the novel (after Elizabeth’s confession), however, 
Darcy now occupies the position of the prophesying patriarch. Whereas readers typically 
see Lydia’s and Wickham’s elopement as confirming the “truth” of Darcy’s letter, I see 
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their elopement as well as Wickham’s villainy as a fulfillment of Darcy’s prophetic letter. 
Although Elizabeth and readers unquestionably accept Darcy’s letter as “truth,” it really 
only offers an alternative version of events that we accept as “truth” for the reasons I 
mentioned above. What strikes me as inconsistent with our easy acceptance of 
Wickham’s villainous behavior is that Wickham himself never changes his original story 
when he talks to Elizabeth again after his marriage to Lydia. He maintains his original 
version of events, and willingly and sincerely discusses them with Elizabeth as if she still 
shared and understood his viewpoint; he seems oblivious to her new derision and 
disrespect for him—why? because he has not changed so neither does his story, but 
Elizabeth has changed: she now perceives Wickham through the eyes of Darcy (power’s 
worldview); she is now blind to his genuineness and sincerity in the conversation. We 
also tend to forget that Lydia is someone who can manipulate anyone and certainly 
enough hints are directed to Elizabeth and the reader that Lydia intended to be the first 
married Bennet girl although one of the youngest. It is not a stretch to believe that the 
loud and pushy Lydia seduced or simply overwhelmed the already powerless and 
feminized Wickham. Also, neither the reader nor Elizabeth is privy to what actually 
happens between either Lydia and Wickham or Darcy and Wickham with regard to the 
elopement and marriage. All accounts of what happens come second or third hand and in 
a modern court of law, would be rendered mere hearsay. This is why I think our 
conclusions about Wickham are clearly preconditioned by Darcy’s prophetic letter. In 
other words, Darcy (as power’s representative) gets to have one of those “I told you so” 
moments of which Bourdieu speaks and terms the “killjoy realism” of the father, whose 
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“prophylactic prediction” is “complicit with the order of things” and whose words, which 
operate as divine verdicts, have the power to “redouble the force of the laws of natural or 
social nature by converting them into laws of reason and experience” (70-1). It’s as if 
Darcy’s letter collapses time and space, and Wickham’s alleged seduction of Darcy’s 
sister is now Wickham’s alleged seduction of Lydia, reaffirming not only the latent evil 
of the lower classes or the low borne, but also that only the aristocracy can save society, 
restore harmony, and even overcome class division if necessary to preserve community. 
The fact that Darcy hunts down Wickham and Lydia allegedly to make Wickham marry 
Lydia can be viewed as Darcy’s successful attempt at making Wickham into the “man” 
he always wanted him to be.24 Indeed, Darcy does restore harmony between Jane and 
Bingley. Remember earlier in the novel when Elizabeth gave sanction to their 
relationship, when she, in other words, occupied the role of the father who either gave his 
curse or blessing? Now it is Darcy who gives his consent and allows Bingley to return to 
Netherfield to pursue his relationship with Jane. Both the sudden appearance of Bingley 
at Netherfield and Lydia’s rescue come across as magical and fairytale-like, because 
Elizabeth and readers only see the effects of Darcy’s paternal social magic, while he 
produces this reality entirely behind the scenes. It is as if the action or momentum of the 
entire novel was blocked, because Darcy did not fully occupy his rightful position of 
power.  Once Elizabeth confesses and power successfully removes her from what it sees 
as Darcy’s rightful position, the novel’s action gains an enchanting momentum and all 
conflicts are quickly resolved. The novel acts as if the reality Elizabeth constructed 
simply couldn’t bring about social harmony at the end. 
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While Darcy plays God in the last part of the novel, Elizabeth has come to exist 
primarily as a disturbed, crying, and blind body. Indeed, for the first time we see 
Elizabeth in the passive role. Elizabeth is no longer the author of her own or our reality. 
As Fraiman asserts, “her eye is less bold, her tongue less sharp, the angularity . . . less 
acute” (81). She is “blind” to or denied full knowledge of events. She actually takes 
Jane’s advice to not mention what she heard about Wickham in Darcy’s letter. In other 
words, she is now denied the role of the paternal visionary or prophetic father. Her 
helplessness and crying body authorizes Darcy (power) to come to her rescue and create 
Elizabeth’s reality for her. From the romantic point of view, he saves Lydia out of his 
love for Elizabeth, but we can see also that power now has an even greater hold on 
Elizabeth in this particular exchange. We now see Elizabeth as positioned outside the 
man’s game, so to speak, with the rest of the women, in a state of anxious passivity in 
which she and they passively wait for dribs and drabs of already censured information to 
come from the men, primarily Darcy, who are the active players. Even though she seems 
to be her assertive self when conversing with the arrogant Lady Catherine, she remains in 
a state of mystery, doubt, and conjecture, because she can’t fully explain Lady 
Catherine’s unexpected visit, and she is only vaguely aware that there must have been an 
incident between Darcy and Lady Catherine. Further knowledge of the issue, however, is 
outside of her now darkened realm of perception. Later, near the novel’s end, when 
Darcy finally revisits her home, Elizabeth is again kept in mystery and doubt because 
Darcy is once more “silent, grave, and indifferent” (258), revealing not only that 
Elizabeth is being kept in the dark, but also that Darcy has not changed at all as some 
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scholars contend.25
While it may appear that Elizabeth has much to gain by her marriage to Darcy 
practically speaking—she will be financially secure, which is ideal for a non-heiress with 
an entail on her father’s estate, and it is what we all have been hoping for to alleviate our 
anxiety on her behalf—their marriage, I argue, is really about Elizabeth fulfilling her 
“obligation” to Darcy in terms of his bail-out of Lydia and Wickham and rescue of the 
Bennet family reputation. Darcy, in essence, paid for Elizabeth, however indirectly. Yet 
again, however, masculine power has an “out”:   the novel constructs Elizabeth as having 
witchcraftian powers and represents Darcy as the victim of Elizabeth’s charms. Recall 
that The Reform’d Coquet deploys this same strategy. When Darcy observes Elizabeth 
and Caroline walking around the library, he “unconsciously close[s] his book” (emphasis 
mine), and when Jane and Elizabeth finally leave Netherfield, Darcy says that “[s]he 
attracted him more than he liked” (44). The grammatical construction of this latter 
sentence positions Elizabeth (not him) as the agent of his attraction. Later, Darcy claims 
that he “had never been so bewitched by any woman as he was by her” and that “were it 
not for the inferiority of her connections, he should be in some danger” (38; emphasis 
mine). Later another male will confirm Elizabeth’s witchcraftian power—Mr. Lucas says 
to Darcy “you will not thank me for detaining you from the bewitching converse of 
[Elizabeth]” (70; emphasis mine). No other woman in the novel is referred to as 
“bewitching,” including the beautiful Jane. Recall also that he proposes to her despite his 
 Indeed, just as The Reform’d Coquet silences the voice of Amoranda, 
Pride and Prejudice blinds Elizabeth, and she can no longer read, perceive, or create the 
world.  
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“scruples” as he calls them—all those just reasons why he shouldn’t marry her:  “his 
sense of her inferiority—of it being a degradation—of the family obstacles which 
judgment had always opposed to inclination” (145). “In vain,” he tells Elizabeth, “have I 
struggled” (145). Thus the novel not only reasserts Darcy’s or masculine power’s 
shameless evasiveness that camouflages the operations of masculine power in this novel 
all the more, but it also strongly hints towards Elizabeth’s innate female maleficence or 
what Bourdieu terms the unofficial power of women that serves only to reaffirm and 
perpetuate their negative identity (32).26
But what is also very disquieting about the heterosexual romance in Pride and 
Prejudice is that the marriage itself is, for the most part, initiated by the heroine and not 
only in terms of her bewitching charms. The burden is on Elizabeth to get Darcy to 
propose to her a second time (279). One wonders if she didn’t again flatter his generosity 
and assure him of her gratitude in/for rescuing Lydia if they would marry at all. I cannot 
help but think that this also allows power its plausible deniability. The text, in other 
words, gives Elizabeth the “unofficial” power to attract and keep a man as compensation 
for being denied the official masculine power she originally had in the beginning of the 
novel. And it does this while simultaneously enabling patriarchy to deny its domination 
of women. Indeed, I find it impossible to view Austen’s fiction as Susan Morgan does—
as “leav[ing] out the whole politics of domination and submission that we have been so 
 The violence done against Elizabeth always 
seems to find its way back to Darcy, constantly constructing him as the victim, just as 
Formator’s violence against Amoranda boomeranged to Formator in The Reform’d 
Coquet.  
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carefully taught to confuse with natural passion” (39). In the end, both Elizabeth and 
Amoranda marry masculine power’s representatives, and, rather than seeing Elizabeth 
and Darcy’s relationship as “sexy,” as “natural passion,” or as Elizabeth’s deserved 
reward for learning about the dangers of first impressions, i.e. the traditional ending of 
the female bildungsroman, we must view their relationship in terms of asymmetrical 
power. Through this lens, their relationship is very unhealthy, because it eroticizes 
Darcy’s power.  Moreover, if the novel eroticizes his power, then it consequently 
eroticizes his power and domination of Elizabeth. Because Elizabeth is clearly attracted 
to his power (she even tells Jane she fell in love with him after touring his mansion), the 
novel constructs her as masochistic.  In this sense, Darcy’s gaze or “the gaze of the 
powerful,” as Bourdieu points out, “carries authority” and can reassure the physically 
inadequate woman (68). Darcy at first rejected Elizabeth’s body and later he found it 
pleasing. This troubling aspect of their relationship, however, is misrecognized by 
Elizabeth (and readers) as what Bourdieu identifies as amor fati or “love of destiny” or 
“to find lovable and to love the man whom social destiny assigned to them” (109). In 
fact, the plot of the female bildungsroman depends upon such an idea. Readers desire that 
the sexy, powerful, and wealthy Darcy will rescue the somewhat less than beautiful 
Elizabeth from the anxiety caused by the entail on her father’s estate. We want our 
heroine to out-marry the beautiful Jane or the spoiled Lydia. This “Cinderella” story is 
one of the hidden constants of this genre that astute readers need to recognize in order to 
see the more subtle operations of power at work in the story. 
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Now we finally return to the beginning of this chapter where I mentioned that no 
two female bildungsromans could seem less alike than The Reform’d Coquet and Pride 
and Prejudice. But, as I have demonstrated, they are, if anything, disturbingly similar. 
Masculine power’s strategy of embodying its heroine is more difficult to see in Pride and 
Prejudice, because it has widely dispersed its presence by insinuating itself through and 
amongst so many different discourses, including and most importantly, the female 
bildungsroman itself.  It is hard for us to resist the seduction of such Enlightenment 
discourses as self-transformation, justice, and social etiquette, which represent some of 
our most cherished beliefs of what it means to be a civilized society and to be an 
individual with free will. Masculine power also hides its strategies through its lies and its 
misrepresentation of itself:  as the rescuer, the truth-sayer, the representative of justice, 
the suffering victim, the penitent lover—and its misrepresentation of others: the vanity of 
Elizabeth and the villainy of Wickham. As I have also argued, this power pretends to 
discover Elizabeth’s diseased female body (i.e. her vanity and even her witchcraftian 
charms) in the past, even as it tortures her throughout the novel to produce this body.  
Elizabeth’s Foucauldian-style confession, in other words, acknowledges a latent vanity 
that was always there but unknowable to her until the moment she makes her confession. 
While we laugh as Mr. Collins tries to force the term of “coquet” onto Elizabeth, we later 
become very troubled to see that Elizabeth confesses to essentially the same flaw as 
Amoranda, especially since The Reform’d Coquet uses the terms “coquet” and “vanity” 
interchangeably. In contrast, however, we see that Darcy is a bodiless floating signifier of 
masculine power who in Volume III magically makes everything right behind the scenes, 
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bringing about social harmony and peace through three Bennet marriages: Lydia and 
Wickham’s, Jane and Bingley’s, and his own and Elizabeth’s. What he has really done, 
however, amounts to a “transaction”—an exchange—so that Elizabeth, Wickham, and 
her family are under the obligation and debt of power, and Elizabeth submits her body to 
Darcy as payment. Through marriage, she fully enters the reality of Darcy’s (patriarchal 
power’s) world. Moreover, while it can appear at first that the novel wants to make 
Elizabeth marriageable by first reforming her of her pride and prejudice, we now know 
that this novel is really about highlighting what it sees as the inherently and incurably 
diseased nature of women. Elizabeth, and Amoranda before her, pay the price for 
“draw[ing] too near the fire of life” as Browning’s speaker relates in the lines from 
Aurora Leigh. Is masculine power’s logic of torture as successful in Pride and Prejudice 
as it is in The Reform’d Coquet? In fact, it is more successful, because it is more difficult 
to detect and because readers must now overcome the enormously appealing force of 
more modern discourses that appear to promote feminist and democratic ideals. Our one 
consolation, however, is this:  we now know better.   
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themselves in re-tellings of themselves” (134). But in the “Introduction” to her book, O’Farrell more fully 
explains that she reads Austen’s use of repeated mortifications as a type of Foucauldian “local resistance”, 
in which the body involuntarily confesses its interior desires, while the individual still maintains the proper 
outward decorum required in a novel of manners. Consequently, O’Farrell views these embarrassing 
moments as “signs of love” and as the most erotic moments in Austen’s novels (6-7). More recently, Kay 
Young interprets shame in Austen’s writing, including Pride and Prejudice, “as the first feeling on the way 
to an expanded consciousness begun from the demand for the separation from others” (Endnote 4). Anita 
G. Gorman states that Austen uses “blushing and turning pale” in Pride and Prejudice “both to pique the 
reader’s curiosity and to guide the reader’s emotional response” (146). 
22 “Darcy, after looking at [Mrs. Bennet] for a moment, turned silently away” (32); “at the end of [Mr. 
Collins’s speech], [Darcy] only made him a slight bow, and moved another way” (75); “The expression on 
his face changed . . . to a composed and steady gravity” (76); “She looked at . . . Darcy, who continued . . . 
impenetrably grave” (77). 
23 Interestingly, Liman claims that masculine shame also evades its shame through shame’s opposite:  
pride. 
24 I resist this possible reading, however, because (as I mentioned earlier) we can also see Wickham and 
Lydia as taking from Darcy (his power/wealth) what was never rightfully or naturally his to begin with. 
25 Darcy himself admits that he was an unprincipled and selfish child, which negates the benevolent image 
that his servant communicated to Elizabeth at Pemberley:  “I was spoilt by my parents, who though good 
themselves, allowed, encouraged, almost taught me to be selfish and overbearing, to care for none beyond 
my own family circle, to think meanly of all the rest of the world” (282). Darcy claims he would still be 
this way if it weren’t for Elizabeth, but his behavior upon his revisit the Bennet house shows he has not 
changed at all. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
From the “[I]nviolate [A]sylum” of Mettingen to the Logic of the Insane Asylum: 
The Production of Clara Wieland’s Madness in Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland 
 
 
 
“It is true that I am now changed.” 
 – Clara Wieland 
 
“The visibility of the body and the permanence of writing go together.” 
 – Michel Foucault, Psychiatric Power 
 
“Women have often felt insane when cleaving to the truth of our experience.” 
 – Adrienne Rich 
 
 
 
 
 “Confessed madwoman,” “hysterical,” “unstable,” deluded,” “perverse,” 
“insane,” and “idiot”—these are just a small sampling of the reproachful words and 
phrases some commentators use to describe Clara Wieland, the heroine of Charles 
Brockden Brown’s American Gothic novel Wieland; or the Transformation (1798). 
These descriptors, to a great extent, re-enact the novel’s own condemnation of Clara. 
Clara’s madness, it seems, is a given. There is no need to question it. The exigency lies in 
determining its cause in the context of the newly formed United States. Is it hereditary 
predisposition, a shortsighted education, the absence of authority, isolation from 
community, religious enthusiasm, or over-confidence in Lockean epistemology? Indeed, 
this approach to Wieland’s exploration of insanity results in a cause/effect inversion:  the 
effect (Clara’s madness) produces the reasons for her madness. Those reasons, moreover, 
will validate her madness. Thus, in a very real sense, Clara’s madness precedes its own 
genesis. What’s troubling about this inverted logic is that it reproduces the way in which 
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power functions in the insane asylum—it produces the madness it claims to discover in 
the patient’s confession or what the asylum calls a “biographical corpus” through which 
the patient owns his/her madness (Foucault Psychiatric Power 158). Indeed, this chapter 
will argue that the logic of Wieland resembles asylum logic. The novel produces Clara’s 
“madness” even as it professes to discover it as always already latently present in her 
“confession” and biographical history. This chapter will also challenge claims that Clara 
Wieland has been, or will become, “mad.” It will finally release this American heroine 
from the above undeserved labels. In fact, what will become apparent to readers is that 
Clara may very well be one of the most empowered heroines in British or American 
eighteenth-century literature—at least, that is, until masculine power strategically 
“tortures” her out of this position, just as it did Amoranda and Elizabeth Bennet. As it did 
with these heroines, patriarchal power intervenes just as Clara reaches the age about 
which it is most anxious—when she is expected to make the move from her father’s 
house to her husband’s. What is different, however, is that Clara has many more reasons 
than her British counterparts not to marry; consequently, patriarchy’s intervention in 
Clara’s case is aggressive at its most benign and brutally cruel at its worst. It will 
repeatedly torment her until she admits her body has the unavoidable taint of Eve and 
requires management by the rational Pleyel. 
At the time Brown published Wieland, post-revolutionary America was still 
deeply engaged in British and European social influence and politics. It is generally 
known that Brown was a reader of British literature and that his writing was greatly 
influenced by the works of Britain’s William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft. Brown 
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wrote at a time when America had mixed feelings with regard to England and Europe—
influenced by their latest social fads, such as the “culture of sensibility”1
Indeed, the newly formed American nation seems to offer Clara potentially 
liberatory practices that heretofore existed for women only as an abstract possibility, a 
‘theory’ of liberty based on eighteenth-century Enlightenment ideals. In the beginning of 
her full-length, first-person narrative, Clara exists as a rational and abstract thinker, a 
“self”-directed, male-oriented educated woman, and most surprisingly, a property-
owning, head-of-her-own household, self-managing individualist. In other words, she 
lives the “self” shaping life that Lockean sensorial epistemology promises. Like 
Amoranda, Clara’s situation precludes the need for a husband (manager); she manages 
her “self.” Moreover, the community to which she belongs at Mettingen represents an 
, yet anxious 
about their turbulent politics. Indeed in 1798, the year Brown published Wieland, the 
United States Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in order to protect the new 
and fragile republic from the threat of foreign enemies. The Acts were “a means of 
‘quarantining’ America from the ‘vile and loathsome embrace’ of the French (Samuels 
51), revealing the early republic’s paranoia about French revolutionary radicalism. 
Regardless of Brown’s progressive, if not radical politics, and despite his published 
feminist piece Alcuin, inspired by Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women 
(1792), Brown’s Gothic novel still reveals the intractable persistence of patriarchy in 
subjugating (or attempting to subjugate) women, especially given the fact that he wrote 
Wieland at an historical turning point when female equality had one of its best 
opportunities for actualization.  
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asylum of Enlightenment ideals in which there is the free and equal exchange of ideas 
between rational thinking and creative men and women. Because of Clara’s rationalism, 
“manly” education, and disciplined sensibility, she personifies Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
paradigm of the mentally sound woman. However, pervading this idealized community 
are patriarchal power’s tactics of domination (which previous chapters uncovered). These 
tactics will gradually and violently destroy Clara and with her, any possibility of the real-
world tangible practice of female equality and liberty.  
In contrast to the brief confessional moments of Amoranda and Elizabeth Bennet, 
Clara’s coerced “confession” will comprise something more than a first-person statement 
or two, in which the heroine pronounces a new version of her ‘self’ near or at the novel’s 
end. Indeed, the entire narrative of Wieland will constitute her “confession,” or what the 
asylum terms a “biographical” narrative that is required of all “mad” patients—a speech 
act, in other words, that constitutes the patient’s ownership of his/her madness. Thus, 
while Clara’s confessional statement (at the story’s end) and her biography (the entire 
novel) may represent tangible expressions of the speaking subject, both disempower her 
by making visible (individuating) her body as diseased. I will show that Brown’s full 
length female-authored first-person narrative deceptively functions to make its speaker 
seemingly willingly construct her “self” as mad, even though she is repeatedly tortured 
into confessing her “madness.” Wieland’s sophisticated use not only of a first-person 
female narrator but of what the novel’s logic goes out of its way to stage as an unreliable 
female narrator epitomizes the disturbing discursive transformative abilities of 
disciplinary power functioning as patriarchal power. What seems particularly insidious 
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about this strategy is that, if Brown is showcasing the failure of Lockean epistemology as 
some scholars contend, then it is a female’s mind and body that he co-opts to bear the 
violence of making his point. Because we have full access to her consciousness, Clara’s 
reasoning errors appear habitual and thus demand judgment by readers. If the novel is in 
fact ‘testing’ the limits of its characters’ rationalism, then the novel’s logic of torture and 
confession ensures that the men’s failure of the tests does not bear on them to the same 
degree or with the same consequences that Clara’s failure demands. Clara is the only one 
subjected to the repetition and intensification of horrors and, as narrator, it is her failure 
of reason that is permanently recorded and made visible.  
Also similar to the British novels is the early part of Wieland, which presents 
readers with an already empowered heroine. Indeed, Clara’s narrative begins with her 
transgressive adoption of several traditionally masculine pleasures and practices. 
Furthermore, while readers of The Reform’d Coquet and Pride and Prejudice 
misrecognize their respective heroines as vain, Wieland’s readers misrecognize Clara’s 
transgressive use of masculine pleasures and discourses as “madness.”  
American scholars are inclined to read the novel as Brown’s critique or 
complication of Enlightenment ideals, especially Lockean sensorial epistemology, on 
which the newly formed republic had been founded.2 Generally speaking, these ideals are 
shown to fall short or utterly fail when Theodore’s latent religious mania compels him to 
commit familicide and/or Clara’s latent “madness” surfaces under the slightest 
provocation. While their scholarship highlights Brown’s awareness of the new republic’s 
foundational shortcomings, I believe that these readings greatly underestimate the degree 
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to which Clara’s gender plays a role in her experience, her writing, and her alleged 
madness.3
Indeed, the issue of madness is one of scholars’, if not Wieland’s, central 
concerns. Are Clara and Theodore both mad or is it just Theodore? What is the nature of 
their “madness”? When, how, and why does their madness manifest itself? Do the 
mysterious voices simply expose an already present madness? Critics seem to agree that 
brother and sister are already predisposed to insanity and are insane by the novel’s end, 
although each character may develop his/her mental illness differently. I will argue, 
however, that the novel is concerned with generating Clara’s “madness” only to turn 
around and disclose that it was always already latent in her female body. Strategies of 
power will produce Clara’s “madness” by violently and repeatedly subjecting her to 
situations that produce intense and extreme emotion. Simply stated, masculine power will 
horrify Clara into “madness.” Indeed, eighteenth-century aesthetic theories define 
 Indeed, it is because of her many gendered transgressions that the novel’s 
logic will oust Clara from her home, her masculine rationalism, and her subversive 
appropriation of masculine pleasures through a consistent project of violent coercion. It 
will also “torture” her out of these traditionally male domains by producing her purported 
madness as a peculiarly female one—a “madness” that it will expose as originating in her 
alleged excessive (albeit latent) sensibility as well as a “madness” that suggests her 
uncontained female sexual desire. The text’s logic goes so far as to exile Clara and all the 
female transgression she represents from the young America, suggesting that the novel’s 
vision of the newly formed republic did not include women in its promise of 
Enlightenment ideals. 
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“horror” in terms of emotional affect taken to its extreme. Edmund Burke describes it as 
the most powerful of the emotions, since it is the response of self-preservation manifested 
as the fear of “pain, sickness, and death” (36). “Horror,” as Gothic writer Ann Radcliffe 
conceptualizes it, “contracts, freezes, and nearly annihilates [the mental] faculties” in the 
face of “dreaded evil” (On the Supernatural in Poetry). Most significantly, however, 
Wieland’s oppressive logic will have readers and Clara herself believe that her “madness” 
is the result of her own excessive sensibility and uncontained sexual instincts rather than 
a consequence of its own campaign of horror. In short, the “inviolate asylum” that 
Mettingen represents for Clara will transform into her insane asylum. Moreover, the 
novel’s logic will legitimize Clara’s “madness,” ironically enough, by mitigating if not 
totally excusing Theodore’s insanity, constructing it as rational—yes, rational—and even 
heroic. Just as it did in the British novels, masculine power will employ numerous and 
diffuse strategies to evade responsibility for its campaign of violence against Clara.  
Unlike the logic of torture and confession in The Reform’d Coquet and Pride and 
Prejudice, whose subtle forces of immaterial power and embodied victimization were 
made apparent through Elaine Scarry’s model of political torture and Doug Liman’s 
conception of political shaming, respectively, the logic of torture and confession in 
Wieland can best be illuminated through Michel Foucault’s elaboration of the mechanism 
of power that functions in the insane asylum (herein referred to as “asylum logic,” 
“psychiatric power,” or “asylum power”). Asylum logic will expose how the widely 
distributed and immaterial forces of power in Wieland utilize “continuous punitive 
pressure” to generate Clara’s “mad” embodiment. Drawing primarily on Foucault’s 
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Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1964), Abnormal: 
Lectures at the College de France, 1974-1975 (2004), and Psychiatric Power: Lectures 
at the College de France, 1973—1974 (2008), I will show that Wieland’s “torture” of 
Clara, which produces both her “confession” of “madness” as well as her biographical 
narrative, is analogous to the logic of the insane asylum and to the concept of madness 
that Foucault claims emerged throughout the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Indeed, the eighteenth century’s concept of madness is rooted in emotional 
excess or nervous system overload. The possibility of madness, according to Foucault, is 
an innate feature of eighteenth century sensibility. The finely attuned nervous system that 
enables sensibility in the first place can turn against itself and manifest as delirium, 
mania, melancholia, etc. Foucault describes this nervous system assault as a “multiplicity 
of excitations constantly accumulated, prolonged, and echoed without being attenuated” 
(Madness and Civilization 90-1). Moreover, sustained “violent” “movement of the 
“nerves and muscles” can suddenly intensify into “convulsions” or “frenzy,” i.e., 
“mania,” or total “pacification,” i.e. “melancholia” (Madness and Civilization 91-2). As 
we shall see, the repetition of masculine violence that assaults Clara’s “neurological 
body” (to use Foucault’s term) will produce these very same symptoms (Psychiatric 
Power 323). 
By reading Wieland through the lens of asylum logic, it will become apparent that 
masculine power functions very similarly to what Foucault calls “psychiatric power.” It 
will invest in Clara’s body to control it and to individuate it as a visible sign of female 
“madness.” Furthermore, psychiatric power will expose Clara’s “madness” not as an 
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“illness,” but as a “fault”—a specifically female fault, i.e. uncontained sexual desire 
(Foucault Psychiatric Power 176). Moreover, the novel wants readers to see that Clara’s 
narrative—in asylum logic’s terms, her “biographical corpus” or the fulfillment of her 
“obligation of anamnesis”—exposes her “madness” as always already constituted—as 
inherently part of her biological female body. The biographical history that Clara 
recovers from memory, in other words, constitutes a confessional ritual in which she 
owns her madness and accepts the reality that asylum power imposed on her. Indeed, her 
first-person “biography” functions as a history of the body—not a history of events. 
Undoubtedly the novel wants readers (and Clara herself) to view her narrative in the end 
as one written by a female who is “mad” prior to writing it. In fact, Wieland functions 
both as a novel and as a “mad” person’s biographical history. Consequently, Wieland’s 
double role—we might even say its biloquism—contributes to our misrecognition not 
only of Clara’s many gender transgressions but also of the way in which the novel’s logic 
ensures she is disciplined for them. In other words, Clara’s biographical history by 
definition validates her madness—only a “mad” individual writes one. Wieland’s 
structure, by its very nature, quickly closes down alternative readings of Clara; indeed, 
how can a history of someone’s madness be anything but incontestable evidence of that 
person’s “madness”? 
Consequently, any hindsight interpretation of Wieland seems more likely than not 
to result in either a conscious or unconscious evidence-hunt for indicators of Clara’s 
“madness.” In fact, several critical views inadvertently reproduce asylum logic by 
viewing Clara either as a victim of hyper-sensibility4 or of her uncontained and even 
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aberrant sexual desires (or both). Indeed, these critics conduct what Foucault terms an 
“anatomy of [Clara’s] pleasures of the flesh” (Abnormal 186). Some readings see her 
“brooding” over Carwin’s portrait and read her response to his voice as sexual attraction.5 
One interpretation implies that Clara’s solitary contemplation is “autoerotic” in nature6. 
Other readings regard Clara’s insistence on Carwin’s guilt as a persistent and worsening 
sign of her growing hysteria or madness.7 Overlooking the alarming level of misogynist 
violence in key scenes, certain articles claim that Carwin and his threats of violence are a 
figment of Clara’s over-active or diseased imagination.8 Indeed, some even view Carwin 
as a projection of Clara’s own “raw” sexuality or as a sign of her subconscious sexual 
desires.9 These understandings deflect masculine violence back onto Clara in the form of 
her uncontainable sexuality. Moreover, a few of the readings see Clara as either 
experiencing a “sexual awakening” or as experiencing a sexual awakening that she 
subconsciously attempts to deny (an early sign of her impending madness).10 Still other 
analyses suggest that Clara’s dream of her brother and her subsequent suspicion that he is 
in the closet indicates her sexual desire for her brother, and through him, her father.11 
One article even implies that Clara is “possessed” when she suspects an evil being in her 
closet, in that her closet represents herself (15).12 Such an interpretation reproduces the 
nature of possession that Foucault claims started to replace the traditional concept of the 
witch (Abnormal 207-212). The reinvented witch emerges as the possessed (mad) female, 
whose body is divided into multiple sites of pleasure that she at once desires and rejects 
(Abnormal 207-212).  
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These interpretations reproduce asylum logic by assigning the eighteenth-
century’s “mad” body of hyper-sensibility to Clara precisely because she does not, in 
fact, have one. They transform, moreover, Clara’s neurologically mad body into her 
“mad” sexualized body, infused with aberrant sexual instinct. According to Foucault, 
aberrant sexual instinct was believed to originate in human imagination, because the 
imagination “opens up to [sexual instinct] the space in which it will be able to develop its 
abnormal nature (Abnormal 280). Also of crucial significance is that these readings posit 
Clara as the agent or originator of the violence that assaults her. As a result, they lessen, 
if not totally obscure, the misogynist violence directed at her. Overall, these observations 
of Clara (re)produce her “madness” by reading her alleged “hyper-sensibility” or over-
active imagination as latent, aberrant sexual desire and instinct.  
The novel’s logic, like these critical readings, also collapses Clara’s assumed 
excessive sensibility into her alleged latent sexual desires. Clara’s “confession” of hyper-
sensibility at the novel’s end will have become synonymous with the taint of female 
sexual deviance. In fact, Clara is in a lose-lose situation. At the novel’s beginning, her 
masculine practices and pleasures (discussed in more detail below) negatively position 
her as one of the late eighteenth-century’s “unsexed” women. Claudia Johnson explains 
that men’s appropriation or “masculinization” of the “feminine attributes” of 
sentimentalism at this time left women with only “two [gender-site] choices:  either the 
equivocal or hyperfeminine” (12-14). Clara’s masculine practices and pleasures make her 
one of Johnson’s “equivocal” beings. Clara’s “manly” pursuits, in other words, “unsex” 
her—“she is a female mutation of a male hero” (12). Moreover, Claudia Johnson argues 
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that patriarchy ironically viewed the late eighteenth-century “unsexed” woman as 
“oversexed” (9). Her masculine disposition, in other words, means that she must also 
have masculine sexual desires (Johnson 9). However, what will become clear is that 
Clara’s movement from her empowered “unsexed/oversexed” position at the novel’s start 
to her confession of “hyperfemininity” (i.e. hyper-sensibility) by the novel’s end does not 
free her from the taint of sexual aberration. As G.J. Barker-Benfield explains, the concept 
of female sensibility (excessive or not) already semantically contains within itself the 
idea of female promiscuity; society viewed women’s pursuit of aesthetic pleasures as 
concomitant with the pursuit of sexual pleasures (xxvii). Barker-Benfield further states 
that sexualizing sensibility resulted in the dangerous trope of female virtue in distress and 
the “associat[ion] [of] desire with the rake/victim dyad” (xxvii). Indeed, psychiatric 
power, working through Carwin, will “author” Clara as a “virtue in distress” character—
as the “victim” of Carwin as “rake.” In other words, Carwin will “write” Clara into art as 
the heroine of a formulaic seduction novel. 
If we resist experiencing or interpreting Wieland as a mad woman’s “biographical 
history,” it becomes apparent that Clara represents one of the most empowered heroines 
of the eighteenth century. At the start of the novel, in fact, Clara occupies several 
eighteenth-century masculine ideological positions. Clara essentially lives a “man’s” life 
with all of its privileges:  she is economically independent, and significantly, she is the 
head of her own household.13 Despite the fact that the orphaned Clara has an older 
brother nearby, whose household she could have joined after receiving her inheritance, 
Clara flouts this traditional practice and deliberately opts to live alone. This is a radically 
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modern concept for its time, especially when the maiden Clara hosts the bachelor Pleyel 
as an overnight guest. Moreover, as was the situation with Amoranda, Clara’s house 
contributes to her non-corporeal existence.  Her house acts as a body substitute and 
enables her to live free of bodily concerns and discomforts. In short, when one’s house 
substitutes for one’s body, it leaves that individual free to pursue the higher and 
pleasurable activities of the mind. In contrast to Amoranda’s house (as well as her 
financial independence), which enabled her to live more like a marriage-avoiding 
bachelor than like a chaste maiden searching for a husband (the reason why I argued that 
the novel tortured her out of this position), Clara’s house, servant, and financial 
independence enable her to pursue the bodiless and masculine occupations of abstract 
intellectualism and aesthetic pleasures.  
Clara is also a practiced rational thinker in the Lockean sense at the novel’s start, 
since she is a woman who reasons by carefully weighing the limited amount of sensorial 
evidence she has at hand and drawing what conclusions she can from that evidence. In 
this sense, she is like Elizabeth Bennet at the start of Pride and Prejudice. Clara is not 
impulsive and restrains her own sensibilities through cool reasoning and deliberation, 
frequently playing devil’s advocate to her own ideas. Indeed, Clara epitomizes 
Wollstonecraft’s mentally healthy female14. Moreover, Clara’s rationalism, unlike 
Pleyel’s, is not uncompromising. She doesn’t dismiss an idea just because it is unusual or 
can’t be rationally explained right away. In short, Clara has a healthy and balanced 
worldview, and her narrative implies that this has been her state of mind for the past 
“[s]ix years.”15 For example, in reflecting on her father’s mysterious death, she 
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demonstrates this balance when she relates that “I could not deny that the event was 
miraculous, and yet I was invincibly averse to that method of solution” (39). Clara finds 
the event to be extraordinary, even supernatural, but she immediately neutralizes this 
unscientific explanation, knowing that it is not a sound method from which to draw 
conclusions. And she does this, even though the limited facts she has available through 
her uncle’s story do not offer her any natural or rational explanation. Moreover, Clara and 
her small intellectual group do not allow the subject of mysterious voices to give free 
reign to their fancies, licensing incessant speculation, despite the confirmation of the 
second voice’s prophecy (55). They are intrigued by the idea, yes, but as a topic of 
conversation, it does not consume them. The conversation of her little circle of 
intellectuals discusses a variety of topics despite the fact of the curious mystery that has 
entered their lives. 
Clara’s ability to deliberate rationally before drawing conclusions also manifests 
itself after she hears mysterious voices in her bedroom closet. She hypothetically 
considers the possibility that Judith (her servant) may need her help or may even be ill, 
and in trying to wake her, courteously whispered in her ear in an attempt not to alarm her 
(64). Then, after spending several minutes mentally exploring her bedroom and house, 
reasoning out the possibilities or impossibilities of someone actually entering either, she 
concludes that no one could have entered and that the voice must have been her 
“imagination” or “some casual noise” that she has mistaken for a “human creature” (65). 
Clearly, Clara does not underestimate the power of imagination to offer the human mind 
alternatives to more rational explanations. In fact, when she again hears the voices, she 
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does not startle (“I was so much mistress of my own feelings”). Instead she intently 
listens to the voices’ conversation to see if she could gain more information about their 
source (66). 
Besides Clara’s healthy rationalism in the novel’s beginning, Clara possesses a 
“sixth sense” or a powerful intuition that constitutes her “esemplastic power,” which the 
novel’s logic would rather readers see as her delusions.  Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who 
coined the term “esemplastic power” defines it as an innate feature of humanity 
(“primary imagination”) that mirrors the infinite and omniscient perception of God and 
which reproduces itself as the “secondary imagination” in the poet (272). Esemplastic 
perception supplements limited sensorial perception. Although Coleridge suggests that 
only male poetic genius is able to fully exploit its latent potential. Clara’s apparently 
transgressive artistic intuition reveals that her epistemological position is not one-
dimensional; her sensory knowledge is enhanced by this innate or intuitive perception of 
reality that grants her a creative and Godlike omniscience. Clara’s esemplastic 
imagination, in fact, corresponds to Elizabeth Bennet’s paternal prophesying in the early 
pages of Pride and Prejudice. While Elizabeth’s words create the reality they speak, 
Clara ‘imagines’ futures that later events confirm. Several of Clara’s experiences of 
foreboding exemplify her intuitive omniscience. Clara’s aesthetic contemplation of the 
storm in tandem with Carwin’s portrait, for example, enables her intuitive eye to sense 
her own impending “ruin” as well as her family’s death (62).16 Her next experience 
suggests to her the destruction of her little community’s “happiness” (62). In yet another 
episode, Clara’s intuition manifests as a dream-vision that places a “beckoning” 
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Theodore “on the opposite edge of [a] gulph”—one that Clara will fall into if she obeys 
her brother’s request (71). Clara catches a glimpse of the impending masculine violence 
that future events will confirm. Clearly, Clara has a special knowledge that is usually 
reserved for males. Indeed, her “esemplastic power” situates her in the company of 
celebrated male Romantic poets such as Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Keats. The long 
period of “happiness” that Clara describes (before Carwin’s arrival) seems directly 
related to her ability to make use of her intellectual and intuitive abilities.  She makes it 
clear that this is how she has spent and spends most of her time, which is quite atypical of 
most eighteenth-century women, who are confined to their husbands’ houses, caring for 
their husband’s children and needs. Unlike these women, Clara’s house is not a prison; in 
fact, she refers to it as her “asylum.” She embodies not only Wollstonecraft’s mentally 
balanced woman, but she also personifies the Enlightenment’s rational “man” and 
Romanticism’s second-sighted male poet. Not surprisingly, Clara’s mentally balanced 
state becomes a source of patriarchal anxiety. 
Clara violates proper eighteenth-century gender roles when she indulges in 
several practices and pleasures reserved for men. One of these roles, in fact, is writing. 
Although we do not know exactly what Clara records in her secret journal, we can safely 
assume that it contains her uncensored thoughts, ideas, and desires, and, as Andrew J. 
Scheiber suggests, Clara’s journal represents “an alternative channel of expression . . . 
through which she might subvert or resist . . . [patriarchal] conventions” (188). While 
journal writing is not unusual for women of the period, what strongly implies that Clara’s 
journal writing most likely represents something transgressive is that, at the novel’s 
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conclusion, masculine violence ultimately destroys her journal (in the fire), but only after 
both Pleyel (143) and Carwin (235) know its contents. In other words, patriarchal power 
censors Clara’s potentially subversive writing. In this context, it is not unreasonable to 
believe that the very different culture of independence and freedom in which Clara lives 
(and has lived) relative to other women, has most likely affected the nature of her writing. 
Indeed, her writing, which we will never know, represents in a sense the lost potential of 
women in the new America.  
This American heroine continues to violate proper eighteenth-century gender 
roles when she (ironically) acts the part of Foucault’s asylum psychiatrist. Indeed she 
assumes psychiatric power for herself and exposes what is hidden in Theodore’s 
behavior, his looks, his words, and then predicts future behavior based on these outward 
‘signs’ of latent madness. Clara states that she “could not bear to think that his senses 
should be the victims of such delusion. It argued a diseased condition of his frame, which 
might show itself hereafter in more dangerous symptoms” (39). Positioned as the 
powerful “psychiatrist” with Theodore as her “patient,” she “investigat[es] the state of his 
thoughts” (40). He “confesses” his thoughts to her, she assesses them, and then forecasts 
a future based on her findings. Of particular note, Clara’s assessment of Theodore results 
in her assigning a “diseased” mind/body to the paternal side of the family, and thus she 
deliberately exempts herself from any influence by the family bloodline.  
Clara also transgressively appropriates for herself two of the period’s masculine 
aesthetic pleasures: “masculine sublimity” and “man of feeling” sensibility. It is because 
of these two activities that Clara’s female “foibles” seem much more transgressive than 
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either Amoranda’s or Elizabeth Bennet’s; her mental activities involve more than just the 
ability to reason—they involve pleasures—masculine pleasures. In fact, we are made to 
feel that Clara spends most of her time in pleasure-producing mental states. Clara’s 
pleasurable aesthetic musings reproduce the English Romanticism form of the “masculine 
sublime” that Anne K. Mellor describes in Romanticism and Gender (1993). Mellor 
describes this experience as one in which the self or “ego” transcends the body, or what 
patriarchy traditionally views as the feminine realm of materiality (88).  This mental 
transcendence, as Mellor explains it, has its own language, which she refers to as 
“linguistic omnipotence” (89). The participant speaks from his/her “mental power” in lieu 
of the “absent presence” of the material body while engaged in the sublime experience 
(Mellor 89). The sense of non-corporeality suggested here should sound familiar—both 
Amoranda and Elizabeth Bennet started off in such a purely mental, non-corporeal state. 
Clara engages in masculine transcendence and linguistic omnipotence several times 
during the beginning of the novel. We can, in fact, view Clara’s responses to the stories 
about her father’s mysterious death and Theodore’s experience of the mysterious voice, 
as those of masculine sublimity:  “My wonder was excited by the inscrutableness of the 
cause . . . [it] begat in me a thrilling, and not unpleasing solemnity” (39). Then, after 
hearing Theodore’s and Pleyel’s story about another instance of the inexplicable voice, 
she describes her reaction as: “An awe, the sweetest and most solemn that imagination 
can conceive, pervaded my whole frame” (52). Clara’s transcendental experience is one 
in which her mental experience of “awe” substitutes for her physical body. She 
participates in the absent presence of the body that Mellor describes. 
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War is the object that inspires Clara’s second transcendental experience.17 As 
with the male romanticists, Clara’s mental response is immediate awe, joy, or ecstasy.18 
Clara begins Chapter IV of her narrative by describing her and her family’s and friends’ 
“uninterrupted happiness” in the context of ongoing war (29). She then relates that [t]he 
sound of war had been heard, but it was at such a distance as to enhance our enjoyment 
by affording objects of comparison . . . [r]evolutions and battles contributed in some sort 
to our happiness, by agitating our minds with curiosity, and furnishing causes of patriotic 
exultation” (29). Despite its violence, war stimulates their minds to ecstasy. Clara’s 
reflections here align even more specifically with the Kantian sublime as Mellor 
describes it, in which the sublime experience models the warrior’s own “capacity to 
withstand fear and danger” (88-9). In other words, Clara’s transcendental pleasure is one 
in which she experiences the same “patriotic exultation” of the warrior about to do 
battle—they (she and the warriors) are, in essence, of one mind. What makes her sublime 
experience even more transgressive is that Clara does, indeed, recognize the toll war 
takes on male bodies (“however calamitous to those who occupied the scene”); she 
nonetheless continues to exploit war in order to experience a sublime mental state. 
What’s more, Clara’s experience inverts the gendered logic of the sublime as Mellor 
outlines it, in which the male poet “speaks of, for, and in place of nature originally 
gendered as female” (90). In contrast, Clara-the-poet’s sublime experience “speaks of, 
for, and in place of” the warrior originally gendered as male (e.g. Mars, the God of War). 
Her elevated mind, we might say, is made possible by vulnerable and silenced male 
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bodies.19
 A little later, Clara occupies yet another traditionally masculine position when a 
“wanderer” (later discovered to be Carwin) becomes the object of her contemplations:   
 Clara’s sublime reflections indicate her bodiless or mind-only existence at this 
point in the text. 
I continued in the same spot for half an hour, vaguely, and by fits, 
contemplating the image of this wanderer, and drawing, from outward 
appearances, those inferences with respect to the intellectual history of this 
person, which experience affords us. I reflected on the alliance which 
commonly subsists between ignorance and the practice of agriculture, and 
indulged myself in airy speculations as to the influence of progressive 
knowledge in dissolving this alliance, and embodying the dreams of the 
poets. I asked why the plough and the hoe might not become the trade of 
every human being, and how this trade might be made conducive to, or at 
least, consistent with the acquisition of wisdom and eloquence. (58) 
 
Note that Clara’s mind assigns a more specific identity to the wanderer, making him a 
farmer, and then her mind “speaks” on behalf of the farmer, for whom she substitutes the 
“dreams of the poets.” Her notion of poets’ dreams, in fact, reflects her own present 
mental state:  she is the “poet” whose “linguistic omnipotence” transforms the farmer into 
a wise and eloquent ideal—in other words, she mentally transforms Carwin into an objet 
d’art. Similar to her sublime experience of war and the gendered inversion evident there, 
the female poet (Clara) silences the manual laborer (male body) by first joining and then 
speaking for him with her mind.  
Besides appropriating the mental pleasures of the “masculine sublime,” Clara also 
transgressively participates in and speaks as the eighteenth-century’s “man of feeling.” 
She responds to Carwin’s voice with “overflow[ing] sympathy” and “unbidden tears” 
(59). Clara’s aesthetic pleasures entail her transgressive occupation of late eighteenth-
century male sensibility. She responds to Carwin like a Harley20 or a Harrington21 when 
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her gender requires her to be the suffering, indeed, mad female who “solicit[s] male 
tears” (Johnson 15). Again, however, Clara substitutes the mental image of a tragic male 
in lieu of the usual female as the object of her pleasurable sentimentalism. Indeed, she 
once more mentally transforms Carwin into an objet d’art.  His request for water “‘for 
charity’s sweet sake’” triggers her emotional response (59). Clearly, Clara’s response to 
Carwin’s voice is not sexual attraction as some scholars misread it; neither should it be 
read a symptom of her hyper-sensibility; indeed, it is total aesthetic pleasure—more 
significantly, it is male aesthetic pleasure. Clara’s emotion is generated by the artistic 
incongruity of the previous mental image of the wise and eloquent farmer and present 
close proximity of the pathetic farmer’s voice. Clara’s “mental portrait,” as it were, 
juxtaposes his beautiful and elevated voice with his low station, his poverty with his 
asking for so little, and his courage (to make the request) with his shy reserve. It is her 
own poetic imagination, not Carwin, which brings Clara her pleasure in this scene. 
Reproducing insane asylum logic, the novel will violently impose its version of 
reality (male superiority and female subjugation) onto Clara, i.e. the “mad” patient, 
primarily working through what Foucault call “psychiatric power.” In Wieland, it is the 
male characters, especially Carwin, who function as power’s relays of asylum 
psychiatrists. Foucault explains that the psychiatrist uses “direction” to make his version 
of reality an inevitability through a very regimented and closely controlled asylum 
routine of daily praise, reward, reprimand, constraint, threat, etc. (Psychiatric Power 
174). The irony of this special, isolated “treatment” of the mad, as Foucault points out, is 
that the asylum’s reality is reality—it functions as power (Psychiatric Power 175). The 
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only difference is that the invisible forces that make “normal” behavior compulsory 
outside of the asylum are greatly intensified within the hyper-reality of the asylum. 
Sooner or later, the patient must, of necessity, resign his/her own will and succumb to this 
hyper-reality’s unremitting pressure and accept power’s reality as his/her own. How, 
then, does Foucault’s concept of “direction” (a.k.a. “management” or “moral treatment”) 
manifest itself in Wieland? What are the forces at work? What is the routine or regimen 
that will act on Clara’s body, break her will, and “cure” her”?  
Psychiatric power uses four major forms of “direction” that coerce Clara into her 
“confession” and “cure,” i.e. her subjugated role. First, asylum power subjects Clara to 
escalating violence that produces increasingly intensified states of horror that function to 
take their toll not only on her body but also on her mind. Second, asylum power employs 
“recognition by mirror” to make Clara see her own madness through her family’s and 
Theodore’s madness. Third, asylum power repositions Clara from active and creative 
writer/poet/artist into a passive objet d’art. And fourth, it constructs the ideal 
environment in which Clara’s rationalism will be used against her. 
What better way can patriarchal power “direct” Clara into submission than to 
separate her from her family as well as threaten her and hold her body hostage? Indeed, 
these strategies re-enact the asylum’s own strategy of isolating the patient from his/her 
family (Foucault terms it “seizing the body”) and controlling the patient’s body through 
“orthopedic” (literally means “child straightening”) devices. Power’s strategy of horror-
producing violence makes Clara go ‘out of her mind’ and into her body. Moreover, each 
act of masculine violence against her elicits a greater response of horror than the previous 
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act:  sororicide incites even greater horror than familicide; familicide provokes more 
horror than the threats of incest and rape; and the threats of incest and rape elicit more 
horror than murder threats. This effect of escalating violence is what asylum power refers 
to as the “law of intensification”; the retaliative effect of greater violence when Clara 
resists submitting is what Foucault refers to as “the system of the straightjacket”—“the 
more one tries to escape [it], the more one suffers” (Psychiatric Power 105-106)—
indeed, it seems that with each effort Clara makes to end her suffering, the more power 
retaliates with increased violence. 
Carwin’s (the voices) and Theodore’s repeated threats of murder and rape/incest 
produce Clara’s heightened awareness of her body-as-female; in other words, she 
becomes anxious about her body and its vulnerability to male violence.22 These violent 
acts, moreover, occur in two key places: Clara’s bedroom and summerhouse—places that 
represent her body and mind, respectively.23 Masculine violence replaces Clara’s earlier 
responses of the pleasurable masculine sublime with its aesthetic opposite:  responses of 
increasing horror. Clara’s mind-contracting response of horror is evident in the “fit” into 
which she “s[i]nk[s]” after hearing the threatening voices in her closet (66). In this 
state—unconscious, silenced, and positioned low to the female-gendered, material 
earth—Clara is anything but an elevated or speaking “mind.” The murderous and 
incestuous threats at the summerhouse are accompanied literally and figuratively by 
absolute darkness, one of aesthetic theory’s key conditions for producing horror. After 
awakening from her dream-vision, she finds it impossible to move; any step may literally 
plunge her into the Schuylkill River. Moreover, Clara’s intuitive dream-vision, which 
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includes a threatening “abyss,” a landscape feature of gothic fiction that produces horror 
and is usually a punishment reserved for transgressive characters, stands in direct contrast 
to the image of the mind-elevating, sublimity producing Alpine cliffs. The image of the 
abyss in gothic fiction generates a response of absolute horror manifested as acrophobia, 
impending danger, a violent, painful death after falling, and total oblivion, whereas the 
height of the Alpine cliffs produces the mind-expanding experience of the profundity of 
nature and spiritual renewal. In effect, Clara’s horrifying experiences render her mind-
less and sight-less. Indeed, the total darkness that envelopes her after her dream-vision 
represents her loss of a poet’s second sight—her esemplastic power. The “visions” of her 
later and prolonged delirium are comprised only of the realization of the fall in the abyss 
(269). Horror takes Clara’s previous pleasures of sublimity, heightened awareness and 
omniscience and contracts them down to what amounts to total blindness in the absolute 
and utter darkness of the abyss. 
Carwin’s threat of murder and rape play themselves out on the architecture of 
Clara’s two houses. Not only does Carwin steal into Clara’s bedroom and hide in her 
closet twice without her consent, he also reads her private journal. Conceptually, Carwin 
rapes Clara twice. If Clara’s journal is her mind and her house is her body, with her 
bedroom representing her sexual body, then Carwin penetrates the deepest recesses of her 
mind and body. Because Clara’s empowerment is mostly mind generated (her pleasures 
and rationalism), masculine violence, in effect, “rapes” her mind, leaving her with a body 
that it will disclose as the site of her “madness.” Also, Carwin’s threat of murderous 
violence if she returns to her summerhouse (72-3) is the equivalent of forbidding her to 
 
 
135 
 
return to her mental pleasures, since her summerhouse is her place of quiet repose and 
scenic inspiration and contemplation. Furthermore, the continually escalating threats and 
violence directed at Clara force her to seek male protection. She relates that the “solitude, 
formerly so dear to [her], could no longer be endured” (69). At first it is a short stay at 
her brother’s, but the subsequent return to her own house necessitates Pleyel’s occupation 
of Clara’s spare bedroom—a quasi-marriage that starts to resemble the reality that asylum 
power wants Clara to adopt (69). Later, Carwin’s rape threat forces Clara to take 
permanent residence in her brother’s house (115). However, when his house is no longer 
an option after it becomes a crime scene, she has no choice but to remain permanently in 
her uncle’s “protection,” and not just in another town or state, but in another country. 
Power doesn’t just oust Clara from her heretofore “manly” life; it violently banishes her 
from the land of (female) opportunity. 
Clara’s nerve-shocking responses of horror register time and again on her body as 
“trembling” (110), “shuddering” (73, 75, 97, 218), “phrenzy” (101, 265), and 
“convulsion” (258), with the chronology of the words connoting rising tension and 
intensifying vibration. The escalating violence and the abject horror to which she has 
been a witness and of which she has been a victim eventually take their toll on her 
nervous system; Clara relates that the horrors “acted on [her] nerves like an edge of steel. 
It appeared to cut asunder the fibres of [her] brain, and rack every joint with agony” (97); 
she even alludes here to the Inquisitorial “rack” of torture that stretched victims’ joints to 
and beyond the breaking point. She again relates that “[Her] frame shook, and the vital 
current was congealed” (98). Once these repetitive jolts to her system pass the tipping 
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point, Clara finds herself experiencing a short period of “delirium” (179), and then 
finally, her long episode of delirium and melancholia (268-271). If horror tenses or 
tightens Clara’s nervous system to the breaking point, it also contracts the space around 
her. In addition to the absolute darkness that encloses Clara at the summerhouse, the sight 
of Catharine’s corpse renders Clara immovable—“for more than an hour” her “faculties 
and limbs [are] deprived of all activity” (173). Indeed, Clara resembles Catharine’s 
unmoving corpse. Her reality is temporarily contracted to a single point in space.  
The constantly shrinking space around Clara reaches its nadir when she 
encounters Theodore in the final scene of horror. Theodore—epitomizing the masculine 
violence that threatens Clara—approaches his sister and closes the space between them so 
he can strangle her. He plans to cut off the blood supply to her brain, metaphorically 
making her mind-less, but his murderous intentions and approach produce Clara’s 
strongest sense of self-preservation yet. She is forced to the point at which she will have 
to kill her brother or be killed. Indeed, it is horror at its extreme in the form of 
preservation of life—her own life—that finally takes Clara over the edge. Her sense of 
self-preservation is so strong that she first disobeys her uncle and tells Theodore that 
Carwin is behind the voices so her brother might quit the spiritual mandate he believes 
himself to be carrying out. She then picks the ideal time to drop the weapon she is 
holding, letting it fall at the very moment she sees his expression change—when he 
realizes the true extent and nature of his crime. She knows he will pick up the penknife 
and use it on himself. Indeed, Clara’s subsequent prolonged state of delirium is less a 
response to her brother’s desire to kill her, or because he nearly did kill her, than it is her 
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realization that she has the capability of facilitating the death not only of another human 
being but of her own brother. Yet, it is masculine violence that has brought Clara to this 
claustrophobic, confession-producing space of horror—a place in which she had to 
choose. But masculine violence will have us see Clara’s subsequent delirium as madness 
produced by her own hyper-sensibilities.  
Clara’s loss of mind and space, which culminates in the final scene and 
subsequently produces her confession (passed off as a cure), parallels asylum logic’s 
technique of producing a crisis in which the patient is gradually constrained into 
confessing his/her madness (Foucault Psychiatric Power 274). To describe this process, 
Foucault even draws on the metaphor of space contraction:  “the subject must be forced 
into a sort of tight corner, a point of extreme contraction at which he is constrained to say 
‘I am mad’” (Psychiatric Power 274). Internally, the space of Clara’s mind contracts—
her omniscience telescopes into total blindness. Externally, the space around her shrinks; 
she is gradually cornered. What she is left with is an immovable, rigid body—in other 
words, her body resembles that of a corpse. Where can she go if she has no family and no 
friends? Where can she go if she can’t go to her own home, her brother’s home, her 
summerhouse, or even to Pleyel’s? Besides the crisis-producing technique of the asylum, 
Clara’s loss of all her options closely models the asylum’s “maneuvers” of “deprivation,” 
in which the mad patient is denied certain needs until he/she is willing to “pay” for 
his/her “cure” with the “currency” of obedience (Foucault Psychiatric Power 156). Either 
way, these techniques ultimately “corner” Clara’s body into her uncle’s management that 
is euphemized as paternal protection. 
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Another strategy that the novel employs that parallels asylum logic is what 
Foucault calls “recognition by mirror” (Madness and Civilization 262). Foucault explains 
that the asylum’s isolated containment of mad individuals provides the ideal 
circumstances in which “madness would see itself, would be seen by itself” (Madness 
and Civilization 262). According to Foucault, this mirroring is necessary because one’s 
madness can “be recognized only in the object” (Foucault Madness and Civilization 262-
3). This strategy, in conjunction with the horror of the novel’s final scenes of violence, 
requires Clara to acknowledge her own madness in her family history and in Theodore. 
The first instance of “recognition by mirror” that occurs in Wieland is when Clara’s uncle 
tells her about the madness on her mother’s side of the family (203). Clara’s uncle 
represents another of the novel’s “psychiatrist” figures, especially since he steps in as the 
“voice of reason” and “master of reality.” Notable here is that her uncle relates this 
maternal history of madness only after Clara informs him that she strongly suspects 
Carwin is behind the voice that Theodore believes he heard. Up until this point, Clara 
only had knowledge of madness on the paternal side. Indeed, it seems that Clara’s 
rationalism, i.e., her search for a reason outside of madness, necessitates the inclusion of 
a history of madness on the maternal side, so that Clara will finally recognize her own 
possibility for madness. In effect, the uncle’s narrative nullifies the exemption from 
madness Clara allowed herself at the novel’s beginning where she transgressively 
wielded psychiatric power and assigned madness to Theodore, i.e., the paternal side of 
the family. Most significantly, because Clara resists embodiment, the narrative’s logic 
provides her with a “mad” family body, in which she must of necessity see her own 
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madness or at least its possibility. In fact the first thing Clara does after her uncle leaves 
is ask herself, “‘What was my security against influences equally terrific and equally 
irresistible? . . . Was I not likewise transformed from rational and human into a creature 
of nameless and fearful attributes?” (204-5). To further ensure Clara’s “madness,” her 
uncle also informs her that Theodore, despite his imprisonment, is determined to kill 
Clara and has already escaped from prison twice (215). Living under the constant threat 
of Theodore’s violence positions Clara as the mirrored mad victim to Theodore’s mad 
purpose. Clara even states, “The phrenzy which is charged upon my brother, must belong 
to myself” (217). The uncle’s narrative provides Clara with the body and the “mirror” 
(via Theodore) she needs to recognize her own mad self.  
The final, climactic scene between Clara and Theodore also resembles the asylum 
logic of “recognition by mirror.” Several scholars comment on the scene’s doubling or 
twinning effect.24 Theodore’s madness will again function as a mirror for Clara. Clara 
stands facing him (mirror-like) with the penknife in her hand ready to defend herself if 
necessary. The knife, in fact, passes back and forth between the two of them, suggesting a 
confusion of the mad victim/mad murderer dynamic25. Most significantly, Clara seems to 
share in Theodore’s delusion.  Even though Clara knows that Carwin is most likely the 
source of the disembodied voice that is speaking, she relates that she “partook of 
[Theodore’s] credulity, shook with his amazement, and panted with his awe” (262). 
Scholars also point out that the voice’s message of “‘Man of errors! cease to cherish they 
delusion’” (262) can be directed at either Theodore or Clara or both26. The voice’s use of 
the phrase “Man of errors” to refer to Clara is semantically loaded, and points to Clara’s 
 
 
140 
 
gender transgressions (“errors”) in leading a “manly” life. In the context of the asylum, 
this scenario plays out the two-part “recognition by mirror” logic in a single step:  Clara’s 
objective observation of her mad brother (part 1) compels a subjective recognition of her 
own madness (part 2); for the instant she recognizes his madness, she acts (is herself) 
mad. What the “recognition by mirror” that occurs in this scene further suggests is that 
Theodore’s suicide signifies Clara’s suicide of her former empowered “self.” In fact, 
what follows this scene is Clara’s long period of delirium and melancholia. Clara’s 
“madness” represents a rebirth into “true” femaleness. 
The third way that asylum power “directs” Clara into submission is by 
repositioning her into objects of art. Carwin (as power’s agent) essentially removes Clara 
from her subjective positions of female-empowered writing and masculine 
sublimity/sensibility by “authoring” her as a “ruined” literary heroine in a clichéd novel 
of seduction27 and as a male’s inspirational muse, respectively. Indeed, this form of 
“direction” ensures that Clara will never again mentally transform men into art through 
her poetic imagination. In “writing” Clara into a literary heroine, she becomes his 
property. As Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar claim, because Carwin “defines” Clara 
“in language,” he now “owns [her], controls [her], and encloses [her] on the printed 
page” (12). This act of masculine violence makes real Carwin’s earlier threats of murder 
and rape, since he uses, as Gilbert and Gubar put it, his “pen” to kill her into art and 
“authors” her ruination. He also ensures Pleyel completes the clichéd love triangle by 
writing him into the jilted lover. Using a combination of his ventriloquism and mimicking 
skills (to mimic Clara’s voice), he ensures that the duped Pleyel overhears a 
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sensationalized lovers’ intimate dialogue between Clara (seduced heroine) and himself 
(rake). Clara resists this literary role by confronting first her brother then Pleyel. 
However, she finds herself helplessly engaged in a scene with Pleyel that mimics 
seduction novel melodrama. She must bear his accusations and moralistic monologue, 
and, despite herself, she ends up fainting like the typical heroine of that genre. Adding 
greater distress to Clara is that her exit from this scene does not end her literary role as 
the seduced heroine. She receives what is tantamount to the seduction genre’s 
conventional “seducer’s billet” from Carwin asking her for a “clandestine meeting” 
(156). Carwin’s authored revision of Clara also turns her into an art form that was 
considered “low” at the time (not the least of the reasons being because these novels were 
primarily written by women).  
Authoring Clara into a higher art form is Pleyel. However, Pleyel’s “pen” revises 
both Clara’s past and her future. He “writes” Clara into the passive object of male 
inspiration (what she once was), even as he simultaneously helps Carwin author her into 
the “ruined” woman (she is now). Referring to Clara, Pleyel exclaims, “Here . . . is a 
being, after whom sages may model their transcendent intelligence, and painters, their 
ideal beauty. Here is exemplified, that union between intellect and form, which has 
hitherto existed only in the conceptions of the poet” (139). As Andrew T. Scheiber 
observes, Pleyel sees Clara not as “a participant in the life of the mind and the 
imagination” but rather “as an exemplar which stimulates it . . . an earthly muse” (179). 
Pleyel’s words here revise Clara’s empowerment of the past. She is no longer the 
imagining poet, but what the poet himself imagines. Furthermore, in the context of 
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masculine aesthetic theory, Pleyel repositions Clara at the opposite side of the aesthetic 
spectrum, moving her from the active, mind-speaking poet to a position of passive and 
silent beauty. Scheiber further observes of this scene that Pleyel imposes the stereotypical 
and “self-contradictory Eve/angel symbology” onto Clara that all women represent in a 
patriarchy (180). In effect, Pleyel “writes” Clara into two objets d’art that correspond to 
the Eve/angel dichotomy—the literary ruined heroine and the muse, respectively.  
The final strategy that psychiatric power employs to “direct” Clara into admitting 
her “madness” is by contriving the means in which Clara’s reasoning abilities are used 
against her. Indeed, added to the repetition of horrors that function to discipline Clara’s 
body are the mysterious voices that Clara cannot readily explain using her reasoning 
abilities. Further adding to the horror and the mystery of the voices is the inscrutability of 
the relationship, if any, amongst the voices, Carwin’s appearance, and the murder of her 
family. Such a concurrence of extraordinary events in such a short period of time cannot 
fail to confound Clara’s thinking, especially since she relies on her rationalism to form 
the basis of her reality. Jane Tompkins also observes that Clara “strives continually to 
find some concrete, rational basis for understanding” of the mysterious events that plague 
her (50). Indeed, asylum power in this sense repeatedly bewilders and overwhelms Clara 
with what can be viewed as its tactic of Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (generally known 
by its acronym FUD) to coerce her into a loss of confidence not only in her ability to 
reason but in the reality that Lockean rationalism had heretofore constructed for her. 
While her exposure to a repetition of horrors transforms her from a self-reliant and 
confident woman into a woman who lives in constant fear, her “uncertainty” and “doubt” 
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transforms her into a woman who no longer sees herself as rational. Clara’s uncertainty 
and doubt are more evident at the novel’s beginning, before Clara is subjected to the 
greater horrors produced by facing Catharine’s corpse and Theodore’s attempt on her life 
and his suicide. Note the language that she uses to describe her struggle to explain events 
around her without success: 
The most careful observation . . . produced no discovery. (78) 
 
I compared the cause with the effect, and they seemed disproportioned to 
each other. All unaware, and in a manner which I had no power to explain. 
(79-80) 
 
[D]id not my senses assure me that a plot was laid against my life? (75) 
 
Before Carwin’s threat of rape: 
[I was] wholly uncertain, whether he were an object to be dreaded or 
adored. (81) 
 
He afforded us no ground on which to build even a plausible conjecture. 
(82) 
 
After Carwin’s threat of rape: 
I studied to discover the true inference deducible from his deportment and 
words with regard to his former adventures and actual views . . . No new 
ideas suggested themselves in the course of this review. (109) 
 
How was I to interpret this circumstance? (113) 
 
Because Clara’s reasoning abilities fail to demystify events—indeed, now Clara faces 
greater horrors and a deepening sense of mystery—her prolonged uncertainty and doubt 
become the very instruments of her torture:  “but now my bosom was corroded by 
anxiety” (79); “Tortured with suspense” (92); “I strove to give a slower motion to my 
thoughts, and to regulate a confusion which became painful” (106); “a new train of 
apprehensions . . . merely added to the turbulence and agony of my reflections” (113); “I 
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was tormented with fears” (131). “‘The story of the grounds of my suspicions would be 
painful and too long’” (182); “When thought becomes merely a vehicle of pain, its 
progress must be stopped” (205). What becomes evident is that Clara’s initial agency in 
rational deliberation is brought to the point where she would rather not think at all (i.e., 
the woman patriarchy desires). However, what she and readers recognize instead are that 
her “opinions [are] the sport of eternal change”—the very symptom that Wollstonecraft 
derides in women. 
 Clara’s narrative, moreover, can be construed as an anti-detective novel as it 
were. Instead of the usual plot trajectory in which mystery decreases as the reasoning 
investigator’s knowledge increases, for Clara, it is mystery that increases as her relative 
knowledge about it decreases.28  Significant, however, is that Clara’s narrative takes on 
this anti-mystery form because she is denied access to all the facts required to make 
correct judgments. The novel’s logic compels her to draw associations amongst events—
associations that it will foreground as erroneous, even though they are actually reasonable 
in the context of what facts are available to her at the time. For example, Clara incorrectly 
concludes that Carwin may be Catharine’s and her family’s murderer. She asks her uncle, 
“Is it not . . . an unavoidable inference?” (183). Clara is right; it is “unavoidable.” 
Returning to the scene that produces her ‘inaccurate’ although reasonable “inference,” we 
see that Clara decides to meet Carwin at her house—a decision she did not come to 
lightly and only after lengthy deliberation. She plans to meet him at the appointed time to 
gain knowledge, to clarify the mystery of events that have besieged her up and until this 
point and to restore her reputation (that Carwin’s ventriloquism and mimicking abilities 
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have ruined); however, what she discovers instead is Catharine’s dead body in her bed. 
Mr. Haller further confuses the situation when he uses the pronoun “he” to inform Clara 
that “he spared not one!” (179), referring to Theodore, when Clara only knows that it was 
Carwin who was supposed to meet her at her house; she concludes that Catharine’s fate 
was meant for her. What facts are not present in this scene but bear on it nonetheless are 
that Carwin had just recently threatened to rape Clara. Pleyel also recently informed her 
that Carwin was wanted for murder and robbery as advertised in a British newspaper. Is it 
not reasonable that Clara would suspect Carwin as Catharine’s murderer and that it was 
she who was actually Carwin’s intended victim?  
Even more significant is that Clara suspects Carwin because her uncle denies her 
the knowledge that Theodore is behind the murders. While it can be argued that her uncle 
is protecting her from knowledge that could hurt her, the asymmetrical relationship that 
constitutes relations of power is based on the one who has power/knowledge (silent) and 
the other who confesses (speaks). Bourdieu also points out that the manipulation of time 
is itself a strategy in social relations (Outline of a Theory of Practice 6-9). Her uncle’s 
delay (his silence) in providing Clara with the necessary information—with Theodore’s 
courtroom confession—provides psychiatric power with an advantage:  the opportunity to 
display an instance of Clara’s (speaking) ‘irrationalism.’ 
To cite one more example, after Clara discovers Carwin in her bedroom closet 
and he relates that he had intended to rape her, she later mistakenly assumes it is Carwin 
whose footsteps she hears approaching her bedroom door (112). The next morning Clara 
discovers it was actually Pleyel. Clara’s hypothesis is not that unreasonable in the context 
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of Carwin’s very recent threat of rape, in which he left open the possibility that he may 
still rape her. Furthermore, Pleyel at that time was unaccounted for—he 
uncharacteristically did not show up for their planned rehearsal of a German play. 
Moreover, fear itself overwhelms and dulls memory functions and explains why Clara 
forgets that Pleyel is staying with her as a form of protection. Clara, however, readily 
“confesses” herself as irrational when she declares upon her discovery it was Pleyel, “he 
[Pleyel] whose footsteps had been listened to with such inquietude! What is man, that 
knowledge is so sparingly conferred upon him! that his heart should be wrung with 
distress, and his frame be exanimated with fear, though safety be encompassed with 
impregnable walls!” (116). While Clara’s language here positions herself within the 
larger context of “man,” its disclosure nonetheless still bears on her as a woman; the 
cumulative effect of these multiple instances of drawing the ‘wrong’ conclusion (that the 
novel’s logic repeatedly showcases) suggests that Clara is a victim of her own over-active 
imagination—the latent hyper-sensibility just waiting for the right moment to surface.   
Making Clara appear most irrational, however, to the point at which it appears as 
“madness” resulting from an overactive imagination, is her lack of knowledge about 
ventriloquism. Indeed, the novel’s delay in delivering this knowledge to Clara (she finds 
out near the novel’s end) is one of asylum power’s primary strategies (along with its 
campaign of horror) in producing Clara’s “madness.” It coerces her into accounting for 
the mysterious voice that protects her as a supernatural guide. After the first two 
instances of the mysterious voices (which Theodore and Pleyel also hear), Clara rejects 
the supernatural as an explanation, because it is a conclusion based on unsound 
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reasoning. The third instance, however, which she alone experiences, forces Clara’s mind 
into the realm of fancy, to draw what seems to be the only available conclusion, in which 
she informs the reader, “I was no longer at liberty to question the reality of those accents” 
(68). By the end of Chapter XX, long after the novel’s logic maintains Clara in a 
continual state of fear, confusion, doubt, and uncertainty, while it yet denies her the facts 
about ventriloquism’s existence and functioning, asylum power finally “corners” her into 
concluding that Carwin must be a supernatural evil entity (206). In the very next chapter, 
Clara’s mind takes its ultimate imaginary leap when she embraces the idea that Carwin is 
the “grand deceiver,” confirming, if it didn’t already, readers’ view of her as having 
crossed the line into “madness” (217). Note, however, that it is only after the novel’s 
logic at last elicits this spectacle of Clara’s madness that she and readers finally get 
Carwin’s confession in the very next chapter.  
Carwin’s ventriloquism is behind the violence that threatens her (voices in the 
closet threatening murder), even as he is also the voice that produces Clara’s belief in a 
disembodied spiritual guardian. While the novel may be trying to suggest that any person 
who relies solely on their senses (sensual evidence) to account for these mysterious 
voices will ultimately be compelled to draw the same conclusions as Clara—that 
reasoning is itself flawed and forces people to draw not just incorrect conclusions but 
irrational ones—it is Clara’s mental instability that asylum power repeatedly makes 
visible, foregrounding it as a sign of her latent madness surfacing.  
Moreover, when Carwin’s “confession” of his ventriloquism finally comes 
(Chapter 22 in a 27 chapter novel), it functions to further confirm Clara’s irrationalism, 
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since he informs her that the murderous voices in her closet were not discussing her 
murder (she misheard) and, even more significantly, he informs her that he really didn’t 
intend to “injure her” (rape her) but found himself “desperate” to come up with a reason 
for being in her closet that would coincide with the rest of his schemes (238). What his 
confession essentially does is imply that Clara’s fears were unfounded all along. The 
novel’s manipulation of time in terms of delay of certain information, especially in its use 
of postponing Carwin’s confession, functions to foreground Clara as an irrational female.  
Perhaps readers at the time, who were also uninformed (like Clara) of 
ventriloquistic abilities, were also fooled (but fooled only in the privacy of their reading) 
along with Clara (whose irrationalism is publicly recorded) until Carwin’s “confession,” 
in which he explains to Clara his ventriloquism abilities near the novel’s end and sets 
Clara and ignorant readers straight (as Darcy does Elizabeth Bennet with his letter). This 
suggests a narrative pattern that, similar to others of the period, constitutes the quixote 
narrative, in which the novel cures29 the female quixote (and readers) of her (their) 
delusion.30 In other words, Clara may be termed the “quixotic female” just as Amoranda 
is termed the “coquet.” Modern readers, however, have the advantage of knowing about 
ventriloquism, and consequently, they do not have to wait until Carwin’s disclosure to 
view Clara as the irrational fool, in which her reasoning abilities ironically compel her to 
draw the ‘crazy’ conclusion that the mysterious voice that protects her is supernatural in 
origin. Power’s strategy of delay—delay of vital information—ensures that Clara and 
readers (then and now) see Clara as a victim of her own overactive imagination—one that 
was just lurking beneath the surface waiting for the right conditions to surface.  
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Indeed, patriarchal power functioning through the logic of asylum power employs 
a strenuous campaign of repetitive misdirection and delayed information that, when 
added to the strategy of repetition and intensification of horror, converge so that neither 
Clara nor readers can easily distinguish them from one another. In other words, Clara’s 
failed reason becomes one and the same with her gradual nervous breakdown caused by 
her repeated exposure to horror. Asylum power stages horrific scenes for Clara to 
encounter while it ostensibly attempts to ‘protect’ her from these encounters through a 
ventriloquized voice that reason itself leads her to believe is supernatural:  “I had no 
grounds on which to build a disbelief” (205). Moreover, while the mysterious voice 
seems benign, it still contributes to the mystery and confusion that already accompanies 
the events that horrify Clara. Thus each encounter with horror, which takes a further toll 
on Clara’s nerves, contributes to her greater emotional investment in a benign protector, 
even as Clara’s reasoning leaves her with no natural explanation for the mysterious 
voice—a “ground” for her “disbelief.”  
Time is a crucial feature in this novel since patriarchal power utilizes the tactic of 
delay to deny Clara pertinent knowledge and to repeatedly showcase her irrational belief 
in a supernatural protector and her series of erroneous conclusions. Indeed, patriarchal 
power’s concurrent violence against, and protection of, Clara represents the way 
patriarchy actually operates—it offers women ‘protection’ from its own violence against 
women, thus mitigating its own culpability (more about this later). What’s more, Clara is 
placed in situations in which no matter what angle it is viewed from it appears her latent 
madness is beginning to surface. Her belief in the protection of a supernatural guardian 
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makes her look irrational, while her disregard for its cautions also makes her appear 
irrational. Her previous encounters with horror, moreover, activate her imagination at the 
next encounter, making reasoning more difficult. Indeed, the fact that Clara’s fear is 
sometimes warranted (e.g. Carwin is in her closet and he threatens rape) and sometimes 
not (e.g., it was Pleyel outside her door not Carwin), contributes to the construction of her 
as irrational if not outright mad. Yet, the reasoning she uses to draw certain assumptions 
is actually reasonable in the context in which it occurs. Reason fails her but it appears to 
be Clara’s surfacing madness. If we view Clara’s story as her biographical history as 
required of each “mad” patient in an asylum—a reading that my argument constantly 
resists—then we can see how Clara’s self-condemnation becomes the readers’ own, since 
she starts to view herself in terms of “madness.” Note that what was previously doubt and 
uncertainty, which produced “anxiety,” “suspense,” and “confusion,” now transforms 
into a certainty of her “madness”:  “Surely it was phrenzy that dictated my deed” (100); 
“My reason had forborne, for a time” (101); “Surely I was utterly bereft of 
understanding” (101). Clara makes these assessments of her “self” from a point in the 
future, after she confesses to her “madness.” 
Before I discuss in detail what constitutes Clara’s “cure,” which we see at the 
novel’s end and in which she comes to recognize or “confess” her “madness,” I want to 
first examine how the novel’s logic represents masculine violence in such a way as to 
mitigate it, exonerate it, or obscure it entirely. Whereas in the two British novels 
masculine power worked its strategies through both male and female characters, power in 
Wieland operates only through the male characters. One of the main ways that power 
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operates so subtly is by suggesting that each character is somehow a victim of the 
mysterious voices. However, if we look a little closer, it becomes apparent that these 
voices only affect the senses of the male characters, meaning that for them, it is simply a 
sensorial experience that has no repercussions. In contrast, women’s bodies bear the 
fallout for this insult (at most) on male senses. After Theodore hears the first voice, he 
immediately suspects his wife (Catharine) is deceiving him. Even after she assures him 
she did not follow him, he looks to Pleyel and Clara to confirm the truth of her story; in 
other words, just as Pleyel transformed Clara from an angel into a fallen Eve, Theodore 
remakes the saint-like Catharine into a duplicitous “Eve.” Even more significantly, 
Catharine’s body ultimately bears the brutal consequences of Theodore’s “Godly” 
message to murder her. Likewise, after Pleyel hears the mysterious voice, his betrothed’s 
body bears the violence—she is confirmed dead (as far as we know at the time). And, 
after Pleyel hears the “voices” of Clara and Carwin, it is Clara’s body (as the “ruined” 
woman) that bears the repercussions.  
Pleyel’s mind, it should be emphasized, remains intact; he maintains his 
reputation for a rational mind despite the fact that his senses have been tricked. His 
reputed rationalism also overshadows his own attraction to Clara, which his own 
emotional investment in her honor as well as her present “ruin” strongly suggests. Most 
importantly, it obscures the fact that his judgment of Clara is in error. Despite this, 
however, readers tend to overlook Pleyel’s emotionally committed, sexist, and flawed 
perception of her. Indeed, while Clara’s “madness” may precede her, Pleyel’s reputation 
for cool-headed reasoning precedes him in a very real way, since he effortlessly revises 
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readers’ perception of Clara. In this way he is also very much like Darcy of Pride and 
Prejudice whose letter revised our perception of Elizabeth. Pleyel’s words have the same 
reality-producing effect when he “rewrites” what was Clara’s previous aesthetic interest 
in Carwin (and his portrait) into sexual attraction for Carwin (141).31
Indeed, the novel’s logic exempts and we might even say elevates Theodore’s 
character not in spite of, but because of, his “madness.” It achieves this in three different 
ways:  it constructs his “madness” as inaccessible to the reader, as ironically rational, and 
as a sublime experience. The reader’s lack of access to Theodore’s consciousness 
 He effectively 
revises Clara’s perception of herself as well as readers’ previous perception of Clara. We 
are made to suddenly suspect that Clara’s prior aesthetic pleasures were sexual pleasures. 
In the context of Clara’s biographical history, Clara (again like Elizabeth Bennet) also 
revises her perception of herself based on Pleyel’s alleged “objective” perception of her. 
When she discusses her aesthetic contemplation of Carwin’s portrait (62), she addresses 
readers, saying that they might suspect her lengthy observation of the portrait as “a 
passion incident to every female heart” (62); however this comment she is writing in 
hindsight, and so this moment in the text not only provides us with her own perception at 
the time (the one that I see as legitimate), but she also provides an editorial that 
ventriloquizes Pleyel’s own perceptions—the hindsight reading that makes Clara’s story 
the biographical corpus required by asylum power (what I view as the logic of torture at 
work in the text). Pleyel revises Clara’s pleasures of the mind into pleasures of her female 
body. The men may hear mysterious voices, but their minds and bodies suffer no real 
consequences.  
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positions him more as a passive mirror—or more accurately, a literary technique—for 
producing Clara’s “madness” through recognition (as I argued earlier). Moreover, our 
inaccessibility to Theodore’s mind stands in direct contrast to our unlimited access to 
Clara’s consciousness. Clara’s vulnerable exposure works against her (I discuss this in 
more detail later in this chapter). Readers cannot help but read the novel as the asylum’s 
“biographical corpus.” Her story bears the burden of absolute visibility; i.e., her 
“madness” already precedes her.  
Our very limited view of Theodore’s mind also contributes to our perception of 
his madness as both rational and sublime. Indeed, Theodore represents an early archetype 
of the admirable masculine rational irrationalism we see in contemporary iconic male 
characters such as Hannibal Lector, Fox Mulder, and Batman. One of the defining 
characteristics of the rationally irrational man is that he acts on his beliefs. The power of 
conviction is very attractive and very American, and Theodore embodies the spirit of the 
early republic in that he acts on his beliefs. His “madness” represents his individualism. 
In contrast, as Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds phrases it, Clara “is acted upon” (120). Also, 
there is no denying that the reasoning of Theodore’s courtroom “confession” is sound and 
persuasive. In fact, Norman S. Grabo describes the “logic” of Theodore’s confession as 
“impeccable” (9). Grabo also adds that “his entire defense or justification rings with 
moral necessity” (9). Shirley Samuels claims Theodore’s “confession” demonstrates “his 
belief in the value of family” despite the evident contradiction (57). Furthermore, 
Theodore’s rhetoric positions the spectators (including readers) as ignorant, silly, 
mindless children who couldn’t possibly understand the trying task he had to undertake at 
 
 
154 
 
the command of God. Theodore’s rhetoric implies that, for the spectators, the voice out of 
the sky is just an idea—a biblical myth; but Theodore lives it. Our condemnation of 
Theodore’s actions, in fact, backfires, because it works to further validate his spiritual 
quest. It presents another obstacle for him to surmount. Theodore’s courtroom speech, in 
other words, represents the ‘manifest destiny’ of the spiritual realm. But even later, when 
Clara informs him that Carwin is behind the voices, Theodore’s reaction is not what we 
would expect. He does not break down, become emotional, or turn his rage onto Carwin; 
instead he slowly, methodically, and deliberately, as if reasoning out the best course of 
action to take, reaches for the penknife and plunges it into his neck. In other words, 
Theodore rationally judges himself, delivers his own verdict of guilty, and then sentences 
himself to death. Like Pleyel, Theodore gets to keep his rational mind even when he loses 
it. The novel’s logic writes Theodore into this role of “rational” madness to the point 
where it actually inverts itself into American greatness, even martyrdom. As Wayne 
Franklin so fittingly puts it, Theodore’s “madness” is “grand” and “tragic” like a Greek 
tragic hero (156). Moreover, the sensationalism of Theodore’s madness alone is enough 
to obscure Clara’s own status as a victim. Notable, however, is that the novel’s 
sensationalism revolves around his victims rather than himself. Clara and readers see 
Catharine’s body and hear the description of Louisa’s brutalized body. We never see 
Theodore commit the violence he is responsible for. The novel’s logic is complicit with 
asylum logic. Theodore represents power’s prerogative of how it wants others to see it—
he is rational and irrational, visible and invisible, active and passive, a murderer and a 
martyr. Like Carwin, he changes his identity depending on the tactics needed at the time. 
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Besides constructing Theodore’s insanity as an heroic spiritual quest, the novel 
also constructs it as a sublime experience. In terms of masculine aesthetic theory, 
Edmund Burke claims that “power” is the true source of the sublime, and, because God 
represents the “highest” form of power, God’s disembodied voice produces the bar-none 
sublime experience (64-5). Burke even cites several Old Testament examples to explain 
his point. Theodore’s face registers his sublime experience in the form of “exultation” as 
he plays out the role of Abraham to his family’s Isaac. What also contributes to 
establishing Theodore’s madness as a sublime experience is that Clara’s uncle protects 
Theodore from the knowledge that Carwin is the real source of “God’s” voice. He forbids 
Clara from telling Theodore the truth and consequently, Theodore’s “sublime” 
experience can be maintained (213-14). While the uncle’s request seems charitable, it 
traps Clara in a position of extreme danger, since Theodore is intent on killing her in 
order to fulfill God’s commands. Thus, while the uncle’s request may seem like a minor 
detail in the novel, in the context of all the other ways the novel protects Theodore’s 
“madness” from the actual taint of madness, it does have significance; it enables the 
violence of threat and murder to continue against Clara. 
What also relegates male violence and madness to the shadows is that the novel 
constructs the elder Wieland’s death as a sign of masculine power. His prophesy of his 
own destruction represents another instance of Bourdieu’s concept of the self-fulfilling 
language of the father. His words act as “verdicts,” and he has a special kind of “quasi-
visionary” knowledge of the world; he can “redouble the force of the laws of natural and 
social nature by converting them into laws of reason and experience” (Bourdieu 
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Masculine Domination 70). In the context of what the novel itself is defining as madness 
for Clara—an overactive imagination—her father’s imagined impending doom should be 
a legitimate sign of his madness—especially since Clara’s sense of doom32
To some extent, I have already shown Carwin’s role in Clara’s subjugation 
through the tactic of delay in the disclosure of his ventriloquism skill and his actual 
intentions toward Clara. He is one of the primary ways in which Clara is subjected to fear 
and misdirection. Indeed Carwin is the behind-the-scenes director of events just like 
Formator and Darcy; Clara and readers alike only get to experience/see the effects of his 
“panoptic drama.” Indeed, several scholars view Carwin as blameless, as a victim, or not 
even as an integral part of the storyline much less the cause of its tragedy.
 is read as 
such; yet, the mystery and terror that he creates around his own predicted death, not to 
mention the strange manner of his death, renders his death sublime. Even though the 
sublime and terrible power of a Zeus-like God may have struck the elder Wieland dead 
with his thunderbolt, his prediction of it reveals that he is in control of his own destiny 
(like Theodore’s suicide). Thus the elder Wieland is excluded from the madness that is 
used as evidence of Clara’s predisposition to madness because of her family history 
(along with the maternal family side).   
33 Carwin, like 
Darcy and Formator, however, is represented through his unrepresentability. His low 
profile and bodily absence are exactly what makes him function like power the most—
“the force of immateriality” as Foucault calls it (Psychiatric Power 74). Carwin occupies 
the God-like position of omniscience, omnipresence, mystery, and shifting disguise. And, 
Carwin’s non-corporeality is literally represented as a disembodied voice. He is a puppet 
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master working mostly behind the scenes, pulling the strings of Clara’s perception just as 
Darcy and Formator created ‘realities’ for Elizabeth and Amoranda, respectively. Carwin 
is both elusive and illusive; we hear his voice, but he is not there; he may be behind a 
closet door, in the cliffs above the river, or in the temple. Is he American, English, 
Spanish, Protestant, Catholic, a farmer, a wanderer? Like Formator, he is a man of many 
disguises. No one can contain his identity, because he is everywhere and he is nowhere, 
just as power is itself diffused and works throughout the various interactions and 
relational forces in the novel.  
One of the other ways Carwin escapes any culpability is by manipulating our 
perceptions of him through his dialogue (as opposed to his ventriloquism). His 
manipulation of language is most apparent in the second closet scene and in his 
“confession.” In the second closet scene, he ensures readers view Clara as a victim of her 
own hyper-sensibility, since he discredits her response of horror by claiming that there is 
no reason for her to be afraid. He even transfers blame for his violent intentions onto 
Clara. In other words, his emergence from her closet does not result in his own exposure 
as a villain as much as it exposes Clara as a victim of her vulnerable female body. He 
offhandedly informs her that he had planned to sexually violate her, but her mysterious 
“guardian” (also a product of Carwin’s manipulative ventriloquism) intervened and 
ruined his “best concerted schemes” to commit rape (102-3). In an attempt to expose 
Carwin as a real villain as well as a character through which patriarchal power is 
working, it is important to take a closer look at his dialogue; it is most disturbing and is 
itself an act of violence against Clara: 
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“What is it you fear? Have I not told you, you are safe? Has not 
one in whom you more reasonably place trust assured you of it? Even if I 
execute my purpose, what injury is done? Your prejudices will call it by 
that name, but it merits it not. 
 “I was impelled by a sentiment that does you honor; a sentiment, 
that would sanctify my deed; but, whatever it be, you are safe.” (103) 
In breaking down his language, we can more clearly see its unsettling semantics:  we 
should note that he first upbraids her for still fearing him after he lets her know of his 
intentions to rape her—as if she is being irrational for being afraid. He then implies that 
the possibility of raping her still exists (“Even if I execute my purpose”). Note that he 
does not say “Even if I would/could execute” (conditional) nor does he say “Even if I 
executed” (conditional), certainly leaving open the very real possibility that he may yet 
rape her (two pages later he still describes her fears as “groundless”) (105). Next he states 
that even if he does rape her, no “injury is done”—that the issue is really only one about 
language and social prejudice (“Your prejudices will call it by that name”)—“that name” 
most likely meaning “ruined woman.” His words suggest that Clara’s material body and 
mind will not be directly affected. Indeed, for women living in a patriarchy, in which 
paternal words are “verdicts,” language has the force of material reality. As I mentioned 
earlier, Carwin attempts to subjugate Clara by authoring her into art as a “ruined” 
woman, and his paternal words will have their effects by the novel’s end.  
In the second paragraph quoted above, he utters one of the most misogynist, sexist 
statements in the novel (I am tempted to say, all of eighteenth-century literature):  he 
claims that his motivations for sexually violating her do her an “honor” and that his 
allegedly pure motivations would excuse the rape, if not actually make it a spiritual act 
(connotative meaning of the word “sanctify”). This scene is disturbing on so many levels, 
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and it re-enacts patriarchy’s own hypocritical ventriloquism: Carwin’s biloquism enables 
him to simultaneously assure Clara of her safety through one of his projected voices as 
Clara’s mysterious guardian, while another of his projected voices threatens to violate 
her. Patriarchy constructs itself as the benevolent guardian of women, while obscuring 
the fact that the real source of danger for women is patriarchy itself. For Carwin (as 
power’s strategy), language may be the primary instrument of domination, but it is 
simultaneously the means by which power escapes responsibility for that domination. 
Carwin also avoids guilt through his “confession” of guilt, because it allegedly 
discloses “truth” and resolves the mystery of his character. In all three novels, we see the 
disembodied “Gods” of Formator, Darcy, and Carwin suddenly become imperfect, 
ostensibly embodied humans that have been victimized. He relates that he “felt the 
deepest regret” (231) and that “Seldom [has he] felt deeper mortification” (238). He even 
asserts that the use of his ventriloquism skills at the summerhouse (where he threatens 
Clara with her father’s “doom” if she ever returns to the spot again) “partly removed” the 
“evil” from his “former act,” that is, his threat of rape. Once again, masculine power 
presents itself as subject or object according to tactical necessity. The logic of what can 
be called ‘revelation-as-truth,’ moreover, has the force of truth, for it seems that drawn 
out mystery and hiding followed by sudden disclosure amounts to truth-telling. Somehow 
“honesty” about villainy amounts to innocence. The microphysics of power at work here 
are that listeners are eager to embrace “truth” in gratitude for resolution of the mystery. 
What this all leads to is that Carwin’s “confession” is no more a revelation of “truth” than 
Darcy’s. It is a performance—empty words, but words nonetheless that have reality-
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creating power. Like Darcy, Carwin also draws on legal discourse to explain himself: “It 
is you whom I have injured, and at your bar am I willing to appear, and confess and 
expiate my crimes” (225). He positions Clara as the confessor or judge, and even though 
he positions himself as the criminal, he ultimately turns his criminality into victimization. 
He tells Clara that his “‘life has been a life of hardship and exposure’” (231). Korobkin 
points out that Carwin “is clever enough to adopt a sympathetic stance of grief and 
contrition, and to admit to a range of lesser crimes such as seduction, in order to establish 
a level of credibility,” ensuring Clara’s and the reader’s belief (732). If we use the 
language of law to describe his confession, it constitutes a defendant’s “plea bargain”—
he is willing to accept guilt for a lesser crime in order to avoid the possibility of a guilty 
verdict for a greater crime. Carwin’s frankness and willingness to disclose his personal 
struggles function to humanize and temper his crimes. But what is at work here is the 
rhetorical power of disclosure that follows mystery. This same maneuver worked for 
Darcy. Remarkably, and without us even realizing it, Carwin’s rhetoric also compels us 
to view his violence against Clara as “lesser” in comparison to Theodore’s violent acts. 
Familicide renders seduction crimeless. And, to further displace blame and responsibility, 
Carwin reveals that it was Clara’s courage and rationalism that provoked him to test her 
(230).34 Power ensures that we see Clara herself as responsible for Carwin’s violence. 
Her rationalism and courage, in other words, are the causes of his violence against her, 
implying that if she were a “normal” woman, there would be nothing to test her in the 
first place. Carwin further euphemizes his violence by referring to his crime as simple 
“curiosity,” as if he were a child whose joke inadvertently got out of hand (235).  Finally, 
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Carwin attempts to exonerate himself by referring to himself as a victim of his own 
powers and short-sightedness:  “having gone thus far, my progress seemed to be 
irrevocable” and “how many evils were produced by it which I had not foreseen,” 
respectively (239-40). Carwin’s reasons we have heard before and still hear. His words 
anticipate Victor Frankenstein’s evasion of responsibility.  
What I will examine now is Clara’s official “confessional” statement or what we 
are supposed to recognize as evidence of her “cure.” It is the statement that identifies the 
“foible” or “foibles” that the novel wants us to view as identical with her “madness.” It is 
the statement, moreover, that the novel’s logic knows we will view as Clara’s realization 
of her own “madness,” even though, as I have shown, patriarchal power produced her 
“madness.”  Clara utters her “confession” as an exiled woman whom masculine power 
has transformed into an object of art. She has forsaken her own writing and all other 
masculine aesthetic pleasures and practices. Thus her “confession” is spoken as a 
“ruined” or fallen literary heroine from inside the trite plot of the Stuart-Maxwell-
Conway “seduction novel.” Her confession spoken from this position as “art” accounts 
for what commentators notice as the strange and abrupt transition into the “Stuart-
Maxwell-Conway” plot at the novel’s end. However, as I have shown, the transition is 
not as abrupt as it may seem; it is a continuation of the “plot” Carwin began earlier in 
which he authors Clara into a literary character. Clara’s confession, in fact, provides the 
“moral” of the “seduction novel” into which she has been written: 
that the evils of which Carwin and Maxwell were the authors, owed their 
existence to the errors of the sufferers. All efforts would have been 
ineffectual . . . if their own frailty had not seconded these efforts. If the 
lady [Mrs. Stuart] had crushed her disastrous passion in the bud, and 
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driven the seducer from her presence, when the tendency of his artifices 
was seen . . . If Wieland had framed juster notions of moral duty, and of 
the divine attributes; or if I had been gifted with ordinary equanimity or 
foresight, the double-tongued deceiver would have been baffled and 
repelled. (278) 
 
Yes, Clara’s “confession” reads like a clichéd moral of a seduction novel, but its 
formulaic simplicity hides much more than it reveals. First, Clara aligns herself with Mrs. 
Stuart just as she aligns Carwin with Maxwell. Thus, we are compelled to view Mrs. 
Stuart’s “disastrous passion” for Maxwell as one and the same with Clara’s “disastrous 
passion” for Carwin. In other words, Clara confesses to an excess of sensibility and an 
attraction that I have demonstrated the text’s logic has worked to produce. This logic has 
transformed what was initially only an aesthetic interest into her sexual interest. 
Moreover, like the heroines Amoranda and Elizabeth Bennet, Clara accepts responsibility 
on her own and Mrs. Stuart’s account for the disasters that befell them and their families 
(“errors of the sufferers”). Also, she refers to their own “frailty” as a contributing factor 
(“if their own frailty had not seconded these efforts”). Clara implies that female weakness 
was at fault. What should also strike the reader is that Clara sees herself as lacking 
“ordinary equanimity.” Exactly what does she mean by this? Revising her phrase to shed 
more light on its meaning, we can say she believes she lacked what society deems normal 
(“ordinary”) mental or emotional stability (“equanimity”). What it reveals is that Clara 
herself misrecognizes that patriarchal power horrified her into subjugation. Clara’s 
horror, as I have shown, was not a product of her overactive imagination. Blindness is 
also suggested—Mrs. Stuart apparently didn’t initially see Maxwell’s “artifices.” Clara 
also claims she lacks “foresight.” Here she forgets her own intuitive eye and her ability to 
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deliberate rationally. Clara, notably, doesn’t attempt to puzzle out the flaws of either 
Carwin or Maxwell; their “evils” are a given that amounts to a kind of “boys-will-be-
boys” exoneration. Her use of the comparative “juster” in referring to Wieland 
(Theodore) implies that his “notion” of “moral duty” was “just” to begin with—more 
male exoneration.  
 Looking closer at Clara’s alleged lack of normal “equanimity” we can restate the 
idea for further clarity as follows:  Clara lacks “emotional stability,” suggesting she has a 
surplus of emotion; in other words, Clara’s emotional excess implies that her responses to 
stimuli are disproportionate. Her coerced “confession” requires that we now see all of her 
heretofore responses to horror, her erroneously drawn conclusions from lack of 
information, as well as her masculine aesthetic pleasures as signs and symptoms of her 
hyper-sensibility. Moreover, Clara’s confessed excessive emotionalism calls to mind 
Claudia Johnson’s concept of the “hyperfeminine” or “over-sensitivity” that I referred to 
at the beginning of this chapter. It is one of women’s two lose-lose options during this 
period in history. Clara’s “confession,” then, amounts to an admission of her 
“hyperfemininity”—what she herself calls “a defect of sensibility” (269). More 
significantly, Clara’s transition from her “unsexed” position at the novel’s beginning to 
her present confession of hyper-sensibility retains the taint of uncontainable sexuality. 
Women’s sensibility (excessive or not) already implies desire for sexual pleasure. 
Consequently, her “passion” for Carwin, which her confession suggests, reveals more 
than just hyper-sensibility; it indicates a concomitant surplus of sexual desire. What’s 
also suggested is that Clara’s surplus sexual desire moves outside of and beyond the 
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boundaries of what constitutes “normal” sexuality. In other words, her sexual instinct, as 
Foucault would say, “overflows its natural end” of a strictly procreative purpose 
(Abnormal 280). Consequently, not only is masculine violence’s production of Clara’s 
“madness” misrecognized as her excessive sexual desire (as scholars’ readings have 
attested to), it is further misrecognized as Clara’s uncontainable masochistic and aberrant 
sexual desires. Indeed, Clara’s aberrant desires suggest (and as some critical views have 
recognized) that Clara longs for seduction by Carwin and an incestual tryst with her 
brother; also, her fantasy of desirability transforms her contemplative solitude into 
masturbation and Pleyel’s regard for her into one in which she imagines he desires her. 
What it also indicates is that it is her over-active imagination that provides what Foucault 
calls “the relay” or “intermediary” for these aberrant desires to realize themselves 
(Abnormal 280). Lastly, Clara’s “confession,” which is essentially a confession to 
unrestrained sexual desire, should remind us of the seventeenth century’s accused 
diabolical witches, which I discussed in this dissertation’s introduction. Their 
hypersexuality, as the reader may remember, was viewed by the patriarchal church as just 
another sign of their “defective” bodies, explaining why they were so easily tempted into 
making a compact with the Devil. 
Clara’s confession or “cure” is less the statement of a self-aware individual who 
comes to realize her “self” and her own weaknesses than it is an affirmation that women 
are solely responsible for male violence and that this violence is due in most part to 
uncontainable female sexuality. It further suggests that men are innately bad (boys will be 
boys)—no need to try to explain or excuse this—and if destruction and violence occur, 
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then it is women who are to blame because of their “frailty”—i.e. women’s inherent 
weakness—a weakness that always indicates the disease of unmanaged sexuality—the 
weakness, in other words, that always already implies the taint of Eve and the guilt for 
“the fall.” Patriarchal power through Carwin and the other forces of patriarchy at work in 
the novel re-enact the power of God to expel Clara/Eve from her Eden-like Mettingen.35 
Even her delirium nightmares reveal the repetition of falling into the abyss—the doom 
usually reserved for transgressive gothic characters. In the final scene between Clara and 
Theodore, we already know that we are no longer hearing the voice of an empowered 
Clara when she ventriloquizes patriarchy’s viewpoint of women as “Eve’s”:  “Yes, I 
acknowledge that my guilt surpasses that of all mankind: I confess that the curses of the 
world, and the frowns of a deity, are inadequate to my demerits. Is there a thing in the 
world worthy of infinite abhorrence? It is I.” (254). However, Clara still has one last 
spark of female agency that asylum power must snuff out and that is her insistence on 
remaining in her house during her prolonged delirium. She states, “my soul prizes too 
dearly this little roof to endure to be bereaved of it” (265). Asylum power’s burning down 
of Clara’s house is sometimes misrecognized as Clara’s “spontaneous combustion” into 
sanity; however, while it may be accurate to view her father’s death as spontaneous 
combustion—a metaphor for masculine sublime dissolution—Clara’s “death” into 
subjugation is neither spectacular nor “spontaneous.” It is the consequence of repetitive 
and prolonged violence—an unremitting friction that gradually and inexorably razes 
Clara’s nervous system until it ignites and burns out entirely. Indeed, Clara’s world ends 
with a whimper—not with a bang.36  
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Clara’s subsequent exile to Europe ensures that there is no opportunity for Clara 
to again capitalize on America’s Enlightenment promises. Indeed, she must return to the 
side of the Atlantic where some of the first heroines of eighteenth-century seduction 
novels were created (including Amoranda). She is no longer allowed to participate in 
what the period views as the discourses or activities of men. Clara’s multiple 
transgressive behaviors require the authoritative power and the entrenched paternal 
history of the ancien regime and the inflexible rationalism of Pleyel (as her husband) to 
incessantly bear on her and keep her in check. 
I have shown that Clara’s alleged “madness” is a result of her repeated exposure 
to increasing degrees of horror, especially the horror of the final scene that elicited 
Clara’s greatest response of self-preservation. It is also the result of the extraordinary 
convergence of events that functioned as a tactic of misdirection that at once horrified her 
and confounded and confused her rational capabilities, forcing her mind to trespass into 
the realm of imagination. Her “madness” was also produced by denying her certain 
knowledges, especially the phenomenon of ventriloquism that ensured repetitive 
exhibition of her ‘irrational’ belief in a supernatural being. Yet, the novel’s logic would 
have us view Clara’s reactions to this violence and smear campaign as signs of her a 
priori “madness”—that she is, and always already was, a victim of her own hyper-
sensibility and that this “defect” is what drove her into her final prolonged delirium. 
Clara’s “madness,” the novel’s logic has ensured, is about her female flaw.  
What I would ask the reader to recognize instead, however, is that Clara’s 
prolonged bed-ridden delirium is a patriarchal-induced illness. Moreover, Clara’s male 
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violence-induced illness is produced not only from the horrors she has been subjected to 
but from the sense of criminality she feels as a woman who chose life, who dared to 
assert her “self”; in patriarchal society female self-preservation amounts to selfishness, 
and as a female, Clara is supposed to be self-less. Indeed, Clara’s illness originates in 
patriarchal oppression, the logic of which has insinuated itself throughout the entire 
textual matrix of Wieland and reproduces the logic of the asylum. It has repeatedly and 
violently horrified her into forfeiting her rationalism, her aesthetic pleasures, her writing, 
her poet’s intuition, her desire for knowledge, her desire for life, and finally, her home. 
Clara’s “illness,” as Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar explain it, is the cumulative 
effect on all women living in a patriarchal society. It amounts to “train[ing] in 
renunciation,” which, as Gilbert and Gubar state, “is almost necessarily to be trained to ill 
health” (54). Clara’s “training,” while the novel itself does not recognize this, began at 
the age of marriage, when her empowerment inadvertently suggested that she just might 
avoid management by a husband. We must also recognize that Clara’s sudden entry into 
the discourse of the seduction novel—her forgetting, in other words, of her masculine 
pleasures and discourses, as well as her confessed lack of “foresight”—exemplifies the 
“aphasia and amnesia” as well as the “[b]lindness” that “symbolically represents” the 
“intellectual incapacity patriarchal culture has traditionally required of women” (Gilbert 
and Gubar 58).  
Clara’s forgetfulness, moreover, explains the peculiar moments evident in her 
narrative or what Scheiber refers to as Clara’s “problematic identity,” in which Clara’s 
“struggle for inner coherence” originates her “precarious status with respect to 
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[patriarchal] institutions” (174). I read Clara’s “problematic identity” as a consequence of 
asylum logic, which requires the “mad” patient’s “anamnesis” of the past or his/her 
biographical history. In this context, what becomes evident is Clara’s “problematic 
identity” in her attempt to recall a forgotten past in which she once lived as woman with 
agency. In other words, Clara writes/speaks her history from a position that Gilbert and 
Gubar refer to as “anomie” or “alienation” (59). Having been “cured,” Clara is now 
alienated from the empowered woman she once was, yet she is required to write her 
history. To read her story as a “mad” patient’s confessional narrative enables us to 
account for those places in the text in which Clara refers to herself as mad, apologizes for 
her own empowerment, or underplays the agency she had by parroting patriarchy’s view 
of it.  Gilbert and Gubar aptly refer to these odd moments as “infected” sentences. While 
I would argue that Clara’s entire narrative is “infected,” I want to now cite just a few of 
the places in which these infected moments clearly stand out. One of the first occurs 
when the now “cured” Clara tells readers that they may suspect her aesthetic 
contemplation of Carwin’s portrait hints of sexual attraction (62). The subjugated Clara, 
like Elizabeth Bennet, revises her own past in accordance with the patriarchal worldview. 
Other more apparent “infected” sentences reveal themselves when the “cured” Clara 
commiserates with the reader’s own disbelief because she opts to confront danger rather 
than retreat; she qualifies her own courage and reasoning as a symptom of insanity (100). 
It is also the “cured” Clara who discredits her own narrative by calling attention to its 
“ambiguities, abruptnesses and dark transitions” (167). Paradoxically, Clara’s attempt to 
recall her past from a position of subjugation and alienation inadvertently functions as 
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more evidence of her “madness.” Clara’s narrative epitomizes what Adrienne Rich 
describes as the female experience of “insanity” when holding on to the “truth of our 
experience” (190). Indeed, James R. Russo’s viewpoint, which sees Clara’s experiences 
as so “absurd” that it seems he has no choice but to treat them as Clara’s dreams or 
delusions,37
  
 as well as Wayne Franklin’s comment that Clara “is a narrator who doesn’t 
understand her tale”—a “tale,” he adds, “‘told by an idiot’” (153)—reproduce the view of 
Clara that the novel’s logic wants its readers to recognize, but the hyperbolic language 
they draw on to describe Clara’s experience also epitomizes the response of a patriarchal 
worldview that cannot ever fully comprehend female lived experience in a patriarchy. It 
represents the viewpoint that produces the “anxiety of authorship” that is apparent in 
Clara’s narrative. 
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Notes to Chapter 3 
                                                 
1 In The Culture of Sensibility, G. J. Barker-Benfield relates that Tocqueville observes the eighteenth-
century “culture of sensibility” in Democracy of America (Note 66, page 402). 
2 Larzer Ziff argues that Wieland exposes that “the promises of modern enlightenment . . . are siren songs” 
since the “rigorous Protestant doctrines and aristocratic social formulas” still haunt America’s present (56). 
William A. Manly claims that Wieland exemplifies Brown’s “two preoccupations”: “his avowed interest in 
rationalism, truth and purpose; and his equal fascination with the disruption of these qualities” (312). 
Although Michael Davitt Bell discusses the “irrational forces” of “literary imagination” in Wieland, he also 
states that the novel “portrays the contest between Lockean rationalism and the power of the irrational” 
(144). Michael T. Gilmore writes that “the promise of America . . . is the ‘paradise lost’ in Wieland” (117). 
James R. Russo claims that Wieland “deals with the complex issue of epistemology . . . for the novel’s 
major tenet seems to be that Man is incapable of obtaining true knowledge since he is incapable of 
perceiving things correctly” (86). Toni O’Shaughnessy claims that “[t]he matter of interpretive 
accountability is as pressing a concern in . . . Brown’s Wieland . . . as it is in Locke’s essay. But Brown’s 
novel explodes Locke’s vulnerable categories of responsibility and exploits the fearful possibilities implied 
in the mirrored relationship Locke posits between author and reader and in his recognition of the instability 
of language itself” (42). Jay Fliegelman states that “Brown’s novel of authority misrepresented and 
authority imagined is a terrifying post-French Revolutionary account of the fallibility of the human mind 
and, by extension, of democracy itself” (x-xi). Steven Watts claims Wieland represents a “devastating 
critique of eighteenth-century rationalism based on sensory impressions” (82). Peter Kafer claims that 
Brown “turn[s] the philosopher John Locke and the Enlightenment itself, on their side by highlighting the 
disturbing implications of the optimistic epistemology that had influenced so many of the Revolutionaries” 
(125). 
3 Andrew T. Scheiber also explores the issue of gender in Wieland; however, his argument attempts to 
account for Clara’s “superstitious, even ridiculous, interpretations of events” (173). He views Clara’s 
narrative primarily as a “struggle” to “reconcile herself” to the demands of the new nation’s “glorification 
of the intellect” to her own cultural assigned position as a “less ‘rational’” female” (176). Where our 
respective arguments radically diverge is in Scheiber’s view that Carwin represents Clara’s “liberator” from 
gendered norms. Moreover, he claims Clara’s journal represents her “suppressed sexual awareness” and 
that Carwin’s knowledge of what her journal contains is what enables him to be her liberator. Elizabeth 
Jane Wall Hinds’s gendered reading examines Clara in terms of economic class and views her as a leisured 
class heiress/homeowner whose absence of labor positions her outside of what constitutes American female 
virtue at the time—“a hard working, saving, and essentially conservative personality” (100). Hinds, 
moreover, views Clara as a passive and will-less heroine throughout the novel, discounting Clara’s mental 
activities revealed in her ongoing desire for knowledge, her ability to rationally deliberate and interpret 
evidence, as well as her other masculine pleasures. 
4 William A. Manly views Clara as eventually lost to the “melodramatic world of haunting speculation” 
(313). He also claims that Clara inherits her “emotionalism” from her mother (314). Michael Davitt Bell 
claims that the destruction of Mettingen is due to “the force of imagination, of voices heard and visions 
seen in dreams” (144). James R. Russo exonerates Brown for the novel’s “incoheren[ce]” and 
“inconsistencies” and claims they can be accounted for by the fact that the story is told by “a confessed  
madwoman” who constantly “flits back and forth between imagination and reality” (60). He relates Clara’s 
“insanity” to her “inability to see reality” (62). Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds claims Clara spends most of her 
time “creating bizarre fantasies to explain events around her” (126). 
5 Michael Davitt Bell claims that “Clara has an almost sexual reaction to the power of his voice” (147). 
Steven Watts mentions the “sexual dynamic” apparent in Clara’s lingering gaze at his portrait (87). 
6 Frank Shuffleton writes that the “autoerotic suggestions of their preferred sites of solitary contemplation 
[suggest] there is more going on here than Clara can tell us” (104). 
7 Wayne Franklin claims that Clara’s “accusations” of Carwin’s guilt are “hysterical” (155).  Norman S. 
Grabo writes that “[u]p until the end of chapter 26, we have witnessed Clara’s progressive involvement in 
her brother’s and her family’s madness and her deepening and unshakable conviction of Carwin’s 
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responsibility, until she cracks under stress.” He further states that “to account for her complicity in 
madness, . . . [she] persuade[s] us that whatever horrors have occurred are the fault of another, Carwin” 
(23). 
8 Franklin sees Clara’s responses as “feigned extremity,” and he refers to her narrative as “much ado about 
nothing” (153). Russo argues that the closet scenes are Clara’s dreams or delusions. 
9 Larzer Ziff describes Clara as “perilously ripe for seduction” (51), because of her “frustrating desire for 
love” (52). Grabo says of Clara budding sexuality, “[She] is not only able and willing; she’s ready! And it’s 
into that readiness that Carwin strolls” (12). Later Grabo claims that “Carwin is [Clara’s] own self-
generated sexuality—raw, irrational, irresponsible, violent, and even criminal” (27). Elizabeth Jane Wall 
Hinds mentions Clara’s “sexually charged state during the two closet scenes” (104). 
10 Grabo claims Clara “links” her “habitual fantasizing . . . with her sexual awakening” (14). Russo argues 
that the closet scenes represent Clara’s subconscious mind or what happens to Clara when she is 
“confronted with her own sexuality” (63). 
11 During the second closet incident, Grabo characterizes Clara as “[s]exually charged, hyperimaginative, 
[and] deeply frustrated” (15). Then, after Carwin emerges (not Theodore) from the closet, Grabo writes, 
“The great irony of the scene is that he does not satisfy Clara’s barely suppressed sexual desires. Not only 
does he not rape her, he is not even her brother!” (16). Shuffleton claims that there are “hints of incestuous 
attraction between Clara and Theodore” (104). 
12 When Clara suspects “that some being was concealed within [her closet],” Grabo calls attention to the 
sentence’s “ambiguity” that he claims “makes it possible [that] the evil being is within her own mind” (15). 
13Recall from Chapter 1 that Amoranda is also an heiress and head of her own household in the beginning 
of Davys’s novel, but she had no older brothers who could have assumed the fatherly role, and her uncle 
was unavailable because he was abroad. In contrast to Clara, Amoranda became the head of her own 
household by chance. 
14 In the Vindication of the Rights of Women, Wollstonecraft describes the problem of women who are 
susceptible to excessive sensibility and mentions, by comparison, how they should respond:  “All their 
thoughts turn on things calculated to excite emotion; and feeling, when they should reason, their conduct is 
unstable, and their opinions are wavering-not the wavering produced by deliberation or progressive views, 
but by contradictory emotions. By fits and starts they are warm in many pursuits; yet this warmth, never 
concentrated into perseverance, soon exhausts itself; exhaled by its own heat, or meeting with some other 
fleeting passion, to which reason has never given any specific gravity, neutrality ensues” (italics mine130). 
Unlike the women that Wollstonecraft describes are susceptible to easily excited emotions, Clara 
exemplifies “perseverance” in rational “deliberation” throughout Wieland (which I discuss in more detail 
later in the chapter). Clara also shows the “wavering produced by . . . progressive views” when she 
maintains an open mind about the mysterious voices until she has more evidence. Indeed, Clara gives 
“reason” the “gravity” that Wollstonecraft calls for in this passage. Later in her treatise, Wollstonecraft 
calls for “sensibility . . . moderated by reason (183), the comparison of ideas (291), and “sensibility . . . 
tempered by reflection (296), all of which characterize Clara’s responses to the events at Mettingen. 
15 Charles Brockden Brown, Wieland; and Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist. (New York: Penguin Group, 
1991), 29. All citations of the novel refer to this edition and are cited parenthetically in the text. 
16 In fact, Clara’s contemplation of Carwin’s portrait ultimately leads to her first experience of “horror.” 
Her reading of a war ballad “suggest[ed] to [her] thoughts . . . the horrors of war” (63). Her experience of 
war as horror is in contrast to her earlier experience of war as an inspiration for the sublime (discussed in 
more detail below). 
17 Anthony Galluzzo claims that Carwin “represents an aesthetic education of sorts for the Wieland family” 
(257). The focus of Galluzzo’s argument, however, is on Brown’s political use of Burke’s sublime in 
transatlantic debates about the revolution. The Wieland family, in his view, represents the transplantation of 
the ancient regime to America that Carwin, as a revolutionary, must overturn. 
18 As opposed to the eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, in which Edmund Burke describes the sublime 
experience as beginning with terror and subsiding into “awe.” 
19 Recall that Amoranda inverted Lord Lofty’s insinuation that she is a prostitute by turning him and men in 
general into female (embodied) prostitutes. 
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20 Protagonist of British sentimental writer Henry Mackenzie’s The Man of Feeling (1771). 
21 Protagonist of American sentimental writer William Hill Brown’s The Power of Sympathy (1789). 
22 Recall that both British novels worked to embody their heroines. 
23 According to Mellor, male threats of incest that elicit the heroine’s response of horror are the way in 
which some female gothic novels represent “patriarchal tyranny” (91).  
24 Norman S. Grabo sees her entire narrative as a “movement toward a kind of identity with Theodore” 
(27). Toni O’Shaugnessy observes of this scene that “Clara experiences such strong sympathy with 
Theodore that she almost becomes him; the two are strangely indistinguishable” (46). Lisa Westwood 
Norwood claims that Theodore “functions more as an intimate double” than as “her brother” (91). 
25 Norman S. Grabo suggests that Clara’s convenient dropping of the penknife at the key moment as akin to 
murder (22).  
26 James R. Russo claims the voice’s message is entirely for Clara’s benefit and represents another instance 
of the “voice function[ing] . . . as Clara’s conscience” (82). 
27 Larzer Ziff also notices the novel’s shift in genre to a “novel of sentiment and seduction”; however, he 
views the entire scene between Clara and Pleyel as evidence for Brown’s “greatest condemnation of [the] 
tradition of the seduction/sentimental novel” (52, 53). Moreover, rather than see Clara’s silence in this 
scene as a form of resistance, which I discuss in more detail below), Ziff views it as Clara’s “whole-hearted 
endorsement to the ideal of the palpitating and defenseless female” (52). Standing in ironic juxtaposition to 
my argument, in which I see the novel’s logic as turning Clara into an object of art, Ziff claims that Clara’s 
maturity lies in her realization that “life . . . is not an imitation of art” (52). Michael Davitt Bell also sees 
Carwin as a “literary artist” whose “duplicity” is in constant “contest” with Clara’s “sincerity,” which battle 
takes on a “literary dimension” that Clara ultimately loses (147). His overall argument is that Brown’s 
novel “made the conventional fear of fiction a central preoccupation of works of fiction” (151). Wayne 
Franklin blames the novel’s plot inconsistencies on Clara’s “insanity” (154). Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds 
view the shifts in narrative structure as Clara’s inability “to control events or narrative’ (128). 
28 Unlike Sherlock Holmes or Edgar Allen Poe’s Dupine, whose pursuit of information is met with an 
almost effortless and steady unfolding of “truth,” Clara’s pursuit results in deeper concealment and violent 
retaliation; for as a woman, Clara’s attempts at rationalism are transgressive; she is operating outside of her 
proper domain. Revealing the extent to which only men are authorized to employ reason to solve crimes is 
the unquestioning acceptance of the outrageous conclusion that Dupine draws after his investigation of the 
murders in the Rue Morgue: the evidence leads him to conclude that an orangutan committed the murders. 
29 To read Wieland as a quixote narrative is to also read it according to the logic that the novel desires, since 
to do so misrecognizes the narrative’s actual crisis, which is Clara’s multiple female transgressions. 
Furthermore, it requires that readers and Clara recognize her “cure” or her moment of self-realization at the 
novel’s end, which, as I argue, is her coerced “confession” and the epitome of her disempowerment. For 
both an in-depth and insightful study of the female quixote narrative, see Scott Paul Gordon’s The Practice 
of Quixotism: Postmodern Theory and Eighteenth-Century Women’s Writing. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006. 
30 Interestingly, Laura Korobkin claims that Clara’s belief in Carwin’s guilt “is reasonable and legally 
defensible” in an American eighteenth-century courtroom” (722). Korobkin asserts that “If, as the novel 
strongly implies, Carwin did exploit Wieland’s propensity toward religious mania, if he ‘urged him to fury 
and guided him to murder’ in a spirit of curiosity [as Clara claims], then he is as guilty of the murders as if 
he had performed them himself” (722). She later writes “the law will not permit us to escape responsibility 
for the damage we do by letting us use the limits of our conscious mental states to deny the link between 
our acts and their consequences. The legal definition of malice will effect the linkage that the individual 
disavows” (733).  
31Clara also revises her own perception of herself based on Pleyel’s alleged “objective” perception of her. 
When she discusses her aesthetic contemplation of Carwin’s portrait (62), she addresses readers, saying 
that they might suspect her lengthy observation of the portrait as “a passion incident to every female heart” 
(62); however this comment she is writing in hindsight, and so this moment in the text not only provides us 
with her own perception at the time (the one that I see as legitimate), but she also provides an editorial that 
ventriloquizes Pleyel’s own perceptions (what I view as the logic of torture at work in the text). 
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32 Recall that I read Clara’s sense of doom as evidence for her poetic esemplastic power. 
33 Manly calls Carwin “a shadowy background figure whose final confessions reveal him to be more of a 
pathetic bumbler than a figure of soaring sexual passion” (319). Norman S. Grabo describes Carwin as “a 
second-rate seducer and trickster” and “a most shabby villain” (10). He further claims that Carwin “set in 
motion a series of actions over which he has not control, and, in sense, no responsibility” (10). James R. 
Russo views Carwin as “little more than Clara’s scapegoat in Wieland” and that “the picture that we get of 
him has been shrouded in the ‘chimeras’ of the narrator’s brain. He is guilty of none of these things he 
allegedly confesses to in this scene; however, he is guilty of the one thing that his ‘confession’ denies: he 
has seduced Clara” (79). Toni O’Shaugnessy writes that “[w]hat seems to Clara to be a clear confession of 
guilt [by Carwin] may as easily be read as a defense of victimized innocence” (45). O’Shaugnessy further 
states that “Carwin’s narrative becomes less the confession of a malevolent criminal than the testimony of a 
bewildered junkie unable to control a habit” (45). Shirley Samuels even calls Carwin a “champion or hero,” 
because “[h]is voice forces a questioning of perceived realities and underscores the abnormalities already 
present within the Wieland family” (55). Andrew T. Scheiber views Carwin as the novel’s 
“trickster/harlequin figure” in that “he eagerly plays the deconstructor of . . . hidden cultural norms” (190). 
As such Scheiber sees Carwin as Clara’s “liberat[or]” from the “ideology” of “the unnatural ideal of 
womanhood” (190). Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds writes that “the destruction of [the Wieland] family results 
not so much from Carwin . . . he has merely set the action in motion” (110). 
34 Lovelace makes the same claim about Clarissa in Richardson’s Clarissa, or, the History of a Young Lady 
(1748). 
35 Gilmore also views Clara as an “Eve” in his reading of Wieland, which he sees as a reworking of 
Milton’s Paradise Lost; however, his reading reproduces the female bildungsroman genre, because he 
views Clara as a redeemed Eve at the novel’s end when she becomes aware of “and finally accept[s] the 
fact of human corruption” (116).  
36 We should, moreover, recognize this narrative pattern in which female obedience seems like an overnight 
transformation. It is still used today in films or stories such as The Stepford Wives, in which husbands seem 
to magically replace their independent wives overnight with zombie-like obedient ones. By the film’s end, 
however, we learn that the masculine scheming was long in the making. 
37 Russo writes “the utter absurdity of Clara’s untruths is the best evidence we have for believing that an 
unstable, deluded woman is telling them” (72). 
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EPILOGUE 
 
From Clarissa to Clara to Clarice: The Constant of 
Misrecognition, Torture, and Confession 
 
 
 
“Revolutionary moments tend to be co-opted—swallowed up by the mainstream and 
turned into pop culture. It’s a way of neutralizing it, when you think about it.” 
 – qtd. in Ariel Levy’s Female Chauvinist Pigs 1996 
 
 
“It is a consequence of the ease with which power can be mixed with almost any other 
subject that it can be endlessly unfolded, exfoliated, in strategies and theories that . . . in 
their very form, in the very fact of occurring in human speech, increase the claim of 
power, its representation in the world.” 
 – Elaine Scarry’s The Body in Pain 1985 
 
 
 
 
The disturbing logic of torture and confession that I have uncovered in the three 
novels that comprise this dissertation may seem to be confined to a particular time in 
history, when certain events during the eighteenth century converged and necessitated the 
self-reinvention of the discourses of torture and confession. However, the logic of 
misrecognition, torture, and confession persists even today. 1  The two films that I 
examine in this Epilogue, namely, Contact, and more briefly, The Silence of the Lambs, 
only diverge from the eighteenth-century novels in terms of the function of 
misrecognition. Whereas in the novels female agency is misrecognized as female 
transgression, in these two films female disempowerment is misrecognized as female 
agency. What we should understand from this inverted form of misrecognition is the 
ability of the disciplinary discourse of patriarchy to effectively and efficiently transform 
itself by appropriating any current cultural discourses that represent the possibility or 
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actuality female agency. As I argued in the previous three chapters, the discourses of 
torture and confession co-opted the female bildungsroman. Presently, however, and most 
disturbingly, they co-opt feminism itself. Although generically speaking, these two films 
are categorized as science fiction and thriller/horror respectively, both can also be 
regarded as narratives of female ‘becoming’ (bildung), since both feature a young woman 
who is transitioning from school into the real-world application of her chosen career. 
These two heroines, notably, are entering career fields that are traditionally dominated by 
men. I think it should trouble readers to see how similar Ellie’s and Clarice’s experiences 
are to the eighteenth-century heroines’ experiences. 
Robert Zemeckis’s 1997 film Contact, based on Carl Sagan’s novel of the same 
name, was critically well-received and is still a much-watched film. Contact follows 
Isaac Asimov’s tradition, in which the fiction of science remains within the field’s 
currently theoretical and known limits. The film, in other words, treats its topic of alien 
contact and space travel within the boundaries of scientific possibility. Furthermore, 
Contact treats the fiction of science seriously, making suspension of disbelief effortless 
for its viewers. 
This film’s narrative reveals that masculine power coerces the brilliant, rational, 
and, most significantly, atheistic female heroine Eleanor Arroway (played by Jodie 
Foster) into “confessing” that science fails in the face of a spiritually transforming 
experience that cannot rationally be explained. By the film’s end, Ellie adopts Palmer 
Joss’s (a theologian and her love interest) worldview that faith in a supreme being is 
necessary for a cohesive identity and a fulfilling life. However, Ellie’s newfound 
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spiritualism and belief in a supreme being have deeper significance than what the film 
itself recognizes. What the film, in fact, misrecognizes is its feminization of Ellie. Indeed, 
the film’s logic “tortures” Ellie out of what it views as her overly ‘masculine’ lifestyle 
and into a “normal” feminine role. Her newly found femininity by the film’s end entails 
her concomitant submission to the “Father” of all humankind and to a “normal” 
heterosexual relationship. Stated another way, Ellie’s masculine rationalism, emotional 
control, and lack of desire for heterosexual intimacy are misrecognized as an unfulfilling 
and unbalanced life, one that excludes an intimate heterosexual relationship and the 
capacity for feeling emotion, most fully represented by an individual’s belief in the 
irrational idea that a God exists.  
Unlike the eighteenth-century novels, the film recognizes Ellie’s agency. In fact, 
it ensures viewers see Ellie as a brilliant scientist. We are made aware that she graduated 
from MIT and was offered a teaching position at Harvard. The film also makes sure we 
recognize Ellie as a self-assured and confident individual in her refusal of Harvard’s offer 
in order to pursue her primary interest which is discovering intelligent life on other 
planets. According to the film’s logic, Ellie’s irrationalism in her desire to search for life 
on other planets is misplaced, since it manifests itself scientifically and not spiritually 
(with a spiritual search for a higher power). As a highly intelligent and empowered 
woman, Ellie asserts the legitimacy of her research, telling Drumlin (played by Tom 
Skerritt) “It’s my life!” when he tells her that she is wasting her career looking for little 
green men on Mars and that she won’t be published. Repeated scenes in which Ellie uses 
sophisticated technology to monitor and analyze radio emissions, including her control of 
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the massively sized, sublime, and Godlike series of radar dishes that comprise the array, 
earns her the viewer’s respect for her knowledge and intelligence. Not only is she the 
only woman working with men in what is traditionally a man’s domain, she is her 
research team’s leader. Indeed, her interest in the SETI project legitimizes its value 
despite Drumlin’s claims for its irrelevancy. 
Ellie’s character also reverses the typical gender roles of film couples who sleep 
together, by telling Palmer Joss (played by Matthew McConaughey) the next morning to 
stay in bed and make himself at home while she goes off to search for signs of extra-
terrestrials. She is also the one to teach him the names of star configurations when they 
search the night sky together. All he has to offer her is his ‘irrational’ belief in God for 
whose existence he has no support except his own personal experiences. Ellie also has 
knowledge that Palmer lacks in terms of Drumlin, who is the president of the National 
Science Foundation. She cautions Palmer about Drumlin’s arrogance and self-conceit 
when Palmer tells her he’s been trying to get an interview with him. The film 
undoubtedly constructs Ellie as an empowered woman. She does not need Palmer’s 
approval or love to make her feel complete; she even tosses his phone number in the 
garbage before setting out on her quest for private funding to continue her research. She 
manages Drumlin’s ego, and she has the ‘inside’ knowledge, so to speak, on space-
science and appears fulfilled by her career.  
The film also acknowledges the fact that it is a challenge for a woman to work in 
a field that has been traditionally dominated by men—representing Ellie’s constant need 
to manage male egos. The film asks us to sympathize with Ellie’s struggles and seems to 
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go out of its way to ensure we find Drumlin and Kitz (played by James Woods) sexist 
and offensive. To cite just a few instances of this overt hostility and sexism, Drumlin 
shuts down Ellie’s SETI project by withdrawing the necessary financing for it. Then the 
government itself refuses to continue to rent its array to the “high priestess.” Later, upon 
Ellie’s discovery of a legitimate alien radio signal, the heretofore skeptical and 
judgmental Drumlin quickly and easily assumes the lead of the research team, which 
should be Ellie’s, since she is the one who made the discovery of intelligent life in the 
Vega system. The film shows him repeatedly and rudely cutting off Ellie’s comments to 
the President’s advisory team; the film constructs him, in contrast to Ellie, as more 
willing to work with, rather than against, the government. Indeed, Ellie’s less than 
diplomatic comments about Kitz’s paranoid and militaristic attitude toward the aliens 
actually function to offer the voice of an alternative or less patriarchal way of viewing 
reality. Her voice is repeatedly silenced, however, by Drumlin’s and Kitz’s allegedly 
more “rational” point of view. Viewers are supposed to find Kitz offensive and 
overreacting when he wants to militarize her project and claims that Ellie compromised 
national security (she asked scientists from other countries to confirm the signal). Ellie, 
however, resists this representation by reasonably asserting that no one country can own 
the signal and that the other civilization’s communication is not intended as a person-to-
person call to the United States. 
To reiterate, the film wants its viewers to recognize Drumlin’s and Kitz’s sexism. 
The film, in other words, recognizes that it is providing its viewers with a feminist 
narrative. However, the film’s accommodation and recognition of the feminist viewpoint 
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is, in fact, why the film and viewers ultimately misrecognize Ellie’s eventual 
disempowerment. Something very subtle is at work in this film. The means of patriarchal 
power’s operations are, in fact, conducted through its feminist men—the characters who 
embrace Ellie’s agency and, significantly, who don’t receive as much screen time as 
Drumlin and Kitz. In other words, they are the men who don’t register on viewers’ radar 
as “sexist,” and they don’t call attention to themselves like Drumlin and Kitz do. Bryant 
Gumbel, for example, makes a cameo appearance and interviews Ellie, who is one of the 
top candidates competing to ‘man’ the spacecraft (referred to in the film as the 
“machine”). When he asks her about the risk involved, she hesitates in her response, 
providing him with an opportunity to respond on her behalf. He mistakenly assumes she 
is about to say that “faith” is required with such a risky enterprise. However, Ellie 
immediately corrects him by asserting, “I was going to say a sense of adventure.” This 
scene represents a subtle attempt and failure of patriarchal power to feminize Ellie 
through a confession of “faith.” 
Another feminist character that the film provides—but who is actually an 
instrument of patriarchal power—is the wealthy, powerful, brilliant, and eccentric man 
Hadden (played by Michael Chaban), who finances Ellie’s research project when no one 
else will. Indeed, part of Ellie’s disempowerment comes from the way in which the film’s 
logic coerces her into becoming Hadden’s ‘prostitute,’ since he pays her to be the means 
of fulfilling his own fantasies about space travel (or as viewers discover later, to be the 
“unwitting star” of his “elaborate hoax”); however, the film misrecognizes this as 
Hadden’s mentorship of Ellie. In this sense, Hadden is similar to Formator in that they 
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are both mentors to the texts’ heroines—they allegedly have their best interests in mind. 
Hadden’s ‘mentoring’ ensures Ellie is not “handed her hat” as the project’s leader, and it 
is his subsidiary companies that are contracted to build the second machine—the one that 
Ellie will ‘man.’ Hadden plays a vital role in power’s coercion of Ellie’s confession—
ensuring Ellie has her ‘spiritual’ experience. He provides the ‘backup’ machine and 
ensures that Ellie pilots his craft—he is the selection committee this time when the first 
committee does not choose Ellie. And, like Formator, Darcy, and Carwin, Hadden 
constructs Ellie’s reality primarily behind the scenes like a disembodied God. He is even 
symbolically represented this way—he lives above the earth in his private jet and later, he 
rents space on the Russian’s space station Mir. Indeed, his voice literally always comes 
from the sky. Hadden also has Godlike omniscience in that he knows every detail of 
Ellie’s past and present life, including the death of her father at the age of ten. Indeed, we 
could say that Hadden, operating as Foucault’s asylum “psychiatrist,” draws on Ellie’s 
past (her trauma of losing her father at an early age), and exploits this knowledge to make 
her the “star” of his hoax—the experience of which produces Ellie’s confession or 
submission to a paternal higher power. Sound familiar? That’s because Hadden is 
Wieland’s Carwin—he essentially does the same thing to Clara Wieland. 
Palmer Joss (Ellie’s love interest) is the other instrument of power in the film and, 
like Hadden, appears to have a feminist viewpoint. He supports Ellie’s ambition about 
manning the machine to Vega, and he is not intimidated by her intelligence. Not being 
able to convince Ellie that belief in God can bring meaning to her life, he takes advantage 
of privately shared information between them and uses it against Ellie during the 
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selection committee’s formal proceedings (in deciding who will man the first machine). 
As a member of the selection committee, Palmer takes the opportunity to “interrogate” 
Ellie in an attempt to trap her into confessing a belief in God. When Ellie asks about the 
question’s relevance, another male selection committee member asserts that the question 
is relevant given ninety-five percent of the world’s population believes in God, and, if 
chosen, she will represent them. However, this tactic fails to elicit Ellie’s confession. 
Indeed, the film recognizes Ellie’s atheism as her hubris, as what is preventing her from 
having a fulfilling life and as what could heal her from the pain of her father’s death. 
Now that her lack of belief has eliminated her from the competition it also prevents her 
from making the most important contribution to the history of humankind.  
The film’s second interrogation of Ellie takes place after she returns from her trip 
to the Vega system in Hadden’s second machine. Ellie’s empirically measured experience 
of an eighteen hour trip conflicts with what viewers witnessed from the control center:  
her spacecraft fell straight to the earth in a matter of seconds. As far as Ellie is concerned, 
she did make a trip that lasted approximately 18 hours; she experienced travel through a 
wormhole and interacted with an alien in the Vega system. The government forms 
another panel, this time to get to the “truth” of what happened. The “truth” that will be 
produced, however, is Ellie’s newly feminized subjectivity. Ellie is brought before the 
Senate and “interrogated” about her experience. Kitz reappears as the Senate committee’s 
chair, asking Ellie leading questions (as we saw in The Reform’d Coquet). Indeed, he 
draws on Ellie’s rationalism, using it against her (as we saw done to Clara Wieland), 
asking her which is more plausible—her trip to another star system or some wealthy 
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brilliant eccentric’s concept of playing a joke on humanity. Consequently, Ellie must 
“concede as a scientist” that it is possible her trip didn’t happen. When Ellie is asked for 
her “proof” of her experience and why the aliens didn’t provide her with any, she states, 
“They told me this is the way it has been done for millions of years.” Kitz takes this 
opportunity to point out that Ellie’s “explanation is a phenomenon known in psychiatric 
circles as a self-reinforcing delusion.” As a scientist, Ellie is forced to also concede the 
possibility that her experience may have been a “delusion.” Kitz ensures that his 
questions (which elicit the answers he already knows) not only discredit Ellie’s 
rationalism, but also make her appear mentally unstable.  Ellie’s “confession,” in other 
words, indirectly admits to a form of latent irrationalism that fully surfaced when she got 
in the driver’s seat of Hadden’s machine. What gets misrecognized in this part of Ellie’s 
coerced “confession” is that it implies female scientists are susceptible not only to a full 
expression of their latent irrationalism (regardless of how rational they may appear to be), 
but also that, like Eve, they are predisposed to temptation and seduction. Ellie, it could be 
argued, was tempted and seduced by Hadden’s wealth, knowledge, and power. Her own 
desire for scientific knowledge led to the world’s current situation. Like Eve, Ellie is 
responsible for humanity’s “fall,” in the sense that she first compromised national 
security and then subjected the world to an expensive hoax. Drumlin’s earlier 
implication—his paternal prediction, in other words—that choosing Ellie to ‘man’ the 
spacecraft would be a mistake comes to fruition. The ironic way in which Ellie’s 
rationalism is used to prove her specifically flawed female rationalism reveals our 
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culture’s deep-seated anxiety about what it means to allow women to occupy positions of 
power.  
Despite Ellie’s concession (“confession”) that her trip to Vega may not have 
occurred at all, she stands by her experience of traveling to the Vega system as ‘real.’ 
While this may appear to be a sign of her empowerment, in that she both resists and 
“confesses” to Kitz’s assumptions, it ultimately represents what patriarchal power wants 
from Ellie, what the film’s logic has been coercing her into, and what the film and 
viewers misrecognize.  Ellie’s “confession” that science fails to account for her 
experience but that she still, in fact, had that experience is equivalent to confessing that 
she may not only be Hadden’s dupe, but that she now, however indirectly, has faith in 
and submits to a paternal God. She now believes in a power that is greater than herself to 
which she must submit: “I [had] [a] vision that tells us that we belong to something that is 
greater than ourselves, that we are not — that none of us — are alone! I wish I could 
share that. I wish, that everyone, if only for one moment, could feel that awe, and 
humility, and hope!” Indeed, the fact that the alien she claims she encountered took the 
form of her dead father is used to both discount and credit her experience. It either 
renders her ‘vision’ a delusion (it confirms her predisposition to irrationalism), or it 
suggests her subconscious desire for a spiritual Father. In fact, no matter which way her 
story is viewed, Ellie has assumed her “normal” feminine role by submitting to some 
“Father”—a “voice from the sky”—in the form of 1) an alien disguised as her dead 
Father; 2) her dead Father, which means it is a delusion; 3) Hadden the father figure who 
gave Ellie his protection; 4) Hadden the ‘pimp’ who financed his and her fantasy; 5) 
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Palmer (the theologian) who represents the spiritual Father and who offers his paternal 
protection of Ellie after the hearing is over. Indeed, Ellie’s spiritual rebirth is really about 
her “conversion” into the proper inferior role of women. Ironically speaking, she has 
joined the “cult” of “true” womanhood. 
But it doesn’t end here. Ellie’s confessional moment further functions to 
‘feminize’ her when her controlled masculine rationalism cracks while delivering her 
“confession.” Indeed, she cries and continues to cry on her way out of the session while 
Palmer physically supports her body. Moreover, it is only after Palmer publicly sanctions 
Ellie’s “born again” experience (when pressed for an answer, he says, “I for one believe 
her”) that the public is more willing to embrace Ellie’s experience as “real.” Palmer’s 
authoritative words, like the heroes in the eighteenth-century novels, effect reality. The 
film mitigates if not totally obscures his role in Ellie’s subjugation by constructing it as 
romantic self interest. Like the pseudo-confessions we have seen from other 
representatives of power (especially Formator and Darcy), Palmer “confesses” that he did 
not vote for Ellie to man the first space trip, because he didn’t want to lose her. In other 
words, he constructs himself as the sufferer. Palmer’s sudden disclosure of the “truth” 
doesn’t discredit him, but rather the opposite. His unexpected vulnerability compels us to 
accept as “truth” that he loves her and has (and had) her best interests at heart. The film’s 
logic coerces us along with Ellie into adopting Palmer’s view of reality. It suggests that 
Ellie’s ‘mannish’ rational worldview, which is epitomized most in her atheism, is holding 
her back from the complete human (really, female) experience. The logic of torture and 
confession seems to say that there must be a feminine soul somewhere inside of Ellie, 
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since she is, after all, biologically female—thus she must be suppressing it (since her 
father’s death) and it just needs to be coaxed out. 
Absurd as it may sound in the context of such a scientifically based film, which 
features such an empowered woman, the film misrecognizes that its actual crisis is that 
Ellie doesn’t have a boyfriend. The film’s logic of torture and confession operates 
through Palmer as both her spiritual counselor and her lover. As her ‘counselor,’ he 
represents psychiatric power in that his “treatment” of Ellie is really coercion. Ellie’s 
soul, however, which she did not know she even possessed until her confession, is 
exposed to be a female one. Not only is it suggested that it is flawed like Eve’s, but it is 
now “cured” and will remain so by Palmer’s management, since he will now be her 
“Father” who is also her lover. Further supporting this is that the closing scene leaves us 
with a more ‘feminized’ Ellie who is surrounded by children and who speaks to them 
with a newly inflected voice that is maternal. The mise-en-scene shows the large array 
(representing her science career) that is literally and figuratively behind her, since she is 
now less the female scientist in this scene than she is the maternal teacher. 
Another film that misrecognizes its disempowerment of its heroine is in Jonathan 
Demme’s The Silence of the Lambs (1991), in which Jodie Foster again plays the female 
lead. This popular film generated a cult-like following devoted to the entire series of 
films that feature the character Hannibal Lecter. Film critic Roger Ebert claims that “[t]he 
popularity of Jonathan Demme's movie is likely to last as long as there is a market for 
being scared. Like ‘Nosferatu,’ ‘Psycho’ and ‘Halloween,’ it illustrates that the best 
thrillers don't age.” While Ebert comments on his website that Clarice and Hannibal 
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Lecter (played by Anthony Hopkins) are very much alike, I believe that their difference, 
in terms of a power relation, overshadows any similarities they may share. Comparable to 
Contact, this film also coerces its female heroine into confessing. The question is, exactly 
what does she confess and when does she confess it? Indeed, this film’s logic of torture 
and confession functions differently than any of the eighteenth-century novels or the film 
Contact.  
The famous scene, in which Lecter offers to give Clarice advice on her case in 
exchange for her answering his questions (the quid pro quo scene), may appear to be an 
equal exchange; it may even appear that Clarice occupies the position of power, since she 
is clearly not the one who is the maximum security asylum inmate and, more 
significantly, since she volunteers to “confess” her childhood trauma to Lector in order to 
get information from him. In other words, it seems like she is manipulating him; she does 
what is necessary to get her job done, refusing to allow what can be viewed as female 
weakness to stop her from confronting the terrifying Lecter. My argument, however, is 
that Clarice’s “confession” is coerced by patriarchal power in order to expose her female 
vulnerability. Jack Crawford (Clarice’s boss), it could be argued, actually sends Clarice 
to Lecter because she is a woman and her inherent female vulnerability would most likely 
garner the information the FBI desires. Crawford’s role in Clarice’s disempowerment is 
misrecognized, however, as a sign of Crawford’s feminism—he gives Clarice the 
opportunity to prove herself in a man’s domain. Indeed, no other male is willing to play 
this quid pro quo game with Lecter—not in this film and not in its forerunner in terms of 
plotline. In fact, the criminal profiler Will Graham featured in the films Manhunter 
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(1986) and its remake Red Dragon (2002) refuses to share any personal information with 
Lecter no matter how many times he probes him for it. Moreover, the mental sickness 
that Will suffers from after solving serial killer murders (including the murders that 
Lecter himself committed) is more than just a sign of his vulnerability—a sign that marks 
him as a sensitive man even as he is a ruthless manhunter. These films make it clear that 
his illness also originates in his ability to think too similarly to Lecter and other serial 
killers. Indeed, in constructing Will as psychologically similar if not identical to Lecter, 
the film implies that Will is as brilliant and as rational as Lecter despite his mental 
sickness. In direct contrast to Will, Clarice readily confesses her trauma to Lecter. The 
actual exchange that occurs in the quid pro quo scene is one in which Clarice is coerced 
into exposing herself as vulnerable in return for the opportunity that Crawford provides 
for her.  
The film’s logic, as in Contact, ensures that viewers see a feminist film and why 
not? Clarice appears to handle Lecter and eventually catches the serial killer. The opening 
scene, in fact, attests to Clarice’s commitment to her job. It shows her running the FBI’s 
obstacle course, designed to accommodate a man’s body. Clarice’s endurance comes 
from the motivational sign posted on a tree half way through the course:  “Hurt Pain 
Agony Love It.” The film’s logic ensures viewers see that Clarice is willing to “torture” 
herself—i.e., do what it takes—to complete her assignment. What gets misrecognized, 
however, is that the film’s logic coerces Clarice into confessing her past traumatic 
experience in order to cast doubt on Clarice’s abilities, implying that her abilities may be 
compromised by an innate flaw. In other words, while this female flaw can be used to 
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patriarchal power’s advantage (not in the sense that she has access to Lecter, but that he 
has access to her), it also suggests that Clarice’s latent vulnerability can, if not now then 
at some future point, cause her to make a fatal mistake. Thus Clarice, while a 
‘manhunter’ or criminal profiler/investigator, is always already a victim because she is 
female. Indeed, she becomes the serial killer’s victim when her body is exposed to the 
killer’s gaze as he watches (through nightvision lenses) her vulnerable and 
hyperventilating body trip and stumble as she pathetically gropes her way around his 
house in absolute darkness. Clarice in this scene is the silent and panicked lamb about to 
be slaughtered. She shoots and kills the serial killer, but the film’s logic taints her 
achievement, because she seems more the victim than FBI agent. Crawford and his men 
are on their way, it seems, less as backup than as her rescuers. 
Similar to Hadden (and the male heroes of the novels), Lecter has godlike 
omniscience and can manipulate events outside of his asylum cell. He is also portrayed as 
rational despite his insanity, and in this sense, points back to the rational irrationalism of 
Theodore Wieland. Like Clara Wieland, Clarice’s own disempowerment through Lecter 
is misrecognized not only because the film foregrounds what it recognizes as a feminist 
film (at least as far as Clarice’s character is concerned) but also because of the 
sensational violence that the serial killer and his female victims provide. Indeed, Clara 
does not appear to be a victim in comparison to the horrific victimization these women 
are made to endure. 
Clara’s graduation from FBI training school at the end of the film suggests that 
the suffering she endured to solve the murders made her worthy to enter this man’s 
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domain. And indeed, her body does suffer, for she exposes it Lecter’s gaze who delves 
deeply into it (and who forces her to lewdly comment on it), to the gaze of the insane 
men whose cells she must pass on her way to Lecter’s, and to the serial killer’s gaze as a 
victim in his sights. Even when the crime is solved, Clarice remains the object of the 
escaped Lecter’s constant and omniscient gaze, confirmed by his phone call to her on her 
graduation. The film appears to end differently than the endings we have encountered 
thus far in the texts of this dissertation. Clarice is sworn in as an FBI agent. As a woman 
she has succeeded in what is traditionally a man’s field; she doesn’t marry, and she 
doesn’t become someone’s girlfriend . . . . . . or does she? Indeed, Lecter himself says of 
their relationship “People will say we are in love.” This film’s logic repeatedly coerces 
Clarice into displaying her vulnerability. Her “confession” to Lecter exposes an innate 
vulnerability that the rest of the film validates even as the film itself believes it is 
presenting viewers with a strong and competent woman. 
 
This dissertation’s introduction claimed that its subsequent chapters would 
demonstrate how the institution of patriarchy functions as disciplinary power in three 
eighteenth-century female bildungsromans. It said patriarchal power would draw on the 
logic of torture and confession to subtly and gradually coerce each heroine into 
confessing her inherent flaw. Amoranda of Mary Davys’s The Reform’d Coquet is this 
dissertation’s standard for what constitutes an early form of disciplinary power’s 
generation of a female subject that it foregrounds as always inherently flawed. Now that 
we have reached the point in this dissertation in which our perspective has greatly 
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widened, we can clearly see how both Elizabeth Bennet and Clara Wieland are much 
more similar to the heroine Amoranda than readers may have first suspected. Indeed, it 
seems as if two periods in history coalesce as Amoranda and Elizabeth Bennet confess 
their pride and vanity. The late eighteenth-century’s ostensibly revised and updated 
heroine is the same dominated female as her early eighteenth-century counterpart. Clara, 
given the loudest voice of all the heroines to speak her evolving ‘self,’ is also surprisingly 
comparable to Amoranda. Clara, as we have seen, was violently coerced by the forces of 
patriarchal power into confessing her hyper-sensibility, and she was also authored into a 
heroine (an object of art) of what is now termed “amatory fiction” by the end of 
Wieland—a genre, moreover, to which Amoranda herself belongs and which was 
ridiculed by late eighteenth-century culture. Most unexpected, as well as most 
disquieting, is that the contemporary heroines are more like the eighteenth-century 
heroines than anyone could have foreseen, since they are also coerced into disclosing 
their inherent flaws. As a viewer, I walk away from these two films not thinking about 
Ellie’s scientific genius or about Clarice’s courage and skills as an FBI agent. Indeed, I 
find myself thinking about Ellie’s “confession” that she may have hallucinated her entire 
experience (just as I think about Clara Wieland), and my mind’s eye always returns to 
Clarice’s attempt and failure to rescue the lambs as well as her groping around in the dark 
as the serial killer has her in his sights. Her absolute vulnerability reminds me of Clara 
Wieland and Amoranda. To distinguish their flaws (not their “cures” or self-realization) 
is what I have claimed is the goal of these films’ and the novels’ logic.  
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What also becomes apparent from our broader perspective is that each of these 
heroines (old and new) occupies a liminal place—a place of transition in which they are 
not in their fathers’ keeping nor are they in their husbands’ charge. Contact and Silence of 
the Lambs hide this fact better than any of the eighteenth-century novels, but it is 
remarkably still there. It is evident our patriarchal culture has a deep-seated and durable 
anxiety about women who postpone—seemingly lacking desire for—a heterosexual 
relationship. There is also something more that we saw:  each of these heroines was an 
exceptional woman for her time—each was independent, intelligent, rational and resisted 
gendered norms by adopting or practicing what were/are traditionally masculine 
activities. The eighteenth-century heroines were empowered women, embodying female 
possibility during watershed moments in history. The contemporary heroines represent 
the feminist advances made by our culture. These heroines’ agency, combined with the 
transitional phase in which they resided, constituted a force of female power that our 
patriarchal culture apparently found very uncomfortable. Consequently, it ousted them 
from their empowered positions through a regime of “torture” until they confessed their 
inherent female flaws. This “torture” amounted to a program of corporeality, in which 
power repeatedly disturbed, threatened, shamed, or dis-eased their bodies until they 
“confessed” the flaws that power itself produced through its coercive tactics.  Also 
unsettling is the fact that the agency I claimed these heroines had (at each novel’s/film’s 
beginning) suggests that their respective authors recognized how their cultural system 
operates and perhaps believed they were resisting patriarchal culture through their texts. 
192 
 
Yet, they misrecognized how this new form of power strategically co-opted their texts to 
serve its own purposes—to individuate these women as a priori flawed women.  
The issue, to which I now return as I bring this dissertation to its close, is that of 
the feminist project of recuperation and its foregrounding of female agency in these 
narratives. I hope the argument that this dissertation presented has also made readers 
recognize that our celebration of female agency in these texts may reproduce masculine 
domination. Indeed, my dissertation project has changed my own viewpoint. I now 
believe that critical works that celebrate any kind of female agency in these texts—
whether through a subtext, a subversive middle, a repressed text, or one that fulfills the 
expectations of the genre itself—function to obscure the continued masculine domination 
of women that these texts very subtly reproduce. When I noticed the discourse of torture 
and confession’s appearance in eighteenth-century novels, it distressed me. But, when I 
noticed its appearance in contemporary films (and still continue to), it unsettled me to the 
point where I knew I had to make it the subject of my dissertation. I felt the exigency of 
informing other feminist scholars who care about social justice. Indeed, over two 
centuries have passed since the novels that this dissertation examines have been written, 
and I am still waiting for a legitimate instance of a female heroine’s self-defining 
moment.2
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Notes to Epilogue 
                                                 
1 A twenty-first century film that I recently viewed on DVD and whose discourse is that of torture and 
confession is Darren Aronofsky’s Black Swan (2010). Similar to the way in which Clara Wieland is 
tortured into madness and an objet d’art, this film also “tortures” its female heroine Nina (played by 
Natalie Portman) into madness and pure aestheticism. While the film’s logic points to Nina’s mother and 
Nina’s childhood as the source of her growing madness (it assigns a mad “family body” to Nina using her 
biographical history), I would argue that the origin of Nina’s progressive insanity and transformation into 
art is the ballet company’s director and choreographer Thomas Leroy (played by Vincent Cassel). He 
functions as the coercive force of patriarchy in this film, and his constant and omniscient gaze of Nina—
particularly of her body—is ultimately what produces her madness and death—a death that renders her pure 
art.  
2 One film seems promising in delivering the moment I’ve been waiting for. Tim Burton’s Alice in 
Wonderland (2010) comes very close to providing a truly self-defining moment for its heroine. By the end 
of the film, Alice chooses not to marry and to run her father’s company instead. Indeed, her experience in 
Wonderland I view as a lesbian fantasy, in which Alice fights heroically on behalf of the White Queen. Her 
transformation in Wonderland is what enables her to assert herself upon her return to the ‘real’ world. 
However, the film has several problems. The first is that Alice is subjected to a repetition of violence in 
Wonderland itself. It’s as if the film is torturing her into what it sees as her new masculine lesbian role. 
Then, upon Alice’s return to the ‘real’ world, the film dresses her in man’s attire, when she takes official 
charge of her father’s company. The film seems to push a view that says if a woman deliberately chooses a 
career over heterosexual marriage, then the decision she makes is by nature a ‘masculine’ decision – 
something out of the ordinary for women, and so it requires the attire of men. But it also suggests that a 
woman who opts out of a heterosexual marriage must be a lesbian. Lastly, the film implies that a woman 
has to choose between marriage and a career – that they are mutually exclusive decisions. Honestly, it 
always surprises me when I hear young women claim we live in a post-feminist world.  
 
 194 
 
Works Cited 
Abel, Elizabeth, Marianne Hirsch, and Elizabeth Langland, eds. The Voyage In: Fictions 
of Female Development. Hanover: UP of New England, 1983. Print. 
Adler, Barbara Laughlin. “A disagreement between us”: Gendered Argument in Austen’s 
Novels.” Persuasions 24 (2002): 164-176. Print. 
Armstrong, Nancy. Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel. New 
York: Oxford UP, 1987. Print. 
Austen, Jane. Pride and Prejudice. Ed. James Kinsley. New York: Oxford UP, 2004. 
Print. 
Backscheider, Paula R. and John J. Richetti. eds. “Introduction.” Popular Fiction by 
Women, 1660-1730: An Anthology. New York: Oxford UP, 1996. Print. 
Backscheider, Paula R. “The Rise of Gender as a Political Category.” Revising Women: 
Eighteenth-Century “Women’s Fiction” and Social Engagement. Ed. Paula R. 
Backscheider. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins UP, 2000. Print. 
Ballaster, Ros. “Women and the rise of the novel: sexual prescripts.” Women and 
Literature in Britain, 1700-1800. Ed. Vivien Jones. New York: Cambridge UP, 
2000. Print. 
Barker-Benfield, G. J. The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992. Print 
Barney, Richard A. Plots of Enlightenment: Education and the Novel in Eighteenth-
Century England. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. Print. 
 195 
 
Baym, Nina. Woman’s Fiction: A Guide to Novels by and about Women in America, 
1820-1870. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1978. Print. 
Behn, Aphra. “The Fair Jilt.” Oroonoko, and Other Writings. New York: Oxford UP, 
1998. 74-119. Print. 
Bell, Michael Davitt. “‘The Double-Tongued Deceiver’”: Sincerity and Duplicity in the 
Novels of Charles Brockden Brown. Early American Literature 9.2 (1974): 143-
163. JSTOR. Web. 12 Dec. 2011. 
Bender, John. Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and the Architecture of Mind in 
Eighteenth-Century England. Chicago and London: The U of Chicago P, 1987. 
Print. 
Black Swan. Screenplay by Mark Heyman, Andres Heinz, and John McLaughlin. Dir. 
Darren Aronofsky. 2010. Fox Searchlight, 2010. DVD. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Ed. John B. Thompson. Trans. Gino 
Raymond and Matthew Adamson. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991. Print. 
- - -. Masculine Domination. Trans. Richard Nice. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001. 
- - - . Outline of a Theory of Practice. Trans. Richard Nice. New York: Cambridge UP, 
1977. 
Bredahl, Jr. A. Carl. “Transformation in Wieland.” Early American Literature 12.2 
(1997): 177-192. JSTOR. Web. 26 Sept. 2010. 
Brown, Charles Brockden. Wieland; and Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist. 1798; 1803-
1805. New York: Penguin, 1991. Print. 
 196 
 
Brown, Lloyd W. “Letters in Pride and Prejudice.” Readings on Pride and Prejudice. Ed. 
Clarice Swisher. San Diego: Greenhaven, 1999. Print. 
Brownstein, Rachel M. “Northanger Abbey, Sense and Sensibility, Pride and Prejudice.” 
Cambridge Companions Online. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Web. 9 April 
2009. 
Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and 
Beautiful. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. Print. 
Butte, George. I Know That You Know That I Know: Narrating Subjects from Moll 
Flanders to Marnie. Columbus: The Ohio State UP, 2004. Print. 
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. Biographia Literaria. Vol. 1. Transcribed by R. N. Robinson 
from the 1907 Oxford ed. London: Electric Book, 2001. eBrary Academic 
Collection. Web. 19 Jul. 2011. 
Contact. Novel and Story by Carl Sagan. Screenplay by James V. Hart and Michael 
Goldenberg. Dir. Robert Zemeckis. 1997. Warner, 2009. DVD. 
“coup de grace.” Def. 5.e Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. Oxford English 
Dictionary. Web. 3 Aug. 2011.  
Davys, Mary. The Reform’d Coquet, or, Memoirs of Amoranda; Familiar Letters Betwixt 
a Gentleman and a Lady; and, The Accomplish’d Rake, or Modern Fine 
Gentleman. Ed. Martha F. Bowden. Lexington: The UP of Kentucky, 1999. Print. 
Donovan, Josephine. Women and the Rise of the Novel, 1405-1726. New York: St. 
Martin’s, 1999. Print. 
 197 
 
Doody, Margaret. “George Eliot and the Eighteenth-Century Novel.” Nineteenth-Century 
Fiction 35.3 (1980) 260-91. JSTOR. Web. 2 April 2011. 
DuBois, Page. Torture and Truth. New York: Routledge, 1991. Print. 
Ebert, Roger. “The Silence of the Lambs (1991).” rogerebert.com.18 Feb. 2001. Web. 25 
Jul. 2011. 
Ellis, Lorna. Appearing to Diminish: Female Development and the British 
Bildungsroman, 1750–1850. Cranbury: Associated UPs, 1999. Print. 
Fliegelman, Jay. Introduction. Wieland; and Memoirs of Carwin the Biloquist. By Charles 
Brockden Brown. 1798; 1803-1805. New York: Penguin, 1991. Print. 
Foucault, Michel. Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France, 1974-1975. Trans. 
Graham Burchell. Ed. Arnold I. Davidson. New York: Picador, 2003. Print. 
- - -. Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 2nd ed. New 
York: Vintage, 1995. Print. 
- - -. The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New 
York: Vintage, 1978. Print. 
- - -. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. Trans. 
Richard Howard. New York: Vintage, 1988. Print. 
- - -. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Trans. 
Colin Gordon. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980. Print. 
- - -. Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the College de France, 1973-1974. Trans. Graham 
Burchell. Ed. Arnold I. Davidson. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Print. 
 198 
 
Fraiman, Susan. Unbecoming Women: British Women Writers and the Novel of 
Development. New York: Columbia UP, 1993. Print. 
Franklin, Wayne. “Tragedy and Comedy in Brown’s Wieland.” NOVEL: A Forum on 
Fiction. 8.2 (1975): 147-163. JSTOR. Web. 19 May 2011. 
Galluzzo, Anthony. Charles Brockden Brown’s Wieland and the Aesthetics of Terror: 
Revolution, Reaction, and the Radical Enlightenment in Early American Letters.” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 42.2 (2009): 255-271. Project MUSE. Web. 2 Dec. 
2011. 
Gaskill, Malcolm. Witchfinders: A Seventeenth-Century English Tragedy. Cambridge: 
Harvard UP, 2005. Print. 
Gilbert, Sandra M. and Susan Gubar. The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman Writer 
and the Nineteenth-Century Imagination. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale UP, 2000. 
Print. 
Gilmore, Michael T. “Calvinism and Gothicism: The Example of Brown’s Wieland. 
Studies in the Novel 9 (summer 1977): 107-18. Print. 
Godbeer, Richard. The Devil’s Dominion: Magic and Religion in Early New England. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2992. Print. 
Gordon, Scott Paul. The Practice of Quixotism: Postmodern Theory and Eighteenth-
Century Women’s Writing. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Print. 
Gorman, Anita G. The Body in Illness and Health: Themes and Images in Jane Austen. 
New York: P. Lang, 1993. Print. 
 199 
 
Grabo, Norman S. The Coincidental Art of Charles Brockden Brown. Chapel Hill: The U 
of North Carolina P, 1981. Print. 
Hinds, Elizabeth Jane Wall. Private Property: Charles Brockden Brown’s Gendered 
Economics of Virtue. Cranbury: Associated UPs, 1997. Print. 
Hinnant, Charles H. “Jane Austen’s ‘Wild Imagination’: Romance and Courtship Plot in 
the Six Canonical Novels.” Narrative 14.3 (2006) 294-310. Project Muse. Web. 9 
July 2010. 
Institoris, Henrich. Malleus maleficarum, translated with an introduction, bibliography 
and notes by the Rev. Montague Summers. London: J. Rodker, 1928. Print. 
Jackson, Louise. “Witches, Wives and Mothers: Witchcraft Persecution and Women’s 
Confessions in Seventeenth-Century England.” Women’s History Review. 4.1 
(1995): 63-84. Print. 
Jeffers, Thomas L. Apprenticeshps: The Bildungsroman from Goethe to Santayana. 
Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. eBrary Academic Collection. Web. 12 
Jul. 2011. 
Johnson, Claudia L. Equivocal Beings: Politcs, Gender, and Sentimentality in the 1790s: 
Wollstonecraft, Radcliffe, Burney, Austen. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995. Print. 
Kafer, Peter. Charles Brockden Brown’s Revolution and the Birth of the American 
Gothic. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2004. Print. 
Karlsen, Carol F. The Devil in the Shape of a Woman: Witchcraft in Colonial New 
England.  New York: Norton, 1987. Print. 
 200 
 
Korobkin, Laura H. “Murder by Madman: Criminal Responsibility, Law, and Judgment 
in Wieland.” American Literature 72.4 (2000): 721-50. Project MUSE. Web. 12 
Feb. 2011. 
Lea, Henry Charles. A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages. Vol. 1. London: 
Macmillan, 1922. Print. 
Levack, Brian P. The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe. London and New York: 
Longman, 1987. Print. 
Levy, Ariel. Female Chauvinist Pigs: Women and the Rise of Raunch Culture. New 
York: Free Press, 2005. 
Liman, John. “The Shame of Abu Ghraib.” Critical Inquiry 33.3 (2007) 543-72. JSTOR. 
Web. 3 Apr. 2008. 
Manly, William M. “The Importance of Point of View in Brockden Brown’s Wieland.” 
American Literature. 35.3 (1963): 311-321. JSTOR. Web. 2 Dec. 2010. 
Mellor, Anne K. “A Novel of Their Own: Romantic Women’s Fiction, 1790-1830.” The 
Columbia History of the British Novel. Ed. John Richetti. New York: Columbia U 
P, 1994. Print. 
- - -. Romanticism & Gender. New York: Routledge, 1993. Print. 
Michaelson, Patricia Howell. Speaking Volumes: Women, Reading, and Speech in the 
Age of Austen. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. Print. 
Miller, Nancy K. The Heroine’s Text: Readings in the French and English Novel, 1722-
1782. New York: Columbia UP, 1980. Print. 
 201 
 
Morgan, Susan. Sisters in Time: Imagining Gender in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction. 
New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989. Print. 
“mortification.” Def. I.1 Oxford English Dictionary. 3rd ed. 2002. Oxford English 
Dictionary. Web. 3 Aug. 2011.  
O’Farrell, Mary Ann. “Austen’s Blush.” NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 27.2 (1994): 125-
139. JSTOR. Web. 3 Apr. 2008. 
O’Farrell, Mary Ann. Introduction. Telling Complexions: The Nineteenth-Century 
English Novel and the Blush. Durham and London: Duke UP, 1997. Print. 
O’Shaughnessy, Toni. “‘An Imperfect Tale’”: Interpretive Accountability in Wieland.” 
Studies in American Fiction 18 (1990): 41-54. Print. 
Poovey, Mary. The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works 
of Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen. Chicago and London: 
The U of Chicago P, 1984. Print. 
Pope, Alexander. The Rape of the Lock. Ed. Cynthia Wall. Boston: Bedford, 1998. Print. 
Potter, Tiffany. “Decorous Disruption: The Cultural Voice of Mary Davys.” Eighteenth 
Century Women 1 (June 2001): 63-93. Print. 
Potter, Tiffany. “Genre and Cultural Disruption: Libertinism and the Early English 
Novel.” ESC 29.1-2 (2003): 171-96. Print. 
Rabine, Leslie W. Reading the Romantic Heroine: Text, History, Ideology. Ann Arbor: U 
of Michigan P, 1985. Print. 
Radcliffe, Ann. “On the Supernatural in Poetry.” New Monthly Magazine 16.1 (1826): 
145-152.  
 202 
 
Rich, Adrienne. On Lies, Secrets, and Silence. New York: Norton, 1979. Print. 
Richardson, Samuel. Clarissa or The History of a Young Lady. 1747-48. London: 
Penguin, 1985. Print. 
Regaignon, Dara Rossman. “Pemberley vs. the Purple Jar: Prudence, Pleasure, and 
Narrative Strategy.” Women’s Writing 11.3 (2004): 439-62. RU-Online. Web. 7 
July 2010. 
Ross, Christine. “Logic, Rhetoric, and Discourse in the Literary Texts of Nineteenth-
Century Women.” Rhetoric Society Quarterly 32.2 (2002): 85-109. JSTOR. 
Web.7 Oct. 2010. 
Russo, James R. “‘The Chimeras of the Brain’”: Clara’s Narrative in Wieland. Early 
American Literature 16.1 (1981): 60-88. JSTOR. Web. 2 Dec. 2010. 
Saje, Natasha. “‘The Assurance to Write, The Vanity of Expecting to be Read’”: 
Deception and Reform in Mary Davys’s The Reform’d Coquet.” Essays in 
Literature 23 (Fall 1996): 165-77. Print. 
Samuels, Shirley. “Wieland: Alien and Infidel.” Early American Literature 25.2 (1990): 
46-66. JSTOR. Web. 19 May 2011. 
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. New York: 
Oxford UP, 1985. Print. 
Scheiber, Andrew J. “‘The Arm Lifted Against Me’”: Love, Terror, and the Construction 
of Gender in Wieland. Early American Literature 26.2 (1991): 173-194. JSTOR. 
Web. 2 Dec. 2010. 
 203 
 
Shofield, Mary Anne. Masking and Unmasking the Female Mind: Disguising Romances 
in Feminine Fiction, 1713-1799. Newark: U of Delaware P, 1990. Print. 
Shuffelton, Frank. “Juries of the Common Reader: Crime and Judgment in the Novels of 
Charles Brockden Brown.” Revising Charles Brockden Brown: Culture, Politics, 
and Sexuality in the Early Republic. Eds. Philip Barnard, Mark L. Kamrath, and 
Stephen Shapiro. Knoxville: The U of Tennessee P, 2004. Print. 
The Silence of the Lambs. Novel by Thomas Harris. Screenplay Ted Tally. Dir. Jonathan 
Demme. 1991. MGM, 2001. DVD. 
Silverman, Lisa. Tortured Subjects: Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France. 
Chicago: The U of Chicago P, 2001. Print. 
Southward, David. “Jane Austen and the Riches of Embarrassment.” Studies in English 
Literature, 1500-1900 36.4 (1996): 763-84. JSTOR. Web. 1 Apr. 2008. 
Spacks, Patricia Meyer. Novel Beginnings: Experiments in Eighteenth-Century English 
Fiction. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2006. Print. 
Spanos, Nicholas. “Witchcraft in Histories of Psychiatry: A Critical Analysis and an 
Alternative Conceptualization. Psychological Bulletin. 85.2 (1978): 417-39. APA 
PsycInfo. Web. 1 Jul. 2007. 
Spencer, Jane. The Rise of the Woman Novelist: From Aphra Behn to Jane Austen. 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Print. 
Stafford, Fiona. Introduction. Pride and Prejudice. By Jane Austen. Ed. James Kinsley. 
Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004. vii-xl. 
 204 
 
Sutherland, Kathryn. “Jane Austen and the Invention of the Serious Modern Novel.” 
Cambridge Companions Online. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. Web. 9 April 
2009. 
Tave, Stuart M. Some Words of Jane Austen. Chicago and London: The U of Chicago P, 
1973. Print. 
Thompson, Helen. Ingenuous Subjection: Compliance and Power in the Eighteenth-
Century Domestic Novel. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 2005. Print. 
Todd, Janet. The Cambridge Introduction to Jane Austen. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2006. Print. 
Tompkins, Jane. Sensational Designs. New York: Oxford UP, 1985. Print. 
“vexation.” Def. 5 Oxford English Dictionary. 2nd ed. 1989. Oxford English Dictionary. 
Web. 3 Aug. 2011.  
Verhoeven, W. M. “‘This blissful period of intellectual liberty’: Transatlantic Radicalism 
and Enlightened Conservatism in Brown’s Early Writings.” Revising Charles 
Brockden Brown: Culture, Politics, and Sexuality in the Early Republic. Eds. 
Philip Barnard, Mark L. Kamrath, and Stephen Shapiro. Knoxville: The U of 
Tennessee P, 2004. Print. 
Waldron, Mary. Introduction. Jane Austen and the Fiction of her Time. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1999. Print. 
Watt, Ian. The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding. Berkley and 
Los Angeles: U of California P, 1957. Print. 
 205 
 
Watts, Steven. The Romance of Real Life: Charles Brockden Brown and the Origins of 
American Culture. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1994. Print. 
Williams, Anne. Art of Darkness: A Poetics of the Gothic. Chicago and London: The U 
of Chicago P, 1995. Print. 
Williamson, Marilyn L. Raising Their Voices, 1650-1750. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 
1990. Print. 
Wollstonecraft, Mary. A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: with Strictures on Political 
and Moral Subjects. By Mary Wollstonecraft. London: J. Johnson, 1792. ECCO. 
Web. 7 Jul. 2011. 
Young, Kay. “Feeling Embodied: Consciousness, Persuasion, and Jane Austen.” 
Narrative 11.1 (2003): 78-92. JSTOR. Web. 7 Oct. 2010. 
Ziff, Larzer. “A Reading of Wieland.” PMLA 77.1 (1962): 51-57. JSTOR. Web. 19 May 
2011. 
206 
 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
OF RITA J. KURTZ 
 
 
EDUCATION: 
 
Ph.D., English, Lehigh University, September 2011 
Master of Arts, English, Lehigh University, May 2003 
Bachelor of Arts, English, Ursinus College, May 2000 
Associate in General Studies, Montgomery County Community College, May 1996 
 
 
DISSERTATION: 
 
Misrecognizing Women: Eighteenth-Century Female Bildungsromans 
and the Logic of Torture and Confession 
 
 
COMPREHENSIVE EXAMS: 
 
Primary Area:  Eighteenth-Century British and Antebellum American Literature 
Secondary Area:  Composition and Rhetoric 
 
 
HONORS: 
 
 Awarded one of two Molin Prizes for best graduate student paper presented at the 
2009 EC-ASECS Conference 
 Awarded Lawrence Henry Gipson Institute for Eighteenth Century Studies 
Dissertation Fellowship (2007-08) 
 Awarded College of Arts and Sciences Summer Dissertation Fellowship (2007) 
 Comprehensive Exams (2006) “Passed with Distinction” in both Primary and 
Secondary Areas 
 Graduated Summa Cum Laude (2000) 
 Elected and Inducted into Alpha Sigma Lamda National Honor Society (2000) 
 Elected to Who’s Who Among Students in American Junior Colleges (1996) 
 Elaine and Herman Blumenthal Award for Outstanding Academic Achievement 
(1996) 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS: 
 
R. J. Kurtz and J. L. Womer. “The Novel as Political Marker: Women Writers and their 
Female Audiences in the Hookham and Carpenter Archives, 1791–1798.” Romantic 
Textualities: Literature and Print Culture, 1780–1840 [ISSN 1748-0116] 13 (Winter 
2004): 47-65. 
 
  
207 
 
Curriculum Vitae of Rita J. Kurtz 
Page 2 
 
 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE: 
 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA: 
(2010-2011) Senior Teaching Fellowship (Composition & Literature I and II) 
 
Penn State Abington, Abington, PA: 
(August 2008 to May 2010) Full-time temporary faculty position with the opportunity to 
design and teach 400 level English courses and Honors Rhetoric & Composition. 
 
Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA: 
(2006-2007) Senior Teaching Fellowship :  designed and taught to undergraduates a 
British and American Gothic Literature course entitled, A ‘Portrait’ of the Gothic and the 
'Gothic’ of the Portrait, in which the class explored a range of slippery and intriguing 
issues that revolved around the prevalent theme of portraiture in gothic texts, including 
identity anxiety, incest, narcissism, immortality, mortality, memory, history, paranoia, 
and surveillance.  
(2005-2006) Teaching Fellowship (Composition & Literature I and II) 
(2004-2005) Teaching Fellowship (Composition & Literature I and II) 
(2003-2004) Teaching Fellowship (Composition & Literature I and II) 
(2002-2003) Teaching Fellowship (Composition & Literature I and II) 
(2001-2002) Teaching Fellowship (Composition & Literature I and II) 
 
 
SCHOLARLY PRESENTATIONS: 
 
October 9, 2009: 
East Central American Society for Eighteenth Century Studies Conference 
Presented dissertation chapter entitled, “Diseasing Amoranda’s Body:  The Logic of 
Torture-Punishment and Confession in Mary Davys’s The Reformed Coquet.” 
 
November 24, 2004: 
British Association for Romantic Studies, Romantic Textuality 1770-1835 
Interdisciplinary Post-Graduate Conference 
Co-authored and presented a paper entitled, The Novel as Political Marker: Women 
Writers and their Female Audiences in the Hookham and Carpenter Archives, 1791-1798 
 
October 23, 2004: 
East-Central/American Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies Conference 
Co-authored and presented a paper entitled, The Novel as Political Marker: Women 
Writers and their Female Audiences in the Hookham and Carpenter Archives, 1791-1798 
 
  
208 
 
April 3, 2004: 
Mid-Atlantic American Studies Association Spring 2004 Conference 
Presented a paper entitled, Survivor as Simulacrum: Rejuvenating the “Real” through 
Images of American Exceptionalism and British Imperialism 
 
March 22, 2003: 
Eleventh Annual 18th and 19th Century British Women Writers Conference 
Presented a paper entitled, “Multum in Parvo”: Felicia Hemans’s Verbal Miniatures and 
Female Identity in Records of Woman 
 
 
REFERENCES: 
 
Scott Gordon, Professor of English, Lehigh University, 35 Sayre Drive, Drown Hall, 
Bethlehem, PA 18015; 610-758-3320; spg4@lehigh.edu 
 
Dawn Keetley, Associate Professor of English, Lehigh University, 35 Sayre Drive, 
Drown Hall, Bethlehem, PA 18015; 610-758-5926; dek7@lehigh.edu 
 
Barry Kroll, Professor of English, Lehigh University, 35 Sayre Drive, Drown Hall, 
Bethlehem, PA 18015; 610-758-5624; bmk3@lehigh.edu 
 
Ellen Knodt, Professor of English, Penn State Abington, 1600 Woodland Road, 
Sutherland Building, Abington, PA 19001; 215-881-7385; eak1@psu.edu 
 
